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This dissertation analyzes how institutions change, particularly how institutions go in and out of 
equilibrium; it proposes a dynamic account of institutional change by examining the endogenous 
and exogenous factors that change the preferences of players and the distributional implications 
of (renegotiated) institutional outcomes. The EU budgetary negotiations provide a compelling 
case for institutional change in the EU.  
Motto: 
“Disequilibrium, or the potential that the status quo be upset, is the characteristic feature 
of politics…What prevents purely random embodiments of tastes is the fact that decisions 
are customarily made within the framework of known rules, which are what we 
commonly call institutions.” (Riker 1980, 443) 
 
 
THE DYNAMICS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
AND THE CASE OF THE EU BUDGETARY NEGOTIATIONS  
Dana Adriana Puia, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2010
 
 
 v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1.0 INTRODUCTION - A RATIONAL CHOICE HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONAL 
APPROACH OF THE DYNAMICS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE................................. 1 
2.0 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
FOR A THEORY OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE ............................................................... 9 
2.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF INSTITUTIONS 9 
2.2 THE PUZZLE OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE.......................................... 17 
2.3 INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE EU ..................................................... 28 
2.4 A THEORETICAL MODEL OF CHANGE .................................................. 31 
2.5 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH ............................................................. 36 
2.5.1 A Formal Model of Institutions-as-Equilibria ............................................ 36 
2.5.2 Analytical Narratives .................................................................................... 47 
3.0 THE EU BUDGET AS A CASE STUDY FOR INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE ... 51 
3.1 THE CHOICE OF THE EU BUDGET AS A CASE STUDY ....................... 51 
3.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE EU BUDGETARY PROCEDURE ...................... 59 
3.3 DYNAMIC CHANGE IN THE EU BUDGET ................................................ 72 
4.0 FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK NEGOTIATIONS – AN ANALYTICAL 
NARRATIVE .............................................................................................................................. 90 
 vi 
4.1 THE EMBEDDED FRAMEWORK OF THE FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK 
NEGOTIATIONS ............................................................................................................... 90 
4.2 A DYNAMIC APPROACH TO PREFERENCES ......................................... 96 
4.3 NEGOTIATIONS ON THE 2000-2006 FF AND 2007-2013 FF ................. 109 
4.3.1 Negotiations on the 2000-2006 FF, an Analytical Narrative (shadow case) .  
  ....................................................................................................................... 109 
4.3.2 Negotiations on the 2007-2013 FF, an Analytical Narrative .................... 114 
5.0 NEGOTIATIONS ON THE EU ANNUAL BUDGET – AN ANALYTICAL 
NARRATIVE ............................................................................................................................ 123 
5.1 THE EMBEDDED FRAMEWORK FOR EU BUDGETARY 
NEGOTIATIONS ............................................................................................................. 123 
5.2 NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE 2008 EU ANNUAL BUDGET AND THE 
EMPIRICAL TEST .......................................................................................................... 130 
6.0 CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER IMPLICATIONS ......................................... 138 
6.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ........................................................................... 138 
6.2 CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE ................................................ 141 
6.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR SUBSEQUENT FF NEGOTIATIONS ................. 144 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................... 150 
 vii 
 LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1. Country saliences and positions for the 2007-13 FF negotiations   ................................ 108
Table 2. Potential exchanges of positions 1999   .......................................................................... 112
Table 3. Potential exchanges of positions 2004-2005   ................................................................ 117
 viii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Dynamic institutional change in EU budgetary negotiations   ........................................ 87
Figure 2. Positions and exchanges in the 2007-13 FF negotiations   ............................................ 109
Figure 3. Spatial representation of the annual budgetary game   .................................................. 126
Figure 4. The Extensive form of the game   ................................................................................. 127
 
 
 
 
 1 
1.0  INTRODUCTION - A RATIONAL CHOICE HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONAL 
APPROACH OF THE DYNAMICS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE  
Change is the driver of progress; the history of mankind is evidence of the fact that change 
means evolution. However, time and time again established patterns have proven resistant to 
change. Hence the perennial question: why and how does change come about?  
Since political science scholars have been long studying the evolution of political entities 
and the role of the institutions of government, the preoccupation with why and how stable 
structures develop and change has grown naturally. Reinvigorated by the new institutionalism, 
the study of the emergence, growth and breakdown of institutions has been a constant 
preoccupation in the last three decades. In spite of this sustained interest, most institutionalist 
literature has not reached a full understanding of the complex mechanisms that trigger and 
sustain change. 
The creation and expansion of the European Union (EU) is a landmark in modern 
political development. The density of institutions in the EU and especially the rate at which new 
institutions are created make the EU the most pertinent field for studying institutional change. 
The legitimacy of such a project is justified by the fact that scholars studying the EU have come 
to agree that, in spite of the EU's unique features, there are general underlying political processes 
that explain European integration. In addition, the uncertainty of the EU institutional equilibrium 
is one of the central puzzles in terms of institutional change. While EU institutions are the 
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product of political bargaining, depending on the theoretical approach, they could be viewed 
either as a stable equilibrium resulting from recent treaty negotiations or as a disequilibrium 
caused by recent exogenous factors – i.e. enlargement or economic crises – accompanied by 
failure to reform the EU institutions consequently. 
This dissertation attempts to solve the puzzle of EU institutional equilibrium. The model 
proposed gains explanatory power by adding a game theoretical component that can deductively 
investigate the outcomes – the equilibria – of political bargaining at EU level. Given that general 
underlying political processes are at work in the EU, the answer to the puzzle of institutional 
change applies not only to the EU but also to political outcomes in general, thus satisfying the 
quest for generalizations in political science. 
In the second chapter, I first review the institutionalist literature in order to identify the 
main frameworks and theoretical perspectives that deal with institutional change. Then I draw on 
what I believe is an incomplete conceptual framework that reduces the explanatory power of the 
theories on institutional change. I propose a rational choice historical institutional approach that 
revisits some mechanisms of change proposed by the literature, builds a formal theoretical model 
and tests the model empirically using analytical narratives. In chapter 3, the theoretical model is 
applied to the EU budget and enriched by the particular specifications of this case. 
This dissertation proposes a dynamic approach to institutional change; the underlying 
theory on why and how institutions change is that both exogenous and endogenous factors 
contribute to changes in both preferences and the distributional implications of (older) 
institutional equilibria; these changes, that happen gradually, lead to an inconsistency between 
preferences and benefits obtained from past agreements. The players whose benefits are no 
longer advantageous will push for a renegotiation of the institutional arrangement that is no 
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longer in equilibrium. Thus the mechanism through which institutional change comes about is 
renegotiation of institutional arrangements that are no longer in equilibrium; renegotiation is 
realized through issue-linkages that the most powerful players use to obtain an outcome as close 
as possible to their preferences. Of the independent variables, the exogenous factors are of 
economic nature – a difference in the degrees of economic development – and also political – an 
increase in the number of players (enlargement in the EU context). Of the endogenous processes 
identified in the literature, my theory builds on the processes of learning – awareness of a change 
in preferences and benefits – and reinforcement of institutions that are part of an older 
institutional equilibrium but have the potential to restore/increase distributional benefits for the 
disadvantaged players. 
Of the various institutionalist approaches, rational choice historical institutionalism 
represents the best analytical framework for a dynamic approach to preferences and institutional 
change. In this dissertation, preferences are not taken as fixed and exogenous, like in standard 
game theoretic models and, unlike in historical institutional approaches, institutions are 
equilibria that change every time their distributional benefits are renegotiated. This dissertation 
thus compensates for the weaknesses of both rational choice and historical institutionalism, 
which suffer from too much or too little change, respectively; it addresses the main weakness of 
game theoretic models by introducing a dynamic perspective on bargaining games. 
Unlike in historical institutional accounts, both incremental and radical changes are 
possible. On the one hand, dramatic changes happen as a result of renegotiation of the 
institutional agreements, therefore they occur from one equilibrium outcome to another. If the 
institutional agreement does not contain a renegotiation clause, foreseen by the designers, 
renegotiation will occur when the disadvantaged players will push for it in order to restore their 
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benefits. On the other hand, incremental change happens in between the big bargaining moments, 
and affects both preferences and the distributional benefits deriving from the institutional 
agreement. 
The main emphasis in this dissertation is on institutions-as-equilibria that are negotiated 
by political actors. Change occurs when institutions go out of equilibrium (incremental change) 
and when a new equilibrium is found (radical change). Institutions-as-constraints feature in my 
approach but are not central to the argument; they define the rules of the game – i.e. the 
bargaining rules – that govern the interactions between the goal-oriented players.  
Like in any rational choice approach, actors are assumed to be rational, acting based on 
their preferences over outcomes; they choose strategies that best satisfy their interests and their 
overall goal is to obtain an agreement as close as possible to their own preferences. The actors 
are considered unitary because they aggregate the preferences of their members and act as one 
single entity. From this point of view, the individuals that represent states or organizations are 
the agents that carry the interests of the respective unitary actors. Given that the 'two-level 
games' literature argues that politicians behave strategically on the international scene because of 
domestic constraints, I take domestic constraints into account but I do not model them explicitly 
because they are conceived as being incorporated into actors’ preferences: the interest in an 
international agreement is defined by each country's desire to maximize benefits in the respective 
field.  
Two distinct dynamic processes interact with agency and structure in this dissertation. On 
the one hand, preferences are modeled dynamically in order to identify endogenous and 
exogenous factors and changes in distributional benefits. On the other hand, the processes of 
(re)negotiation are modeled using the tools of game theory. The preferences of players reflect 
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what actors want – which is their most preferred outcome.  The goal of every player is to obtain 
an outcome as close as possible to her ideal position: “member governments grappled with their 
desire to reach agreement, on the one hand, and with their determination that the terms of the 
agreement be as favorable as possible to their own viewpoint, on the other hand.” (Laffan and 
Lindner 2005, 200)  
This dissertation challenges standard rational choice models that assume preferences as 
being fixed and exogenous. Instead, preferences are followed historically and thus allowed to 
change as a result of endogenous and exogenous factors. Further departing from standard 
models, two input intervening variables are used to represent players’ preferences: first, there is 
the ideal position of a player (classic view of preferences) and second, the salience of the issue 
being negotiated is also part of the concept of preferences.  
Even though position and salience are part of the general notion of preferences, they are 
conceptually and empirically distinct. The ideal position on an issue represents a player’s most 
preferred outcome on that issue, whereas salience is defined as the importance a player attaches 
to an issue negotiated. Given that position and salience are characteristics of the unitary actor 
(i.e. country), they feature in member states’ national interests: salience shows how high a given 
issue is ranked among a country’s national interests whereas position shows the precise outcome 
on the issue that a country would like to obtain. While it is intuitively plausible for actors with 
extreme positions on issues to also attach high salience to those, it is possible for an actor to take 
a moderate position on an issue to which it attaches high salience. 
Institutions-as-equilibria represent compromises between actors with diverging 
preferences. Since conflict between players is defined as competition for resources1
                                                 
1 This definition is according to Deutsch, cited by Lindner (2006). 
, the increase 
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in the heterogeneity of players increases distributive conflict, as bargaining approaches have 
shown. The existence of diverging interests makes coalitions difficult, especially when the voting 
rule is unanimity: “shifting interests across issues mean that states have permanent interests but 
no permanent friends.” (Achen 2006) However, the search for consensus – an agreement 
acceptable to all – underlined by functional approaches is prominent because the reversion point 
– no collective good and thus lower utility – is not desirable to rational players. 
The propositions on institutional change advanced above are tested empirically by 
analyzing the EU budgetary politics. The case of the EU budget is challenging from the point of 
view of institutional change because budgets are known to be stable institutions, at best 
incremental. However, the data shows that dramatic changes happen when the Financial 
Frameworks (FF), the budgetary agreements that fix the ceilings of the EU budgets are 
negotiated every five to seven years. On the contrary, incremental change occurs in the EU 
annual budget and through the mechanisms that affect the preferences of the member states and 
the ‘division of the pie’.  
The analysis of the last two negotiations on the FF and the negotiations for the 2008 EU 
budget show that indeed endogenous and exogenous factors lead to an incremental change in 
both the preferences of member states and the distribution of benefits from the FF. The 
exogenous political factor of enlargement, accompanied by the lower degree of economic 
development of the newer member states led to a change in the preferences of the net 
contributors to the budget, enabled by a deterioration of the benefits derived from the FF and a 
reinforcement of the ‘balance’ issue that becomes more salient to net contributors. The 
endogenous mechanism of learning worked gradually such that member states became aware of 
a change in preferences and distributional benefits. At the moment of renegotiation of the FF, 
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member states used issue-linkage to restore / increase their advantages; the endogenous 
mechanism of reinforcement pointed to the rebate as an institutional equilibrium solution; this 
equilibrium solution represents a departure from the previous FF equilibrium and, compared to 
the changes in the annual budget, constitutes a substantial change. The most powerful member 
states – the net contributors – managed to obtain an outcome as close as possible to their 
preferences; this dominance of the net contributors is also revealed in the annual budgetary 
negotiations, where institutions change incrementally, within the margin stipulated by the FF. 
Last but not least, institutions are shown to have a dual face: while the FF outcomes represent 
institutions-as-equilibria, they act as institutions-as-constraints for the annual budget. 
This dissertation contributes in several ways to enriching our knowledge on political 
processes and outcomes. By explaining both radical and incremental change, it contributes to the 
incipient theoretical and empirical literature that attempts to explain institutional change. The 
game theoretical elements of the dissertation show that the dynamic component that has been 
long missing in bargaining games can be added by simply allowing preferences and payoffs to 
vary. This dissertation also speaks to the historical institutionalist literature in which time matters 
but it enriches it by analyzing both exogenous and endogenous mechanisms of change. In the 
realm of European Union studies, it advances our understanding of EU budgetary procedures but 
also of mechanisms that affect member states’ interests and benefits deriving from European 
integration. Last but not least, from an international relations perspective, it adds to the 
bargaining models that have tried to explain how preferences and institutional constraints are 
translated into equilibrium outcomes. 
In Chapter 2, I present the theoretical framework and expand on the problems posed by 
institutional change; I also sketch the theoretical model and discuss the methodological 
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approach. Chapter 3 outlines the EU budgetary procedure and justifies its choice as a case study 
for institutional change.  The dynamic preferences as well as the analytical narratives that 
empirically support the theoretical models are presented in Chapters 4 (the FF negotiations) and 
5 (the annual budgetary negotiations).  The last chapter discusses the findings and their 
implications for a theory of institutional change. 
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2.0  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH FOR 
A THEORY OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
2.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF INSTITUTIONS 
The modern polity studied in social sciences is a structure of institutions that describe the context 
in which governance and politics occur. (March and Olsen 1989; March and Olsen 2006, 5) 
Conceiving political systems as polities organized by rules, the new2
In this framework, institutions are understood as humanly devised sets of rules that 
constrain and regulate human interaction, hence ‘the dual face of institutions’. (North 1990, 
2005) Rules facilitate exchanges among individuals and create opportunities for collective 
action; they can be either endogenous or exogenous to actors’ choice. (Snidal 1996) Institutions 
constitute therefore the rules of the game and operate at the macro level, whereas organizations, 
 institutionalism is – “a 
general approach to the study of political institutions, a set of theoretical ideas and hypotheses 
concerning the relations between institutional characteristics and political agency, performance 
and change.“ (March and Olsen 2006, 4) While there is no full-blown theory of political 
institutions, the institutionalist framework has pervaded political science in the last three decades 
such that “we are all institutionalists now.” (Pierson and Skocpol 2002, 706) 
                                                 
2 The adjective ‘new’ distinguishes the institutionalism that started to flourish in the 1980s as a reaction to the 
behavioral revolution in social sciences from the older, pre-World War II form of institutionalism that studied the 
formal institutions of government. 
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found at the meso level3, are defined as groups of individuals acting for a collective purpose in 
the game of political competition. (Hall and Taylor 1996; Stacey and Rittberger 2003, 860) In 
political spaces, organizations4
The agents that populate the institutional environment have a common understanding of 
the rules: “for a set of rules to be an institution, knowledge of these rules must be shared by the 
members of the relevant community or society.” (Knight 1992, 3) Moreover, Sweet and 
colleagues argue that actors are individuals whose behavior is governed by three different types 
of logic: first, according to the logic of consequences, rational actors want to maximize their own 
well-being; second, the logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1989) defines the range of 
suitable behavior and its rules are transmitted through socialization; third, policy 
entrepreneurs/skilled social actors mobilize cooperation among others by propagating cultural 
frames, understood as representations of collective problems with the accompanying solutions. 
(Stone Sweet et al. 2001, 8) 
 perform governance functions – the “authority to make, interpret 
and enforce the rules.” (Stone Sweet et al. 2001, 6) Stone Sweet and colleagues distinguish 
between rules and procedures. While rules determine the appropriate behavior in particular 
settings, procedures prescribe the way in which actors and organizations fabricate rules; rules can 
vary according to the type of behavior they stipulate, the degree of codification and the extent to 
which they are compulsory (Stone Sweet et al. 2001, 6-7)  
The different varieties of institutionalism that have emerged all have in common the fact 
that the analytical quest starts with institutions rather than actors and structure is paramount 
                                                 
3 The micro level is occupied by actors, defined in a further section as goal-oriented individuals. 
4 Organizations are in ‘judicial mode’ when they settle pre-existing disputes by creating new rules; in ‘legislative 
mode’, organizations structure the future behavior of individuals in order to reduce conflict. (Stone Sweet et al 2001, 
8) 
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because it determines behavioral patterns and political outcomes. (Peters 2005, 156) In fact, the 
main institutionalist assumption posits that institutions create order and predictability and thus 
impact political actions; these effects are generated by comprehensible and routine processes that 
lead to both institutional continuity and change. While variation in institutions can explain the 
variation in the observed political processes and outcomes,  institutions may be also considered 
as intervening variables between political players and outcomes, hence their crucial constraining 
role.  
In spite of their common institutionalist framework, the different approaches to 
institutions have some fundamental differences in the way institutions are defined but also in the 
conception of preferences and change. (Peters 2005, 159-162) Given that preferences and change 
are critical in my argument and in order to identify the most appropriate approach, I will briefly 
review below the main varieties of institutionalism – sociological institutionalism, historical 
institutionalism and rational choice institutionalism – as well as some hybrid forms of 
institutionalism – actor-centered institutionalism and rational choice historical institutionalism – 
that seem to correct some of the weaknesses of the main approaches. 
In sociological institutionalism, actors lie in a dense institutional environment in which 
institutions provide opportunities for action and reflect shared understanding of norms: 
institutions impact the behavior of individuals through shared beliefs and cognitions that 
individuals internalize and enact. (March and Olsen 1989, 1998, 2006) In this approach, political 
life is organized by these shared values into a community of common culture; political actors 
carry roles and identities and, being constrained by institutions, act within a ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ that ensures the preservation of the constitutive principles and standards, hence 
the stability of norms:  “the basic logic of action is rule following-prescriptions based on a logic 
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of appropriateness… rules are followed because they are seen as natural, rightful, expected and 
legitimate.” (March and Olsen 2006, 7) In this approach, preferences are endogenous: while 
individuals possess basic values, their involvement with institutions leads to their preferences 
being shaped by the institutions. (Peters 2005, 161) 
Historical institutionalism seeks to explain the creation of institutions in past contexts and 
explores the interactions between the institutions’ creators and the contextual structure; in 
particular, the unit of investigation is the institutional choice made at a particular point in time 
and its long-term implications. Even though it lacks a coherent body of commonly shared 
assumptions, the main tenet of historical institutionalism is that institutions are constructed by 
humans, therefore it is better to study them in sequence rather than in a snapshot. (Sanders 2006, 
40)  
Ideas are central in historical institutionalism because they hold institutions together and 
mobilize collective action by social groups that create institutions. Sanders argues that historical 
institutionalist approaches have an endogenous view of actors’ preferences as ideas generate and 
are a disguise for preferences and their evolution over time. (Sanders 2006, 42) As actors are not 
fully aware of the consequences of their participation in institutions, present behavior is 
constrained by the lock-in effect of past choices, thus creating ‘path dependencies’. (Thelen 
2004) Pierson (2004) argues that most social processes are path dependent: some fundamental 
causal factors do not re-occur but their effects are long-lasting; positive feedback makes forgone 
alternatives less and less attractive. (Pierson 2004, 15) In Pierson’s view, sequencing, defined as 
the temporal order of events is important for institutional outcomes, which are explained by 
institutional development rather than by institutional selection; one of the ways to analyze 
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institutional development is to study the interactions between institutions5
Rational choice institutionalism views political life as the exchange bet self-interested 
actors that want to maximize their utility and accordingly act in predictable ways; institutions are 
understood as structures that constrain individuals and provide incentives and opportunities for 
collective action; the actors can also change the rules and recalculate their strategies. (Shepsle 
2006; Tsebelis 1990) Both agency and structure interact to produce outcomes; preferences and 
the rules of the game determine the strategic choices of actors, which lead to political outcomes: 
“specific outcomes are the result of both prevailing institutions and the preferences of the actors 
involved.” (Tsebelis 2002, 8) While players have preferences over outcomes, rational choice 
institutionalism differs from historical institutionalism by treating preferences as exogenous to 
the political game.  
. (Pierson 2004, 15-
16). Since the preferences of the designers cannot determine long-term institutional functioning 
because actors may have a short time horizon, institutions have unintended effects and become 
by-products of social processes rather than embodying actors’ goals.  
As in historical institutionalist approaches, in the rational choice framework political 
outcomes are the result of the interactions of goal-oriented actors, hence Sanders’ argument that 
rational choice institutionalism and historical institutionalism are complementary approaches: 
they differ in the use of empirical descriptions and inductive reasoning (historical 
institutionalism) and analytical descriptions and deductive reasoning (rational choice 
                                                 
5 Pierson describes two possible ways to study the interactions between institutions. Institutional coupling is 
appropriate if there are complementarities between institutions (they are mutually reinforcing) and the presence of 
each institution has a positive effect on the durability of the other institutions; reform in one institution increases the 
probability of change in the complementary institutions. If there are ambiguities between the allocation of authority 
among institutions, loose coupling should be used to examine the interactions between institutions, as for example in 
executive-judicial relations; in loose coupling the ambiguities of authority create opportunities of reform for those 
actors unhappy with the status quo. (Pierson 2004, 162-164) 
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institutionalism). (Sanders 2006, 43) Shepsle also argues that theories that rely on bounded 
rationality, behavioral economics and transaction costs economics blur the line between rational 
choice and historical institutionalism. (Shepsle 2006, 26-28) Further, Stone Sweet and colleagues 
contend that both rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism view 
individual behavior dependent on the expectations regarding the behavior of other actors: 
“institutions make purposive actions possible by providing individuals with a framework of 
shared expectations.” (Stone Sweet et al 2001, 6-7) 
Within the rational choice approach, institutions can be interpreted in two different ways, 
as argued by Shepsle (1998, 2006). First, institutions-as-constraints define a game form in game-
theoretic parlance (the game form and players’ preferences make up a game) and constitute a 
script of actors, strategies, sequences and information at the moment of choice. (Shepsle 2006, 
24) Institutions-as-constraints are exogenous to the game and thus do not allow the possibility of 
a change in the game, therefore this approach should be used only for stable institutions. (Calvert 
1995, 58-59) Second, institutions-as-equilibria are defined as observed “behavior patterns of 
individuals and their expectations about the behavior of others…consistent with utility 
maximization by each individual.” (Calvert 1995, 58-59) In this approach institutions are 
endogenous, “equilibrium ways of doing things,” Calvert (1995, 74) “equilibrium of behavior in 
an underlying game;” (Schotter 1981) they are focal points that induce cooperation. (Schelling 
1960) The common property that institutions share is that, given that all others are doing so, it is 
rational for almost every individual to observe the behavioral prescriptions of the institutions. 
Calvert (1995, 60) When the institutions-as-equilibria are created through a specific process of 
negotiation and agreement, they are not particularly robust, as small perturbations in the 
environment will determine players to find incentives to deviate from the institutional 
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prescriptions. (Shepsle 2006, 26;  Shepsle 2006 b, 1034) This is to say that institutional change 
can be explained only by an exogenous parameter shift, i.e. in payoffs, number of players etc. 
(Calvert 1995, 75) 
In addition to the institutional varieties discussed above, two hybrid approaches borrow 
elements from more than one framework. First, actor-centered institutionalism is interested in 
policy-as-outcome: policy is defined as“intentional action by actors who are most interested in 
achieving specific outcomes.” (Scharpf 1997, 36) Actor-centered institutionalism explains policy 
outcomes by focusing on the interaction between individual/collective actors that are shaped by 
the institutional settings within which they take place. The main tenet builds on rational choice 
institutional assumptions: the institutional setting, comprising anarchic fields, networks, 
associations and organization affects preferences and interactions between “individual and 
corporate actors endowed with certain capabilities and specific cognitive and normative 
orientations;” (Scharpf 1997, 37) In Scharpf’s view, the static unit of analysis is the modes of 
interaction that drive policy processes that lead to policy outcomes and actor constellations 
(i.e.type of games being played); interaction can thus be unilateral action, negotiated agreement, 
majority vote or hierarchical direction. (Scharpf 1997, 44-46) Actor-centered institutionalism 
departs from rational choice by conceiving a range of socially constructed and institutionally 
shaped preferences: institutional self-interest, normative orientations and identity-related 
preferences; collective actors are thus institutionally constituted and institutionalized 
expectations that create common knowledge go beyond the assumption of self-interested actors. 
(Scharpf 1997, 36)  
The second hybrid framework is rational choice historical institutionalism that focuses on 
the choices made by rational actors over time (Lindner 2006, 5). This approach shares with 
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rational choice the assumptions that decisions are the result of the interactions between unitary 
and goal-oriented players that are constrained by institutions but differs from rational choice by 
assuming bounded rationality. This framework borrows from historical institutionalism the view 
that actors’ choices and their subsequent behavior are path dependent, hence the accrual of 
increasing returns; repeated interaction and multiple plays of the game might increase the 
stickiness of institutions. Consequently, the main claim of rational choice historical 
institutionalism is that “institutions are not especially thin” (Stacey and Rittberger 2003, 873) 
and institutional equilibria are “somewhat persistent.” (Stacey and Rittberger 2003, 874)  
The advantage of rational choice historical institutionalism is that it attempts to overcome 
the shortcomings of both rational choice and historical institutionalism. While the rational choice 
approach uses history as illustrative material for general theories, historical institutionalism 
answers empirical puzzles derived from observed events at the expense of theory-building. Most 
historical institutionalist approaches look at relatively stable institutions over time, whereas 
rational choice institutionalism views temporal dimensions with the analytical tools of strategic 
calculations but usually leaves out issues of ordering and sequence. (Thelen 1999) As pointed 
out below in the theoretical section, rational choice historical institutionalism in the best 
analytical framework for my dynamic approach to preferences and institutional change: in my 
approach, preferences are not taken as fixed and exogenous, like in standard game theoretic 
models and, unlike in historical institutional approaches, institutions are equilibria that change 
every time their distributional benefits are renegotiated. 
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2.2 THE PUZZLE OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
…It is important to understand that if preferences are created externally, and are also largely 
unchangeable, then the only way to generate change is to alter the structure of incentives and 
rules that exist within an institution. On the other hand, if preferences are conceptualized as 
mutable, then transformations can be an ongoing process of remaking individual preferences 
through the operations of the institutions themselves. (Peters 2005, 161) 
Institutions have proven to be considerably robust, even when facing radical social, 
economic, technical and cultural change, and routine processes of learning and adaptation have 
been shown to work reasonably well, (March and Olsen 2006, 10)  therefore the institutionalist 
framework is most successful at explaining stability rather than institutional change. (Stacey and 
Rittberger 2003, 859) Streeck and Thelen (2005) complain about the “impoverished state of 
theorizing on issues of institutional change” and “the absence of analytic tools to characterize 
and explain modes of gradual change.” (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 1) March and Olsen argue that 
a lot has been written in the last few years on processes that transform individuals into rule 
followers, utility maximizers or cooperating actors in networks, but the questions related to the 
dynamics of change have remained unanswered; the processes that translate structures and rules 
into political outcomes, the conditions that favor change and the underlying causal factors still 
puzzle social scientists (March and Olsen 2006, 10) Institutionalist scholars are yet to clarify 
how political processes and institutions are stabilized and destabilized and which factors sustain 
or interrupt these processes. (Stacey and Rittberger 2003, 859-860)  
Most institutional accounts attempt to explain why institutional change occurs – because 
of actors’ calculations or exogenously induced variation in the conditions on which the 
institutions rest, be they efficiency-based, power-based or cultural: change is viewed as being 
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instantaneous and efficient. According to March and Olsen, the processes of change considered 
in the literature are better understood theoretically than empirically; these processes of change 
can be grouped in the following four models: single-actor design, conflict design – multiple 
actors with conflicting goals create designs that reflect the outcomes of political trading and 
power – learning through feedback or borrowing and the selection of rules that compete for 
survival and reproduction. (March and Olsen 2006, 11) 
In most institutional accounts change is incremental, if at all, rather than radical because 
the tendency of social structure is considered to be towards reproduction and not towards 
transformation. Sociological institutionalism views change as happening at the margin, 
prescribed by prevailing institutional scripts; institutional change represents the co-constitution 
of individuals as social agents and institutions as social structure. Historical institutionalism is 
better at explaining institutional persistence in spite of changes in preferences, competition and 
highly volatile technological, social, economic an political environment; institutions are sticky 
because of increasing returns that lock in institutional arrangements, uncertainty of risk-averse 
actors about future payoffs in a new institution, the number of institutional veto points, and 
divergent preference constellations; these factors make change incremental rather than abrupt 
through mechanisms like layering or conversion. (Stone Sweet et al 2001, 5-8)  In the rationalist 
approach, given that preferences are exogenous, at any given moment in time, actors adopt 
strategies that best maximize their utility and thus lead to an equilibrium outcome. In spite of the 
inherent stability of the notion of ‘equilibrium’, most rational choice approaches to institutions 
appear to be “infinitely mutable, simply through the selection of rules or structures.” (Peters 
2005, 162) 
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While a rational choice historical institutional approach can compensate for the 
weaknesses of both rational choice and historical institutionalism – too much or too little change, 
respectively – the mechanisms of change still need to be identified. Below I review the incipient 
mechanisms of change that the institutionalist literature has attempted to develop theoretically 
and to a lesser extent empirically; most factors that trigger change are exogenous and, except for 
critical junctures, change is conceived as mostly incremental. My theory builds on economic and 
political exogenous factors, as well as the endogenous mechanisms of learning and 
reinforcement that work gradually to produce the outcome of renegotiations, characterized by 
layering new institutions on top of old ones; power also plays a role in shaping institutions-as-
equilibria. 
Stone Sweet and colleagues (2001) identify four approaches to institutional change. First, 
change comes as a response to exogenous shocks6
                                                 
6 For instance a change in prices might lead to a change in people’s tastes. (North 1990) 
 and to the way in which they are perceived. In 
times of crises, the search for new models and policy innovation leads to competition between 
actors (Sandholtz 1992), competition for survival between organizations, (North 2005) and the 
alteration of organizational routine. Second, institutional innovation can be endogenous to 
politics. Actors search for new rules when increased interactions expose the limits of the existing 
rules and take the opportunity to enhance their social, economic and political positions; in this 
approach actors compete on power, resources and meaning of rules. (Stone Sweet et al 2001, 10) 
Third, institutions can be altered at the organization level when change in one organization 
becomes mandatory for the others or when one organization innovates by copying the model of a 
more successful organization. (Stone Sweet et al 2001, 10-11) Fourth, institutional change can be 
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the effect of political entrepreneurs7
In the same vein, March and Olsen identify four sources of change that are incremental 
but produce transformative results. First, there can be internal pressure for change due to the gap 
between institutional goals and institutional practices. Second, change can be rooted in the 
implementation of rules due to the need to generate a coherent interpretation. Third, routine 
switches between standard operation procedures can occur as people gain or lose faith in 
institutional arrangements. Fourth, a  reallocation of resources can lead to the exploitation if the 
existing rules or the exploration of new rules. (March and Olsen 2006, 12-13) 
 who generate new frames when an organization breaks 
down and then propagate these frames by convincing the others and thus inducing cooperation. 
(Stone Sweet et al 2001, 11) 
Arguing that path dependence limits change and rational choice explains only 
discontinuous institutional change, Streeck and Thelen contend that change is not only abrupt 
and exogenously generated because there are processes of “incremental change with 
transformative results.” (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 8-9) Consequently, the authors propose five 
modes of gradual transformative change, of which two are discussed by Pierson (2004) and 
Thelen (2003): layering is defined as the coexistence of old and new elements of institutions, 
which is realized through amendments and revisions; conversion occurs when new actors, 
previously marginalized, come to power and seek to reorient the institution towards new goals 
and functions. Displacement is a mechanism characterized by the fact that a traditional rule is 
pushed aside by a new one and new models emerge and call the existing ones into question. 
While drift defines an erosion of institutions that are not maintained and adjusted to changes in 
                                                 
7 The term political entrepreneur was coined by Wagner (1966) who argued that such a type of individual makes a 
high contribution to collective action by offering incentives because he/she cares about the group’s objectives but 
also because he/she can extract personal benefits. 
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the external environment, exhaustion gives the  ultimate institutional breakdown through 
depletion, overextension or decreasing returns. (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 19-20)  
Arguing that on-path changes happen through adaptation, Lindner identifies some 
mechanisms of reproduction that cause major institutional (off-path) changes in case of break 
down; the choice of these mechanisms is determined by the willingness of actors to bear the 
costs and distribution of power. Lindner emphasizes the importance of informal institutions, as 
some reproduction mechanisms are more likely to collapse through informal off-path changes. 
Power underlines the first mechanism of reproduction: in line with Knight (1992, 1995) change 
is brought about by an increase in the bargaining power of the coalition interested in change; the 
sources of the increase in power can be exogenous, due to a change in coalition membership/size 
or linkages with other fields or endogenous, when actors learn to interact skillfully or gain a 
strong reputation. While interdependence within an institutional matrix creates different change 
coalitions, large switching costs enforce stability; change occurs when there is a lot of certainty 
over the distributive impact of the new outcomes and institutional choices or when the 
opportunity costs of maintaining the old institutions increase. Radical change happens when the 
scope and nature of change cannot be accommodated through small on-path changes. (Lindner 
2006, 166-172). 
Change can also be viewed from two different perspectives, depending if the approach to 
change is dynamic or static. In Heritier’s opinion, a process perspective on institutional change 
analyzes the factors driving institutional change and the underlying causal processes. These 
processes may differ: bargaining can be of explicit nature or over the institutional change; the 
causal factors can be either exogenous – a change in the environment that changes actors’ 
preferences – or endogenous – the institutional characteristics at t1 alter the institutional 
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properties at t2  without outside influence. (Heritier 2007, 8) By contrast, the structural 
perspective offers a static vision on change that happens across different levels/arena, depending 
on the types of actors that design and/or implement the rules; an important source of change is 
the discrepancy between the designers of the institutions and its distributive implications. 
(Heritier 2007, 9)  
The rational choice functional framework builds on Keohane’s (1984) well-known 
argument that institutions overcome the collective action problem by facilitating cooperation and 
thus providing mutual gains – they supply information and rules that reduce transaction costs, 
enhance decentralized enforcement and increase interaction. This framework describes 
incremental change in a stable environment, occurring through actors’ repeated interaction and 
updating/learning. For North (1990), the learning process is the most important source of change 
because  information regarding the environment is continuously improved and thus leads to 
small institutional modifications. In repeated interactions, actors continue “to change their 
planned responses to the actions of others until no improvement can be obtained in their 
expected outcomes from independent action.” (Crawford and Ostrom 1995) In this approach, the 
source of change is intentionality: having undergone a change in capabilities, actors reconsider 
the existing institutional equilibrium and propose a more advantageous alternative. The cause of 
capability change is not explained by the model but exogenously defined as a revised 
parameter.” (Heritier 2007, 14) Starting from actors’ intentions, Heritier argues that, on one 
hand, “if, due to an external event, the benefits of rule A have decreased, the rule will be 
changed, if the gains of the proposed altered rule B including the transaction costs will be 
higher.” (Heritier 2007, 18) On the other hand, while built-in flexibility and opt-out clauses do 
not change the rules, “with a renegotiation clause, by contrast, an external shock will lead to a 
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change of the institutional rule.” (Heritier 2007, 18) The disadvantage of the functional approach 
is that it views actors as cooperating – a collective body – therefore the intention to change the 
institutions has to be collective, otherwise bargaining will occur and then the rational choice 
distributional approach becomes more appropriate.  
While exogenous causal factors drive change, endogenous functionalist explanations of 
change are much rarer. One such variant is the principal-agent theory in which institutional 
change happens when the principal faces significant agency losses and thus corrects the contract 
initially agreed by both principal and agent. (Heritier 2007, 23-25) Greif and Laitin (2004) also 
endogenize the explanations of institutional change within the functionalist approach. The 
authors propose a dynamic model based on quasi-parameters (i.e. actors’ capabilities and 
information) and distinguish between the mechanism of institutional reinforcement, which does 
not lead to change – more individuals in more different situations adhere to the institutions – and 
the mechanism of undermining, which creates endogenous change – fewer individuals in fewer 
situations adhere to the institutions. While reinforcement occurs through habitual action and 
ideology, laws and regulation, increasing returns of existing capabilities and learning, 
undermining happens through mechanisms like social utopias, counter-hegemonies and the 
decrease of gains from cooperation. Specifically, undermining creates an inconsistency between 
institutions and the associated rule, which reaches a critical level when past patterns of behavior 
are no longer reinforcing. (Greif and Laitin 2004, 633-35) 
In contrast with the collective/cooperative assumption of the rational functional approach, 
the distributional/bargaining version of rational choice institutionalism contends that institutions 
are outcomes of power-oriented bargaining with distributional implications: institutions “reflect 
compromises between actors.” (Stone Sweet et al 2001, 13) Existing institutional rules favor 
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some actors and disadvantage others, which will influence negotiations over institutional change; 
(North 1996) actors bargain over various institutional alternatives and seek to lock in equilibrium 
payoffs – their distributional advantages – through institutions. Political conflict and strategic 
bargaining are the defining features of this approach, especially when there is a ‘shadow of the 
future’ involved: the longer an agreement is in force, the harder actors will bargain over the 
distribution of benefits, hence a difficult cooperation. (Fearon 1998)  
Due to the distributional character of bargaining, resource ownership becomes an ex-ante 
measure of power (Knight 1992) and actors with more bargaining power manage to impose their 
equilibrium (Heritier 2007, 40-41). Since institutions rest on power in this approach, power 
explains both institutional stability and change: actors that possess the most bargaining power 
(i.e. the power to initiate or prevent change) dictate the interpretation and adaptation of rules 
(Lindner 2006, 164). Alterations happen when there is a change in the distributional implications 
due to exogenous changes in power or resource ownership (Knight 1992; 1995), change in 
actors/coalitions – the dominant coalition that resists change breaks (Tsebelis 1990), or when 
unilateral action is less costly than cooperation. (Stacey and Rittberger 2003, 866) Heritier posits 
a power-induced institutional change hypothesis with distributive implications: a change in the 
preferences of a powerful actor or a change in the power balance leads to the renegotiation of the 
existing institutions. (Heritier 2007, 43) However, the translation of the preferences/power 
change into outcomes is mediated by the rules of the negotiations (i.e. voting by unanimity or 
majority), which may enhance/reduce the advantages of the most powerful and thus their ability 
to influence institutional change. Beside negotiation rules, issue-linkage is another tool for 
enacting change and thus empowering the actor who uses it: actors dissatisfied with the status 
quo may broaden the scope of the institutional issues discussed to create issue-linkages, as more 
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issues on the agenda increase the possibility of issue-linkages and thus enable distributive 
outcomes.  (Davis 2004, 153-157; Heritier 2007, 43) 
The power-constrained approach to institutions that brought power on the agenda of 
rational choice (Moe 2005) is rooted in realist theories of international relations. Krasner (1991) 
argues that, even though all benefit, power determines the choice from multiple equilibria: 
powerful nations have disproportionate influence on which point on the Pareto frontier is chosen. 
Gruber (2000) defines the ‘go it alone power’ as “a form of agenda control in which one actor 
denies the status quo to others in order to steer them into accepting alternatives more to his 
liking.” (Moe 2005, 227) In this approach, change is determined by power and distributional 
benefits, as “there is no contradiction between mutual gain and the exercise of power, both are 
often going on at once.” (Moe 2005, 227) 
The distinction between functional and distributional rational choice approaches (Stacey 
and Rittberger 2003; Heritier 2007) echoes the distinction made by Scharpf (1997) between two 
dimensions of the common good – welfare production and  distribution/distributive justice and 
also between two modes of negotiation that influence outcomes. (Scharpf 1997, 15) First, similar 
to the functional framework, the integrative bargaining mode is characterized by problem-
solving in the common interest – the identification of possible solutions that ‘enlarge the pie’. 
(Raiffa 1982) Second, like distributional approaches, the defensive bargaining mode focuses on 
the distributive implications of the (enlarged) pie and is status quo oriented, such that: “if issues 
are redistributive in nature and the proposed changes clearly reveal who is to gain and who is to 
lose, defensive bargaining will prevail…and the outcome will reflect the asymmetry of power of 
the involved actors.” (Heritier 2007, 45) 
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Explanations of endogenous change in the distributive approach start from the 
assumption that actors are both designing and implementing formal institutional rules, which has 
effects across levels. First, formal institutional rules are viewed as incomplete/ambiguous 
contracts whose daily application gives rise to informal rules; these informal rules are the result 
of bargaining and reflect the power of actors. (Farrell and Heritier 2004) Second, in Jupille’s 
procedural politics, when faced with the choice between different lower-order procedural rules, 
actors choose the rule that maximizes their influence; as procedural politics disputes over lower 
level rules increase, change at macro level becomes more likely, as these disputes raise the 
opportunity costs of leaving rules unchanged. (Heritier 2007, 50) Third, an actor that has its 
hands tied in one arena of negotiations has a better bargaining position in another arena of 
negotiations. (Putnam 1988; Moravcsik 1998; Heritier 2007, 51) 
The above-described approaches barely grapple with the dynamics of significant 
institutional change. The models of punctuated equilibrium underestimate the dynamic sources 
of change and conceive of radical change as occurring only in case of massive failure of an 
institution due to an external shock. In fact, institutions are not that sticky because they escape 
path dependencies by changing in response to exogenous environmental factors; (Crouch and 
Farrell 2004) even when accounted for endogenously by conflict and competition among 
institutions, as Thelen (2003) prescribes, institutional frictions do not necessarily lead to critical 
junctures and institutional change, as conditions under which this could occur are not known. 
(Heritier 2007, 58) The models that propose incremental change manage to offer a picture of 
transformation that occurs over time but do not distinguish conceptually between less significant 
and more important change – conditions that favor gradual change and conditions that lead to 
minor alterations. The approaches that ignore the power of the constituencies that have created 
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the institutions cannot adequately explain the distributional interests and why changes in benefits 
lead to renegotiation. While the rational choice framework distinguishes between rule changes 
that are beneficial for all actors (the functionalist approach) and those that are clearly 
redistributive (the bargaining/distributional approach), its shortcoming consists in the fact that it 
describes change as happening in a static game where actors compete over their preferred 
institutional rule. Even in cases when repeated play is modeled, preferences and rules are not 
allowed to vary, hence the difficulty of capturing either endogenous change or the long-term 
effect of exogenous factors. 
In order to fill in the gap on institutional change in the institutionalist framework, it is 
necessary to combine elements from the different approaches: “to explain processes of 
institutional change, it may, however, be essential to combine at least two of these [institutional] 
approaches.” (Stacey and Rittberger 2003, 868) Rational choice historical institutionalism is 
more encompassing in terms of mechanisms of change and compensates for the fact that rational 
choice is deficient in explaining persistence from one snapshot to another and historical 
institutionalism does not describe change adequately. While changes due to exogenous factors 
are more easily understood in the literature, as reviewed above, endogenous mechanisms of 
change are much rarer and at best understood theoretically but not observed empirically. From 
the mechanisms reviewed above, the endogenous mechanisms of learning and reinforcement 
work gradually, together with exogenous factors, to create a model of institutional equilibrium 
and change in a rational choice historical institutionalist framework. 
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2.3 INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE EU 
The EU invites the studying of institutions because it is one of the few areas where institutions 
represent recent creations and developments by strategic actors with a view to obtain mutual 
gains from cooperation. Even more specifically, the multiplicity of areas in which institutional 
change happens in the EU makes it the ideal site for studying institutional change: “change in the 
EU’s institutional milieu has the potential to reallocate power among the EU’s primary 
organizational actors, rendering each more or less able to achieve its own policy preferences.” 
(Stacey and Rittberger 2003, 861) Heritier identifies institutional change in the EU as a situation 
in which member states reconsider the existing institutional rules and propose altered rules that 
are more advantageous; the reason for this could be a change in the capabilities of states, such as 
changes in population or wealth, which leads member states to ask for more votes in the 
European decision-making process. (Heritier 2007, 14) 
The new wave of theories on the EU see the Union as a polity whose exact form may be 
unique, but whose underlying political processes replicate patterns that are present in all levels of 
governance: “The EU may be unique when viewed as a particular set of institutions, but most 
social scientists agree that these institutions ought to be the outcome of more conventional 
political and social processes.” (Stone Sweet et al 2001) Compared to other institutionalist 
approaches that have been applied to the study of the EU –  rational choice, (Scharpf 1997; 
Tsebelis 1990, 2003; Pollack 2003) constructivism, (McNamara 1998; Parsons 2003; 
Schimmelfennig 2003; Checkel 2003) comparative federalism (Kelemen 2004; Nicolaidis 2001) 
– rational choice historical institutionalism has just made its way into the discipline. (Stacey and 
Rittberger 2003; Lindner 2006)  
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Rational choice historical institutionalism is indeed a framework well equipped to 
analyze the processes through which member states change their preferences over time and solve 
their differences.  Moreover, rational choice historical institutionalism appears as most suitable 
for analyzing the specificity of EU institutional change when compared with existing theories of 
European integration – informed by theories of international relations and regional integration. 
Of the other approaches, neo-functionalism (Haas 1964; Lindberg 1963) emphasizes the role of 
supranational institutions and spillover effects in European integration but does not consider EU 
institutional bargaining; intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1998) looks at member states’ 
interests that shape European integration but disregards the effects of institutions. Some authors 
favor historical institutionalism as a “uniquely appropriate” approach because of the emphasis on 
“asking big, real world questions, on highlighting temporal sequences and historical trajectories, 
and on situating political events in their broader social and institutional contexts.” (Meunier and 
McNamara 2007, 2) However, like any predominantly structural theory, historical 
institutionalism lacks an account of agency, therefore predicting change becomes rather difficult. 
(Meunier and McNamara 2007, 7)  
In the EU, differences between member states’ preferences provide an opportunity for 
institutional activity and member states bargain over rules in multiple areas: “preferences of 
national actors, projected onto the EU level, open up avenues for understanding the sources of 
change in the path of integration.” (Meunier and McNamara 2007, 7) Garrett and Tsebelis (1996) 
rightly argue that, besides states’ preferences, the actual institutional decision rules should be 
taken into account. In particular, the rule of unanimity, widely used at the beginning of European 
integration has a strong effect on institutional outcomes: under unanimity voting, an increase in 
the number of players with divergent preferences increases transaction costs because “bargaining 
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becomes more lengthy and complicated…and implementation becomes more costly.” (Heritier 
2007, 17) Since, under unanimity, enlargement increases the time of negotiations, (Ostrom 1990) 
a common institutional change in the EU is the switch to qualified majority voting. (Heritier 
2007, 17) Besides voting rules, distributive bargaining realized through side-payments (Scharpf 
1997, 129) is another dominant feature of the EU that invites a rational choice historical 
institutional approach:  
This is how the European Union has time and again been able to overcome deadlocks 
through package deals involving unrelated issues that were worked out in the ‘summits’ of the 
European Council. (Scharpf 1997, 129) 
Incremental or radical, change in the EU cannot be understood in isolation from the 
broader political and social processes in which it is embedded. Looking at some macro 
processes, Meunier and McNamara argue that European integration did not create path 
dependencies over time. On the contrary, institutions are viewed as bargaining outcomes at 
different moments in time: “the EU institutions clearly are the product of hard-won political 
bargains embedded within specific institutional settings.” (Meunier and McNamara 2007, 7) This 
notion of institutions-as-equilibria lies at the core of the puzzle of institutional change in the EU: 
depending on the theoretical approach, the current EU institutional structure could be viewed as 
a stable equilibrium resulting from a recent negotiation but also as a disequilibrium caused by the 
recent enlargement and failure to reform the institutions appropriately. Meunier and McNamara 
identify this uncertainty of the equilibrium as one of the contemporary EU challenges in terms of 
institutional change. (Meunier and McNamara 2007, 7-8) In my view, this puzzle of EU 
equilibrium can be solved, and with increased explanatory power, by adding a game theoretical 
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component that can deductively investigate the outcomes – the equilibria – of political 
bargaining at EU level. 
2.4 A THEORETICAL MODEL OF CHANGE 
I propose a rational choice historical institutional approach to preferences and processes that 
translate these preferences into political outcomes; I view change in a dynamic way and consider 
both exogenous and endogenous factors of change and functional and distributional elements. In 
my theory, institutions are equilibria – the outcome of political bargaining. (Stone Sweet et al. 
2001; Calvert 1995; North 2005)  In light of Riker’s objection (Shepsle 2006 b, 1042) to 
institutions-as-constraints (i.e. fixed and exogenous), I view institutions as endogenous: 
institutions change from within and therefore cannot be taken as given, they are both the cause 
and the result of institutional change. This endogeneity creates strategic opportunities: “One can 
expect that losers on a series of decisions under a particular set of rules will attempt (often 
successfully) to change institutions and hence the kind of decisions produced under them.“ 
(Riker 1980, 445) Actors follow the rules they have created because it is in their interest to do so 
in order to maintain their gains from cooperation; given the institutional constraints and the 
expectations on the strategies of the other players, each actor chooses the strategy that maximizes 
her utility.  
It is worth noting that rational choice models, which use the concept of utility, do not 
stress enough the commonality between this concept and those proposed by theories of 
socialization. As psychology has shown, the utility of a rational actor encompasses well not only 
material benefits but also the ideas and values that enhance the well-being of an individual (like 
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influence, prestige and satisfaction from following a given canon) in ways that are more difficult 
to compute. An increase in utility is more appropriately viewed as a proxy for any factor that 
brings positive results: it can be an increase in material benefits but also the satisfaction from 
being recognized as a leader or the peace of mind from following/disobeying a custom (as 
opposed to the misery of breaking with/obeying a tradition, respectively). 
In my approach, institutional change is best analyzed from a process perspective, 
(Heritier 2007) follows the conflict design identified by March and Olsen (2006) and is 
endogenous to politics. (Stone Sweet et al. 2001) The result of institutional change is defined as 
'layering’ (Pierson 2004; Streeck and Thelen 2005) or ‘institutional refinement’ (Greif and Laitin 
2004, 640) because old and new coexist in the newly negotiated institutional outcome. As a 
consequence of both endogenous processes like adaptation, learning, (North 1990; March and 
Olsen 2006; Lindner 2006) reinforcement and undermining (Greif and Laitin 2004) and 
economic, political and social exogenous factors that alter the parameters of the game, (Calvert 
1995; Shepsle 2006) – i.e. reallocation of resources, change in the number of players – actors 
search for new rules and bargain over their distributional benefits. In the absence of such 
endogenous and exogenous processes, institutions are equilibria and therefore self-enforcing, 
each player’s behavior is a best response, hence the absence of change in most rational choice 
accounts. (Greif and Laitin 2004) Standard comparative statics analysis seems to be insufficient 
to account for institutional change, which is dynamic and not a one-time change (Shepsle 2006 b, 
1032) 
The most dramatic mechanism of change is renegotiation of the institutional outcome. 
Given that the outcome represents an equilibrium, players have no incentive to deviate ceteris 
paribus. However, once there is a change in the parameters of the game, be it endogenous or 
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exogenous, the players whose distributional benefits are no longer advantageous will initiate  
renegotiation, as “institutional agents … may not only change their own responses in light of the 
changed circumstances but change ‘the rules of the game’ as well.” (Shepsle 2006 b, 1037) This 
argument is in line with Heritier’s (2007) claim that an external shock or a change in the 
preferences of the powerful actors lead to a renegotiation of the institutional arrangement. 
The outcome of institutional renegotiation is characterized by layering. Streeck and 
Thelen follow Schickler (2001) and define layering as the process by which "new elements 
attached to existing institutions gradually change their status and structure." (Streeck and Thelen 
2005, 31) In the authors' view, layering involves amendments and revisions but the actual 
mechanism for change is differential growth because the new added institutions grow faster than 
the old, established ones. The authors consider as a classic example the layering of a voluntary 
private pension scheme onto the public system in the welfare state, with the new arrangements 
continuing to gain ground and political support. (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 23) The result of 
layering is not as radical as dramatic change: "Since the new layers created in this way do not as 
such and directly undermine existing institutions, they typically do not provoke 
countermobilization by defenders of the status quo." (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 23) However, the 
incremental changes introduced by layering can set in motions dynamics that lead to deep 
transformation and reform, as the new fringe will end up "eating into the old core… and… 
siphoning off support for old layer." (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 31) 
The concept of layering can be better understood when compared to geological 
sedimentation. Tolbert and Zucker (1994) define sedimentation within the framework of 
institutionalization: "sedimentation fundamentally rests on the historical continuity of 
structure…across generations of organizational members; sedimentation is characterized by both 
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spread of structures and perpetuation of structures over a lengthy period of time." (Tolbert and 
Zucker 1994, 185) Consequently, there are factors in the process of sedimentation that affect 
both the extent of diffusion and the durability of a given structure; the most prominent factor 
discussed by the literature is represented by agents disadvantaged by the structure that will 
mobilize against it. (Tolbert and Zucker 1994, 186) In my theory, the outcome of institutional 
renegotiation is made up of institutional layers or sediments that bear the print of the 
disadvantaged players; old layers coexist with new ones. 
The distribution of benefits and the power of players are the defining factors that shape 
the renegotiation mechanism. The distributional implications of the outcome are what players 
bargain for: once the received benefits are altered, each actor will try to get rid of rules that are 
no longer advantageous and create new ones that bring more benefits.  On the contrary, what 
lock in institutions are not increasing returns but distributive benefits and the uncertainty over 
future benefits. The asymmetries of power reflected by the outcome (Scharpf 1997) prove that 
mutual gains and power go together. (Moe 2005) The outcome of bargaining is determined by 
the more powerful players (the ones with more resources) who will pull the others towards their 
preferred outcomes by dictating which rules are chosen. (Knight 1992, 1995; Gruber 2000; 
Lindner 2006) The mechanism through which powerful players drive the outcome of 
negotiations is issue-linkage, which enables distributive outcomes. (Heritier 2007) 
“Institutions can change due to endogenous processes, exogenous shocks and 
combinations of both.” (Greif and Laitin 2004) On the one hand, the exogenous factors that 
affect the resources of players and the distribution of benefits deriving from the institutional 
arrangement are changes in the social, economic or political environment: “over time the 
institutional environment changes, thus also generating changes in preferences.” (Shepsle 2006 
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b, 1037) Examples of exogenous factors are different levels of economic growth or a change in 
the number of actors negotiating the institutional arrangement. These changes happen gradually, 
such that there is an inconsistency between preferences and the distributional implications of 
institutions as equilibria.  
On the other hand, endogenous mechanisms gradually affect both preferences and 
distributional benefits from the institutional arrangement, but in their turn players’ preferences 
are affected by the distributional implications of the institutional outcome, hence preferences and 
institutions shape each other endogenously. The endogenous mechanism of learning is critical in 
raising actors’ awareness on the change in distributional benefits: actors learn that the previous 
outcome is no longer advantageous because “information is continuously renewed into strategic 
interactions.” (Heritier 2007) This learning leads to the above-mentioned inconsistency between 
preferences and the distributional benefits of an institutional arrangement negotiated in the past. 
Greif and Laitin (2004) emphasize the endogenous mechanism of reinforcement; the 
authors argue that this mechanism stabilizes institutions and therefore does not lead to change, as 
opposed to the mechanism of undermining that leads to a point where institutions are no longer 
self-enforcing. On the contrary, I argue that, given the distributive implications of the 
institutional outcome, the mechanism of reinforcement, defined as a state where more players in 
more situations adhere to the institutions and increase benefits, (Greif and Laitin 2004) actually 
leads to institutional change with distributional implications. In fact, from the previous 
institutional arrangement, the institutions that will be reinforced by the disadvantaged players are 
precisely those that can restore/ increase distributional benefits. These reinforced institutions can 
very well coexist with institutions that do not change, hence the concept of ‘layering’.  
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Stacey and Rittberger (2003) argue that in rational choice historical institutionalist 
approaches institutions are not very thin but somewhat persistent. In my approach, the thinness 
of institutions depends on how often players interact and the institutional outcome is 
renegotiated. If players foresee exogenous shocks, a renegotiation clause may be stipulated in the 
original agreement, such that change will happen at a pre-defined point in time. (Koremenos 
2005; Heritier 2007) While incremental change happens in between the moments of 
renegotiation, at the moment of renegotiation change is dramatic because preferences and 
benefits have become highly inconsistent due to accumulated gradual change. In this 
renegotiation, like in any bargaining, powerful players prevail by using issue-linkages.  
As argued above, renegotiation is the critical mechanism through which change comes 
about. During negotiations, players use issue linkage in order to increase their benefits derived 
from the institutional outcome. In order to correctly identify the distributional benefits and the 
bargaining success of powerful players, the most appropriate way to describe renegotiation is 
through a formal model that maps players’ preferences into the institutional outcome. A 
bargaining game has the critical advantage that it links institutions-as-constrains – the rules of 
the game – with institutions-as-equilibria – the outcome of the game. 
2.5 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH  
2.5.1 A Formal Model of Institutions-as-Equilibria  
"Interaction-oriented policy research is the specific contribution of political science and political 
sociology and at its core is game-theoretic thinking." (Scharpf 1997, 14) 
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Political science has reached an era in which game theorists have become very interested 
in the empirical implications of theoretical models and their application to interactions that 
happen in the real world. (Scharpf 1997, 4) Within rational choice institutionalism, the use of 
formal models is a methodological tool that allows the identification of the mechanisms through 
which institutions come into being and shape the choice of strategies that lead to political 
outcomes. The main strength of formal theories is that they give a general prediction and thus the 
empirical task of the researcher is to check if and how observed behavior deviates from it. In 
contrast to verbally formulated theories, which are not equipped with a mechanism that could 
check logical consistency, formal models have the advantage of detecting logical inconsistencies 
in theory formulation.  
In the game-theoretic conceptualization of strategic interaction, rational actors are central, 
hence the appropriateness of formal models for the study of political outcomes that emphasize 
agency: "(…)the game-theoretic conceptualization of interactions seems uniquely appropriate for 
modeling constellations that we typically find in empirical studies of policy processes." (Scharpf 
1997, 5) In most models, the analysis is simplified by treating players as unitary: actors with 
relatively cohesive orientations are treated as 'composite': "public policy is not produced by a 
unitary actor but by strategic interaction between many policy actors, each with its own interest 
and capabilities to affect the outcome." (Scharpf 1997,11) 
In spite of the appropriateness of formal models for actor-centered theories, empirically 
oriented political scientists have been reluctant to use game-theoretic models for two reasons: 
First, game theory is a branch of applied mathematics, and much of the literature, written 
by mathematicians for other mathematicians, not only seems forbiddingly technical but is in fact 
practically inaccessible to the uninitiated. Moreover, empiricists who have nevertheless ventured 
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to look behind the veil of technical difficulties are generally repelled by the extreme unrealism of 
the assumptions that they have encountered.   (Scharpf 1997, 6) 
Formal models are stylized versions of reality and contain specifications that are essential 
to the search for generalizations in political science. However, more than descriptive theories, 
formal theories need to be explicit about their assumptions and the propositions derived by 
deductive reasoning. The explanatory hypothesis in game theoretic models is that interdependent 
strategic interaction between goal-oriented actors operating under institutional constraints 
produces equilibrium outcomes. Due to this hypothesis, formal models have the advantage that 
they emphasize the importance of the rules of the game, the bargaining resources of players and 
their influence on the other players and on the equilibrium behavior. One of the defining features 
of the actors is their preferences; in most theoretical models, preferences are exogenous, they are 
not allowed to vary with the interactions of players.  
In game-theoretic algorithms, comparative statics is used to analyze how equilibrium 
behavior varies with variation in the parameters of the game (i.e. resources, payoffs, number of 
players). Comparative statics analysis generates relationships between variables by manipulating 
the conditions that define the equilibrium: changes in exogenous variables generate changes in 
the endogenous variables that form the equilibrium or the set of equilibria in case of multiple 
ones. 
In formal models, political outcomes represent equilibria, therefore no player has 
incentives to deviate from the equilibrium behavior. While Nash equilibria include threats that 
are not credible due to the constraint that in a node that is not reached a player’s choice should 
maximize her utility, subgame perfect equilibria, a subset of Nash equilibria, include only 
credible threats by imposing the off-equilibrium additional restriction that players’ actions 
should be best responses to other players' actions in the subgame. These credible threats help 
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institutionalize patterns of behavior because they prevent players to behave inappropriately, as 
they know the other players will respond by punishing their deviation. (Bates et al. 1998, 10) 
Related to the concept of equilibrium, institutions are conceived as sets of rules that 
induce choices that are regularized because they are made in equilibrium and organize future 
strategic interactions. When no actor has incentives to change his behavior, should exogenous 
factors remain the same, actors' behavior stays unaltered and thus becomes institutionalized and 
individuals become locked in patterns of strategic interdependence. (Bates et al. 1998, 8-9) 
Institutions-as-equilibria are thus defined as stable, self-reproducing social structures achieved in 
the process of institutionalization. (Calvert 1995). However, when exogenous factors change, the 
equilibrium is altered and institutions change as well. This represents the beginning of game-
theoretic preoccupation with the dynamics of institutional change. In this vein, a fundamental 
task of the researcher is to contradict Stone Sweet's argument  that game theoretic models do 
break down when preferences are endogenous or when actors begin to make sense of how rule 
evolution can alter interactions and outcomes. (Stone Sweet et al. 2001, 5) 
Formal theories have a particular, albeit incipient place in studies of the EU. While 
descriptive theories (Nugent 1989; Wallace et al 2005; Peterson and Bomberg 1999; Dinan 2005 
etc.) have enriched the study of EU decision-making, they have also shown to formal modelers 
which specific features to include in their algorithms and how to match abstraction with 
empirical findings. (Thomson and Hosli 2006, 10) Rittberger (2007) draws attention to the fact 
that formal models on the EU make over-simplifying assumptions and counter-intuitive 
predictions, as for instance the impossibility to explain the Council's 'culture of consensus', 
defined as a common understanding of the European good resulting from frequent negotiations 
between the same partners. Thomson et al. (2006) outstandingly put together the existing formal 
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models applied to the EU and develop some empirical tests for these models. One difficulty with 
EU game-theoretic models is that information on European actors' preferences is generally not 
public, therefore scholars have relied on historical accounts, documents assessment and 
structured interviews with experts. Related to the latter, Konig and Proksch (2006) warn of 
missing values in data derived from expert estimates of actors' positions, Bueno de Mesquita 
(2004) cautions that estimates of initial positions by experts could be tainted by knowledge of the 
final outcome, and Schneider et al. (2006) draw attention on using continuous scaling for discrete 
issues. 
Spatial models, a particular class of game theoretic models are reasonably successful at 
predicting behavior based on the rules of a particular social space and the actors' relative 
positions in such an arena, from which interests can be inferred; the distance between initial 
positions and final outcomes is a measure of bargaining success or power. Thomson et al. (2006) 
review two categories of spatial models – bargaining and procedural – and find that bargaining 
models perform better than procedural ones, possibly because actors are willing to compromise 
for the sake of reaching a common position, as bargaining models show, whereas procedural 
models consist of single-shot events in which actors maximize their own self-interest. 
Procedural models focus on formal institutions (e.g. voting rules, the co-decision or 
cooperation procedures) and rely on non-cooperative game theory and spatial voting theories; 
actors affect outcomes either individually (e.g. as agenda-setters) or in groups (e.g. as collective 
veto-players). These models specify both the sequence of play and the moves available to each 
player; it does not matter if states are big or small, if they have similar preferences they might 
form a coalition. Steunenberg and Selck (2006) model consultation and co-decision but warn 
about the room of interpretation in applying the treaty rules in practice. Crombez (1997) provides 
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a procedural model for the EU co-decision procedure (but no empirical testing) and interprets the 
results in terms of the power of the institutional actors.   
Bargaining models rely on cooperative game theory (e.g. the Nash bargaining solution) 
and look at informal institutions such as pre-voting bargaining in committees, logrolling, power 
strategies and exchanges in search of a compromise. The importance attached to the ‘consensus’ 
culture is based on the empirical finding that voting is rather rare in the Council. The exact 
sequence by which decision outcomes are reached is not specified; the bargaining process is 
treated as a black box inputting actors’ power, preferences, and the salience attached to different 
issues.  Scholars that use voting power indices based on the frequency of a member state being 
pivotal (i.e. Banzhaf 1965; Penrose 1946; Shapley and Shubik8
A well known bargaining model is Bueno de Mesquita’s (1994) expected utility / 
challenge model that assumes that players put effort into strengthening the coalition around their 
 1954) argue that formal rules 
lead do a dominant position by the big member states. The difference in these measures lies in 
the underlying distribution of the voting poll, i.e. the number of voters in favor of a decision. 
Widgren and Pajala (2006) claim that empirical evidence from elections rejects the Banzhaf 
model, particularly in the consensus-seeking EU Council where voters cannot be assumed to be 
independent/oblivious of the others; they also discard the opinion that voting weights should be 
proportional to the square root of population, as this solution is not so fair and democratic as 
some thought. On the contrary, the authors find that the Shapley-Shubik model is preferable for 
calculating power and the coalitional probabilities. (Widgren and Pajala 2006, 240-250) 
                                                 
8 The Banzhaf model assumes that all members of a voting body act entirely independently of one another, and 
randomly (as the number of voters increases the probability continually increases that just around half of the 
members are in favour of any decision, and half against, so it becomes increasingly difficult to cross a threshold 
usually around a quota of 70 % of total votes. The Shapley-Shubik model assumes that there is an equal chance of j 
member states (j varying from 0 to n= 25 in EU25) being in favor of any particular issue, and that every coalitional 
combination made up of j countries is also equally likely within that. Efficiency is then the sum of the probabilities, 
thus determined, of winning coalitions. 
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favored policy positions and challenge others based on expected utility; the decision outcome is 
the weighted median voter position. In Stockman and Van Oosten’s (1994) exchange model, 
actors exchange positions on issues and thus influence the outcome. Van den Bos’ (1991) 
compromise model predicts outcomes at the mean of actors’ policy positions on all issues in the 
same proposal, weighted by their capabilities and the salience attached to issues. (Rittberger 
2007, 1154) In Achen’s (2006) institutional realist9 model, all actors must work to reach an 
agreement or else end up with the undesired status-quo; Achen argues that the Nash bargaining 
solution implies that the compromise model’s formula of predicting EU decisions is a very good 
approximation. (Thomson and Hosli 2006, 21) Snyder, Ting and Ansolabehere (2005, 991) 
propose and apply a competitive bargaining model to the EU, predicting nearly proportional 
expected payoffs to voting weights, while the addition of new members decreases the original 
members’ expected payoffs. Ansolabehere, Snyder and Ting (2003, 472) consider the EU as a 
case where both proposal power and voting power are maldistributed and offer useful insights on 
weighted voting and resource distribution.  It is worth mentioning that some bargaining models 
use the notion of bargaining space – the winset / minimal winning coalition10
Some mixed models comprise two stages: an informal bargaining stage before adoption 
of legislative proposals and a formal procedural stage derived from Treaty stipulations. Kőnig 
. Putnam argues 
that, when negotiators have a larger win-set, they can more easily conclude an agreement, as they 
have more room for maneuver; however, their bargaining positions are weaker (Putnam 1988, 
450).   
                                                 
9 Institutional realism is based on the idea that the relative power of governmental institutions determines political 
outcomes. (Thomson and Hosli 2006, 21) 
10 Putnam (1988) defines the winset as the set of possible agreements between actors that can obtain domestic 
support (ratification).  Crombez (1997) describes the set of outcomes as the possible minimal wining coalition for 
the adoption of legislation. 
 43 
and Proksch (2006) procedural exchange model integrates an issue-linkage stage between the 
Commission (as agenda-setter) and the member states, informal bargaining in the Council based 
on exchanges and the final voting round that involves the EP. Widgren and Pajala (2006) 
similarly assume cooperative bargaining on a single dimension in the first phase and a second 
phase of the formal voting. (Rittberger 2007, 1153-1154; Thomson and Hosli 2006, 5-9). 
Some bargaining models offer insights into the behavior and impact of veto players.  
Tsebelis and Money (1997) consider the EU a bicameral legislature with the Council as the 
upper chamber and the EP as the lower chamber:  the lower chamber gains veto power over the 
agenda-setter when the navette11
An appropriate model describing the dynamics of the institutions-as-equilibria is a 
rational choice bargaining model that allows players to shift their positions through exchanges on 
different issues with the view of reaching agreement in the final (voting) stage: while players’ 
initial positions tend to be more extreme, once they realize what is feasible, their positions 
converge towards agreement. Empirical evidence, including my own, has shown the importance 
of informal discussions prior to formal voting plenaries, especially when the decision rule is 
unanimity. Bueno de Mesquita (1994, 74) argues that under unanimity it is very costly to be the 
 procedure is employed, since the more impatient chamber - the 
upper chamber - is more willing to make a concession. Tsebelis (2002) argues that more veto 
players lead to policy stability because it is not possible to agree on change, while Tsebelis and 
Chang (2004) note that, since the preferences of the EP and the Council are divergent in terms of 
increasing the budget, the EU budgetary system leaves little room for exceptional changes 
(Tsebelis and Chang 2004, 449).  
                                                 
11 The navette or shuttle system is a way to resolve disagreements between the two chambers of a legislature. The 
house that first passes a bill sends the legislation to the second house; if the second house ratifies the legislation, the 
process ends; if not, the second house amends the legislation and sends it back. (Tsebelis and Money 1997, 63). 
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veto player, as the survival of the entire agreement is at stake, whereas being in the opposition is 
relatively cheap under QMV. Bargaining models have the advantage that they emphasize the 
importance of informal rules but yet acknowledge the importance of formal institutions, which 
set the rules of the game.  
 The position exchange model proposed by Stokman and Van Oosten (1994) is a 
bargaining model that distinguishes between two stages of the decision-making process: during 
the first stage, players try to influence each other in order to obtain an outcome as close as 
possible to their own policy positions; then, the decision or voting phase produces the outcome. 
In the influence phase, pairs of actors make exchanges on pairs of issues: a player agrees to shift 
her position on an issue of less importance to her in exchange of the other player making a 
concession on an issue of higher importance to the former player. (Stokman and Van Oosten 
1994, 109) This influence stage is in agreement with the conditions for issue-linkage described 
by Tollison and Willett (1979) and Morgan (1994): exchanges happen when relative saliences 
differs. Each actor investigates the potential exchanges with all the other actors on all possible 
pairs of issues and then tries to realize her best potential exchange. All exchanges are binding 
and those with the highest utility gains are realized first.  (Stokman and Van Oosten 1994, 110). 
This bargaining model relies on several assumptions. First, like in any rational choice 
model, actors are assumed to be expected utility maximizers: they choose the strategy (i.e. the 
exchange) that produces the highest utility on a given issue. Second, the utility functions of the 
actors are single-peaked and each issue is unidimensional, even though the model implies 
multidimensional linkages across issues. This implies that players’ preferences over outcomes 
can be represented on a line segment, like in any spatial model; the preferences with their 
associated utility diminish steadily the farther the Euclidian distance between the outcome and 
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the player’s ideal policy position. Actors differ in their preferences over outcomes and in the 
salience they attach to different issues under negotiation. The expected utility for each player i is 
a utility loss linear function of the salience sia attached to the issue a by player i and the distance 
between the decision outcome on the issue Xa and the player’s ideal policy position on issue a 
Pia, such that: 
EUia = - sia |Xa - Pia| 
The total expected utility for an actor i over all m issues is assumed to be the sum of her 
utilities over all issues:  
EUi = ∑
=
m
a 1
- sia |Xa - Pia|     (Stokman and Van Oosten 1994, 108-109) 
The third assumption is that preferences and voting positions, as well as the saliences on 
all issues are assumed to be common knowledge. This assumption is supported by the literature 
(Achen 2006; Thomson and Stokman 2006; Arregui, Stokman and Thomson 2006) who argue 
that the ‘consensual’ atmosphere in collective good bargaining leads to interests being revealed 
beforehand, especially in the case of extreme positions; in some cases, states make a point from 
announcing their positions. I argue that, in bargaining that involves repeated interaction between 
the same players, the endogenous mechanism of learning leads to a situation in which actors 
know the preferences of the other players.  
Fourth, actors cannot behave strategically, which means that mutually beneficial 
exchanges are possible only for actors on opposite sides of the expected outcome of both issues, 
as actors being on the same side can increase their utility just by choosing more extreme 
positions without having to give in on another issue. This implies that on issues a and b, actors' 
voting positions lie in the interval [Piu, Pju] and: 
(Piu- Xu)(Pju- Xu) < 0 for u = a,b 
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Fifth, because actors aim to obtain symmetric benefits through the exchanges, there is a 
symmetric equilibrium post-exchange12
The equilibrium concept for this game involves two aspects. First, the equilibrium is 
based on the Nash bargaining solution
: the exchange rate is equal utility gain for both actors 
involved in an exchange. In order to obtain the maximum gain, one actor needs to completely 
shift to the position of the other, whereas the latter shifts only partially to the position of the 
former; the complete shift can be realized in subsequent bilateral exchanges.  
13
The model proposed by Stokman and Van Oosten (1994) predicts decision outcomes 
according to a ‘base model’ that takes into account the voting power of actors and their policy 
positions. Van den Bos (1991) considers that larger member states have a larger weight in 
. Achen (2006, 92-120) demonstrates that Van den Bos’ 
(1991) ‘compromise formula’ for computing decision outcomes closely approximates the Nash 
bargaining solution when disagreement is the least desirable alternative. Thomson and Hosli 
(2006, 21) state that: “this modest and straightforward compromise formula embodies the best 
case study wisdom of the last century.” Second, Stokman and Van Oosten (1994, 111) draw the 
attention to the fact that the equilibrium of this game is based on intuitive reasoning and not 
derived from micro-processes, as an actor compares her expected utility on an outcome without 
exchanges with the expected outcome of the other voting for her policy position on both issues: 
"From a number of desirable axioms, an equal percentage of utility gain – instead of equal utility 
gain – is derived as the equilibrium after exchange. This solution is proven to be Pareto optimal 
for both actors, and it does not involve intersubjective comparison of utilities." (Stokman and 
Van Oosten 1994, 111)  
                                                 
12 The alternative would be the Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution. (Stokman and Van Oosten 1994, 
111) 
13 The alternative that maximizes the product of actors' utilities when the reversion point is zero. Achen (2006, 99) 
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decision making and thus proposes a ‘compromise model’ in which the Presidency makes a 
policy proposal on an issue a that represents a mean average of the policy positions pia of all n 
member states weighted according to their capabilities/resources via and the saliences sia they 
attach to issues. Stokman and Van Oosten’s position exchange model adds an intermediate 
exchange phase to Van den Bos’ compromise model and thus extends the compromise model 
from one to m issues. Accordingly, in the first stage of the position exchange model the expected 
outcomes on every issue are determined according to the compromise model; after exchanges 
have taken place and players have moved to revised positions, in the last stage the compromise 
model is used again to generate the final outcome:  
Xa = ∑
=
n
i 1
pia via sia / ∑
=
n
i 1
via sia       (Stokman and Van Oosten 1994, 114)  
Stokman and Van Oosten (1994, 115) stress the fact that both the position exchange 
model and the compromise model could be applied to decision involving numerical positions, 
like amounts of money to be spent, but cannot be used for binary outcomes (e.g. support for a 
proposal). Like in a rational choice functional approach, the compromise model emphasizes 
cooperation and the importance of information-based networks where common interests are 
more important than divergent interests, hence the high pressure to reach an agreement 
acceptable to all. On the contrary, the position exchange model is typical for a rational choice 
distributive approach that allows issue-linkages and the influence of powerful players.  
2.5.2 Analytical Narratives 
The most suitable methodology for a dynamic formal model on institutional change developed in 
the rational choice historical institutional framework is the 'analytical narrative': “An analytical 
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narrative is a case study but there is an underlying model that motivates the analysis and frames 
the empirical materials.” (Shepsle 2006, 34-35) Bates et al. have developed “the analytical 
narrative as a case-oriented methodology for studying institutional development in historical 
context.”(Bates et al. 1998) This case-study is different than in mainstream historical 
institutionalism because it is a narrative but logically rigorous account based on analytical 
models – spatial representations/ game forms – as frameworks that embed the case. One may 
argue that analytical narratives have the unique virtue of linking rational choice game theory to 
data by adding stories, accounts and contexts; this feature strengthens the validity of any rational 
choice historical approach. 
Analytical narratives add "parsimony, refinement and elegance" and contribute to the 
"historical turn in the social sciences." (Bates et al. 1998, 10) While games are useful for the 
explanations of political outcomes, one needs to build a story that accounts for the outcomes of 
interest: 
By reading documents, laboring through archives, interviewing and surveying the secondary 
literature, we seek to understand the actors’ preferences, their perceptions, their evaluation of 
alternatives, the information they possess, the expectations they form, the strategies they adopt, 
and the constraints that limit their actions. (Bates et al. 1998, 11)  
As they explore mechanisms that have generated the outcomes of interest, analytical 
narratives follow George and Bennett's (2005) 'process-tracing'. The two methodologies have in 
common the fact that they convert historical accounts into analytical ones in a theoretically 
relevant language and prescribe an iterative process in which the analyst  modifies his/her 
interpretation in light of the data. However, analytical narratives differ from process-tracing by 
putting greater emphasis on theory and by allowing not only tracing but also ways of testing the 
goodness of fit of the theory. (Bates et al. 1998, 16-17)   
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Analytical narratives trace the historical processes that unfolded the events, identify 
actors, the choices they made, the strategies adopted and not adopted, but focus on the logic of 
these processes. In doing so, analytical narratives emphasize the capacity of people to manipulate 
and strategize in order to achieve political outcomes, hence Bates' claim that “the theory is actor-
centric." (Bates et al. 1998, 14) 
On the selection of case studies, Bates et al. recommend 'soaking and poking' (Fenno 
1990) but depart from the standard prescriptions of case selection:  
When students learn research methods, they typically start by learning principles of case 
selection. Like them, we resist this point of departure. As have many of our students, we too have 
been impelled to ‘do social science’ by our fascination with particular cases: World War I, the 
French Revolution, or the US Civil War. In effect, our cases selected us, rather than the other way 
round. So compelling do we find our cases that we wish to immerse ourselves in them, but also 
construct logically persuasive and empirically valid accounts that explain how and why the events 
occurred. (Bates et al. 1998, 13)  
As George and Bennett (2005) suggest, case studies should combine deductive theory 
with empirics. Like all narratives, analytical narratives provide deep insights into the case and 
the interpretation of data, but are more vulnerable because they are constrained by very rigorous 
deductive reasoning and very close attention to empirical detail. In fact, the attention to detail is 
critical: in order to know which analytical narrative provides the best explanation, which 
equilibrium was chosen out of many and if assumptions correspond to what is known, “the 
theorist must ground his or her explanation in empirical materials, seeking the forces that shaped 
the selection of a particular equilibrium” (Bates et al. 1998, 15) Rather than testing hypotheses, 
Bates et al. prescribe that one should derive implications from theory and, when the case 
materials do not confirm the theory, it should be reformulated. (Bates et al. 1998, 16)  
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In order to explain why and how change happens in institutions-as-equilibria, I analyze 
the evolution of preferences and outcomes in a bargaining game over institutions. Exogenous and 
endogenous factors affect the preferences of actors and the outcome; the drivers of change are 
the most powerful players.  
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3.0  THE EU BUDGET AS A CASE STUDY FOR INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE  
3.1 THE CHOICE OF THE EU BUDGET AS A CASE STUDY 
In the literature on EU decision-making, the processes and outcomes of EU budgetary 
negotiations have puzzled social scientists because of several reasons. First, the history of the EU 
budget showed that change was possible in spite of the high potential to stagnate and even break 
down the Union. Second, like any negotiations on the allocation and distribution of scarce 
resources, extremely intense political bargaining characterized EU budgetary negotiations but 
still agreement was reached and certain outcomes prevailed. Third, the European Union was not 
a state but still it attempted to have an autonomous source of financing that resembled a national 
budget. Fourth, the interplay between intergovernmental and supranational institutions seemed to 
be inhibiting change in budgetary matters, especially because contentious national politics were 
brought into the EU arena. 
This puzzle of institutional change is translated into EU budgetary matters as the 
challenge of explaining the absence of budgetary ‘deadlock’. On one hand, deadlock means 
status quo bias, which is characterized by the impossibility of changing the budget due to either 
the lock-in effect of some institutions introduced in the past or the existence of two opposing 
coalitions – payers and receivers – that block change. On the other hand, deadlock means the 
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impossibility to agree on a budget, in other words a gridlock in negotiations that prevents the 
emergence of an outcome. 
Studying the absence of deadlock in EU budgetary negotiations is critical for the 
understanding of institutional change. First, a study of the EU budgetary deadlock contributes to 
the institutionalist literature that explains change and thus answers the question: how can we 
change institutions that are locked-in? Second, answering the question on the existence of 
deadlock in EU finances explains the interaction between EU member states (and institutions) in 
an area conducive to conflict - bargaining over money – and where agreement is difficult 
because of the increased heterogeneity of players. In this respect, analyzing deadlock contributes 
to the rational choice literature on negotiations because it shows how agreement is obtained and 
who influences the outcome. Third, such an enterprise increases transparency on EU decision-
making by explaining the interaction between member states and institutions within the EU 
institutional framework: while it is difficult to obtain an exact account of what happened, some 
theoretical lenses could help us understand the dynamics of negotiations. Fourth, while the 
budget has little macroeconomic significance for the Union as a whole, it is very important for 
the member states that benefit from EU funds. (Laffan and Lindner 2005, 193) The EU budget 
with its independent resources has also been a very important tool in the economic integration of 
the Union. Last but not least, studying the possibility of change in EU budgetary matters could 
help contribute to the 2008/2009 budgetary review. 
Subsequently, the question that arises is: How do we recognize deadlock when we see it? 
In order to answer this question one needs to look for evidence of the two meanings of the term 
‘deadlock’, no budgetary change and no agreement on the budget, respectively. On one hand, we 
are in deadlock when no change of the rules governing the EU budget is possible: because of the 
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lock-in effect of previous institutions, no innovation is possible therefore we do not see any new 
rules on the budget. An example of this is the 2003-2004 proposal of a new institution by the 
Commission – a generalized correction mechanism – which was not agreed upon, thus providing 
evidence for the argument that no new institutions are possible on the budget. On the other hand, 
when there is deadlock, we see veto players bringing EU budgetary negotiations into a halt – 
there is no agreement and negotiations are postponed – budgets are rejected by the budgetary 
authority and court cases on the budget are brought in front of the European Court of Justice. We 
see numerous examples of these in the early 1980s. 
The emerging literature on the EU budget has tried to explain and bring evidence of the 
existence of deadlock in EU finances, but no agreement was reached on the conceptual meaning 
of deadlock. Lindner (2006) presents statistics showing the existence of conflict in the annual 
budgetary procedure for thirteen years during the period between 1978 and 1997. Using a 
historical-institutionalist approach of institutional change, Laffan (1997), Laffan and Lindner 
(2005) and Lindner (2006) argue that the reduction in conflict on the EU annual budgets is a 
result of the lock-in effect of the introduction of the Financial Framework (FF) in 1988, which 
created a specific institutional framework for budgetary negotiations, such that instead of 
fighting every year for EU funds, the big bargains occured every five to seven years. Shackleton 
states that the 1988 decision "marked the end of a long period of bitter argument about the 
financing of the EC and generated a widespread feeling that the Community had been 
dramatically reinvigorated." (Shackleton 1990, 1)  
In this literature, the existence of a status quo bias is explained by actor-centered 
institutionalism: member states have specific preferences which interact and produce an outcome 
that cements the lock-in effect by institutions; change on the budget was possible in the past but 
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the lock-in effect of these past institutions hinders current change and thus leads to a status quo 
bias. The first institutional lock-in happened with agriculture in the early 1960s. On one hand, 
France was interested in a common agricultural policy and left the Council meetings in 1965 
because France wanted a guarantee that the common agricultural policy would have independent 
financing and the related decisions would not be taken by qualified majority voting (QMV); once 
these matters were secured, the French agreed to open accession negotiations with the UK. On 
the other hand, Germany – the main payer for agriculture – decided that the cost of agreement 
would be better than no agreement14
The second institutional lock-in started in 1970-1975 with the own resources decision and 
the budget treaty and culminated with the introduction of the UK rebate in 1984. At the time of 
accession, the UK was troubled by the financial burden caused by its reduced agricultural field 
and the continuous increase in the agricultural expenses of the Union. Since joining the Union 
was more important for the UK, once member of the Union, the UK gradually pushed the 
budgetary agenda to equity matters until it finally obtained the UK rebate in 1984 – a correction 
mechanism on the revenue side in order to ensure unanimity
.  
15
The third institutional lock-in is represented by the introduction of the FF in 1988. This 
significant change of the budget meant an extensive increase in structural funds which originated 
in the desire of member states to achieve a single market. With this change, the dynamic of net 
payers shifted in the period 1988-1994. While Germany and the UK (before its correction) were 
already paying for the Union, the Netherlands also became a net payer, a position it did not 
anticipate. The countries that joined in 1995 – Austria, Sweden and Finland – soon joined the 
. 
                                                 
14 Based on discussion in the Workshop The political economy of EU public finances: designing governance for change organized by the Bureau 
of European Policy Advisers, European Commission. Brussels, February 5, 2009.  
15 Idem. 
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club of the financers of the Union because they obtained only temporary budgetary corrections 
immediately after accession. These developments led to the current status quo bias – the 
formation in the early 1990s of two coalitions of net beneficiaries and net payers16
Another explanation of budgetary deadlock is given by Blankart and Koester (2009) who 
argue that the historical development of decision-making on the EU budget has resulted in a re-
distributive deadlock: "[…] two different historically formed coalitions now have an incentive to 
veto changes on the financing and the expenditure side, which leads to budget deadlock and 
prohibits a change […]." (Blankart and Koester 2009, 3) Trying to explain why some member 
states are consistently net payers while others are net receivers, the authors show that the threat 
of exit played an important role in the development of the budgetary deadlock. In the authors' 
view, deadlock is defined in the following way. Net receivers object to any reallocation of 
resources away from their individual interests, whereas net payers, anticipating net receivers’ 
power to attract additional resources, veto any increase in their financial burden. However, net 
payers cannot enforce a decrease of their burden, as this would be objected by net receivers. This 
leads to a status quo that is a stable equilibrium. 
.  
Blankart and Koester (2009) argue that, with the introduction of the Common Market, the 
formal rules of the Treaty were applied but, since the rules separated expenditure from revenues, 
they generated opposing coalitions with veto power on either side of the budget: the expenditure 
side became dominated by net receivers, whereas the revenue side was controlled by net payers. 
The result was a budget deadlock dominated by redistribution with a fixed allocation of benefits 
and burdens per Member State; as the concessions granted to Spain, Portugal and Greece upon 
                                                 
16 Based on discussion in the Workshop The political economy of EU public finances: designing governance for change organized by the Bureau 
of European Policy Advisers, European Commission. Brussels, February 5, 2009.  
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their accession show. The authors bring evidence of the prevalence of the status quo bias by 
comparing the average annual net payment positions per head in the period 1995 to 1999 with 
2000 to 2003 and finding a striking stability. Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Belgium, Luxembourg 
and Spain receive large net payments per head, while Denmark and Finland receive moderate net 
payments, whereas the net payers are Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria and the UK; 
France and Italy are break-even states. Only Denmark, was a net receiver in 1995-1999 and 
became a break-even state in 2000. (Blankart and Koester 2009, 14-15) 
Blankart and Koester (2009) refute the argument that the 1988 introduction of the FF 
combined agreement both on the size of the budget and the basic structure of spending and 
therefore was a decisive innovation to overcome the budget deadlock. On the contrary, the 
authors emphasize the puzzle and argue that, instead of breaking up the budget deadlock, the FF 
increased the already very large status quo bias. In support of their argument, the authors bring 
several facts: the principle of annuality of the EU budget remains, the FF has to be passed by 
unanimity and does not specify the distribution of expenditure to the member states in full detail, 
the FF does not change the general incentive of the net payers to block increases of budget 
ceilings, and the FF does not fully restrict the bargaining on the allocation of expenditures to 
member states in the annual budget procedure. The authors find that deadlock is persistent in 
spite of the 2004 enlargement and the changes proposed by the Lisbon Treaty, therefore the 
mainly redistributive nature of the EU budget is likely to continue. (Blankart and Koester 2009, 
16) 
Kauppi and Widgren (2009) define the status quo bias in the EU budget on the basis of a 
game theoretic power distribution that specifies the relative voting power of each member state 
in the Council of Ministers, assuming that each state's share in the budget derives from its votes. 
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When comparing actual budget shares with this power distribution, the authors find that France, 
Germany, Spain and Greece have excess power, as they systematically receive more funds than 
their power distribution implies; by contrast, Austria, Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands, 
Denmark, UK, Belgium and Luxembourg systematically obtain smaller shares from the EU 
budget than their power distribution implies, therefore their excess power is negative; the shares 
received by Italy, Portugal and Ireland approximate their power distribution. In particular, France 
has excess power in CAP but negative excess power in structural funds, Spain, Germany and 
Greece have excess power in both structural funds and CAP, Portugal has excess power in 
structural funds but a negative one in CAP. In the authors' view, a high status quo bias is given 
by high excess power: countries with high excess power want an increase in funds, but countries 
with negative excess power will block any increase. This explains the stability – no change – of 
the budget over time. (Kauppi and Widgren 2009, 3) 
Ackrill and Kay (2006) define deadlock in a slightly different way. Since changes in the 
budget are a zero-sum game, member states' interest is to safeguard their shares of the EU 
budget: every member state wants to maximize its budget share, but short of that preserving a 
member state's share is the second best outcome. This implies that the status quo is always 
maintained and no changes are possible, hence the EU budgetary negotiations have recently 
shifted to a debate on maintaining or even reducing the size of the budget: the 1999 inter-
institutional agreement has made unexpected spending increases very difficult and the Lisbon 
Treaty tightens the budget rules even further.  However, the authors argue that there is pressure 
leading to institutional change, and this pressure is endogenous to the EU budget. (Ackrill and 
Kay 2006, 128-130) Since reform of the policy framework is costly, the authors conceive change 
as additional institutions being layered on top of existing ones. (Ackrill and Kay 2006, 113-114) 
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The other meaning of deadlock, as mentioned above, is the impossibility to obtain 
agreement on the budget. This was a hotly debated issue before last enlargement and has re-
emerged with the global financial crisis. Before 2004, some policy-makers in Brussels and the 
EU-15 and some social scientists argued that, as more countries join the EU, the decision-making 
mechanisms become more complex, hence the increased likelihood to end in deadlock, 
especially in a field where money is involved:  “The conventional view is that the increase in the 
number of member states and the greater diversity of their views will not only create pressure for 
financial transfers, it will also trigger breakdown or gridlock in the EU’s decision-making 
process.” (Moravcsik and Vachudova 2003, 54) 
In the 1980s and in the first half of the 1990s, there were numerous cases of no agreement 
(i.e. deadlock) on the EC/EU17
Thomson and Hosli (2006) emphasize the danger of deadlock by giving examples of the 
challenges European decision-makers face in reaching political agreements. The authors argue 
that the deadlock from the June 2005 negotiations on the 2007-2013 FF was a result of the 
French and Dutch referenda that rejected the Constitutional Treaty: forced by the referendum, the 
Dutch Prime Minister asked for a sizeable reduction in the Dutch net payments to the budget, the 
UK refused to discuss its correction mechanism and “agreement failed due to negative votes of 
the UK, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Finland.” (Thomson and Hosli 2006, 1-2) 
  budgets, as they were rejected or contested quite often. Lindner 
(2006) presents statistics showing the existence of deadlock – rejections of the budget or court 
cases involving budgetary decisions– in the annual budgetary procedure for thirteen years during 
the period between 1978 and 1997.   
                                                 
17 European Communities before 1994. 
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With the more recent financial crisis, an argument that has been gaining ground is that, 
under financial strain from bailing out their banks and industries and given the difficulties to 
coordinate action at EU level, some member states will no longer be able to comply with EU 
rules and therefore will paralyze EU decision-making in areas involving money, hence the 
emergence of deadlock. 
There is also a normative component of the deadlock issue but there is no agreement on if 
it is good or bad to keep the status quo; the opportunity costs of keeping the status quo have not 
been properly identified. Coalition theory argues that the larger the coalition needed to change 
the status quo, the more public goods are provided, whereas the smaller the size of the winning 
coalition, the higher the likelihood of bribery and clientele spending. When unanimity is the rule, 
it is clear that the EU has a high threshold for changing the status quo, like the US, therefore the 
EU should produce more public goods and less pork barrel, according to the theory. However, 
this contradicts the distributive nature of the EU budget, locked-in by the opposing coalition of 
net contributors and net beneficiaries, hence the additional puzzle – if deadlock exists, is it good? 
Given the rules that govern the EU budgetary processes over time and the influence of 
actors on outcomes, rational choice historical institutionalism is the appropriate theoretical 
approach for the study of EU budgetary negotiations. 
3.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE EU BUDGETARY PROCEDURE 
The process of making budgets in the EU involves negotiations on both the FF and the annual 
budget that engage the two arms of the budgetary authority – the Council and the European 
Parliament (EP) – and the Commission as agenda-setter and mediator. Although the Council 
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(representing the member states), the EP, and the Commission prefer different levels of increases 
in budgetary resources, the outcomes of the budgetary negotiations show that agreement can be 
reached under different institutional voting rules – qualified majority (QMV) and unanimity.   
While there is a close relationship between the FF and the annual budget, there are 
important differences between the two procedures. The annual budgetary procedure is based on 
Articles 268 - 280 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community18 and Article 177 of the 
Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community.  The EU budget has common 
features with a national budget:  unity19, annuality20, specification21, but it has two distinct 
characteristics: universality22 and equilibrium23.  The own resources system24 is the revenue side 
of the EU budget that relies on the contributions of member states, capped at 1.24% of the EU 
GNI (Gross National Income)25.  Before June 15 every year, the Commission presents the 
preliminary draft budget to the Council.  Before July 31, the Council conducts its first reading 
and votes by qualified majority26 on the draft budget, which is then sent to the EP.  In October, 
the EP holds its first reading and proposes modifications on compulsory expenditures27 by a 
majority of votes cast and amendments on non-compulsory expenditure28
                                                 
18 Nice consolidated version 2002 
 by a majority of 
members; then, the draft budget is 'shuttled' to the Council. During the third week in November, 
19 There is only one budgetary document in which revenues and expenditures are listed. 
20 The budget refers to only one financial year. 
21 All expenditures and revenues have to be mentioned in an article of the budget, otherwise the funds cannot be 
collected or spent. 
22 There are no special revenues out of which particular items of expenditures are financed.  
23 No deficit or surplus is allowed; if a deficit occurs, it is entered as expenditure in the coming financial year; if a 
surplus occurs, it is carried over as revenue to the next financial year. 
24 The EU own resources are made up of the following: traditional own resources (custom duties, agricultural and 
sugar levies), VAT resource (a uniform percentage of each member state’s capped VAT base) and GNI resources (a 
uniform percentage of each member state’s GNP). 
25 Equivalent to 1.27% of GNP according to the old European System of Accounts (prior to 1995) 
26 The qualified majority is explained in Section 4. 
27 Compulsory expenditure results directly from the treaties or other Cummonity acts; it mainly covers agricultural 
policy. 
28 Non-compulsory expenditure mainly covers regional policy. 
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the Council holds the second reading and votes by qualified majority on the EP amendments and 
modifications.  If there are still disagreements between the Council and the EP, a conciliation 
meeting is held between the two budgetary players, with the Commission acting as mediator.  
The amended draft budget is sent back to the EP for the second reading in December.  By a 
majority of members, the EP accepts or rejects the Council's proposals on non-compulsory 
expenditure, and then either adopts the budget with a majority of members or rejects the entire 
budget. 
The FF is intended to pinpoint the budgetary priorities for a given period (usually five to 
seven years) and set ceilings for expenditures, so that forthcoming unexpected increases are kept 
under control.  It is worth noting that the FF is not a multi-annual budget, but a forecast of 
maximum expenditures that introduces a budgetary constraint and thus helps to maintain 
budgetary discipline that is respected by all budgetary players. As the FF does not allow large 
budgetary changes from one year to another, the EU budget becomes incremental, like any other 
budget. The FF is the reference point, it  stipulates the upper limits on every spending category 
and redistributes the actual amounts to be spent each year on every policy and program. What is 
distributed in the annual budget is the margin between the actual expenditures and the FF 
ceilings. The FF stipulates a ‘revision clause’ that allows a modification of up to 5% of the FF 
ceilings. The annual budgetary negotiations usually reflect the FF pattern: the most important 
debates are on agriculture and structural funds, whereas on internal policies member states 
generally leave a margin for the EP priorities, after satisfying external policies requirements and 
some ‘pet’ policies, like R&D. Compared to the FF negotiations, the annual budgetary procedure 
is less visible but still not just a simple formality, as the FF has not taken away the entire 
substance of the annual negotiations. However, without the ceilings imposed by the FF, it would 
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be easier for the budgetary players to refuse a compromise and thus end in deadlock in the 
annual budgetary procedure. This explains the common view that the FF has introduced 
budgetary discipline into the EU. 
As mentioned above, the EU budgetary architecture comprises two levels of negotiations 
on the allocation and distribution of resources. While the FF is mainly negotiated by member 
states, the annual procedure involves bargaining between the Council and the EP, with the 
Commission serving as agenda-setter and mediator. Due to the difference in rules and player-
structure, the EP often uses the annual procedure to increase its budgetary power. Different 
institutional rules operate for the two different budgetary negotiations involving member states: 
the FF is subject to unanimity voting, which gives every state the possibility to veto an 
agreement; on the contrary, member states vote by QMV on the annual budget and thus have the 
possibility to form coalitions for or against an agreement.  Moreover, the 1988 budgetary reform 
that introduced the FF gave the Commission and the EP the possibility to demand concessions on 
the FF through signing an inter-institutional agreement with the Council. The inter-institutional 
agreement (IIA) is the mechanism that actually ensures budgetary discipline by forcing every 
player to comply with the rules. If a member state wants to obtain an increase in the budget of a 
particular policy, in principle it must first negotiate it in the FF to ensure the available resources; 
otherwise, a revision of the FF (up to 5%) might be insufficient or impossible to satisfy such a 
demand.  
The complex EU budgetary construction has received special attention from the scholars 
of European integration that favor a historical institutionalist approach. Lindner (2006) argues 
that institutional change in 1988 – i.e. the introduction of the multi-annual perspective – led to a 
decrease in the conflict between the budgetary authorities. In Lindner’s view, the problematic 
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design of the 1970 budget treaty – the exclusion of the distributive and institutional interests of 
the new members and the EP, and the wide scope of interpretation – explains budgetary conflict 
in the 1980s (Lindner 2006, 2).  Laffan and Lindner (2005) argue that lower conflict on the EU 
annual budget is the result of the lock-in effect of the multi-annual budgetary bargains. The 
authors acknowledge the intergovernmental nature of the budgetary game and theorize that the 
power of the EP has increased considerably in budgetary matters, while the influence of the 
Commission has decreased over time: "since it was granted budgetary powers in 1975, the EP 
has regarded EU finances as one of its key channels of influence vis-à-vis the Council." (Laffan 
and Lindner 2005, 210-211).   
Even though Lindner focuses on the reduction of conflict in the budgetary procedure and 
explains the constraining effect of the FF, the author acknowledges, but does not develop, the 
link between enlargement and budgetary issues: an increase in the heterogeneity of member 
states intensifies conflict over redistribution and enlargement reduces this conflict only when it is 
linked to budgetary decisions (Lindner 2006, 30). Further, Lindner argues that “integration 
decisions and the treaty renegotiations had a limited impact on annual budgetary decision-
making, but a considerable effect on multi-annual negotiations.” (Lindner 2006, 85) In terms of 
resources distribution, Lindner claims that allocation decisions are made by the FF, whereas the 
“annual fine-tuning” is left to budgetary experts. The author notes that the debates between the 
Council and the EP were over “(…) small amounts or declarations, which had limited 
distributive importance, but were of symbolic value,” (Lindner 2006, 110) but does not further 
discuss the implications of these.  
Laffan (1997) provides a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of EU public finances 
and the political processes that led to the institutional rules that form the EU budget. As the 
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economic and market integration of the Union progressed, common policies emerged, hence the 
multiplication of financial instruments made available at EU level. Financial autonomy from the 
member states was truly gained only with the creation of the system of own resources, as the 
Commission used the EU finances to gain the upper hand on member states. For many years, 
fierce conflict characterized budgetary debates, on one hand between the Council and the EP and 
on the other hand between member states on contributions to the budget and net balances. Last 
but not least, enlargement has had a strong impact on EU finances. (Laffan 1997, 1-14) 
Laffan (2000) highlights the role of the (German) presidency in large package deal 
negotiations like the Agenda 2000. As the presidency is the architect of a compromise, the cost 
of obtaining agreement is paid by the presidency abandoning its national interest: in the case of 
Agenda 2000, Germany dropped the request of cutting its net contribution in exchange for 
agreement in Berlin under the German presidency. (Laffan 2000, 1-3) 
Ackrill and Kay (2006) approach the development of the EU budget from the same 
historical institutionalist perspective. The authors’ fine-grained approach hopes to correct the 
weak points of historical institutionalism and path dependence, namely the impossibility to 
explain change.  The authors view institutions as single/complex set of rules governing the 
interactions of political actors and conceive of a matrix of layered institutions as making up a 
policy framework. As change means policy reform, it can occur at the level of either the 
individual institution or the policy framework. There are two types of layers:  the spatial layer is 
made up of the individual decision (i.e. the individual  budgetary institutions) the collective 
choice of policy decision (i.e. the policy framework of the EU budget) and the 
macro/constitutional level (EU decision-making on budgetary matters); the temporal layering 
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deals with the past and the matching between institutions and the designers’ intentions.  (Ackrill 
and Kay 2006, 113-114) 
In the opinion of Ackrill and Kay, the initial set of budgetary institutions was unable to 
fulfill their treaty objectives. Since reforming the policy framework was costly due to the 
unanimity rule, additional institutions were layered on top of the existing ones to preserve the 
key institutions – the balanced budget rule (introduced by the 1957 Treaty of Rome) and the 
compulsory / non- compulsory distinction (introduced by the 1970 Luxembourg Treaty). When 
analyzing budgetary institutions, Ackrill and Kay divide them into procedural constraints (i.e. 
compulsory / non-compulsory) – affecting the rules for reaching a collective decision – and 
domain constraints (i.e. the balanced budget rule, the maximum annual increase rate) – defining 
possible outcomes under the given procedures. (Ackrill and Kay 2006, 113-114) The authors 
argue that the pressures leading to institutional change were endogenous to the EU budget. In 
particular, the CAP price support increased spending over the own-resources limit, such that in 
1984 and 1985 the EU budget required additional payments from the member states. (Ackrill and 
Kay 2006, 129-130) As a consequence, the 1984 Fontainbleau Council had to agree on a 
budgetary constraint that introduced dairy production quotas and the UK rebate and increased 
VAT call-up rate to 1.4% to accommodate Portugal and Spain from 1986. In December 1984, a 
further constraint stopped CAP expenditure from growing more than the own resources. (Ackrill 
and Kay 2006, 120). 
Since changes in the budget are a zero-sum game, Ackrill and Kay (2006) state that 
member states had the interest to preserve their shares of the EU budget: every member state 
would want to maximize its budget share, so that preserving its share would be the second best 
outcome, hence the importance of the net balance. However, this implies that the status quo is 
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always maintained and no change is ever possible; the authors claim to explain change, but their 
argument runs into the same problem as historical institutionalism – the impossibility to predict 
change. 
In response to Lindner’s argument, Ackrill and Kay (2006, 130) argue that the 1988 
reform made the balanced budget rule more transparent, added ‘budgetary discipline’ by 
controlling the rise in own resources and introduced the inter-institutional agreement to avoid the 
regular clashes between the EP and the Council, but did not alter the compulsory definition and 
the open-ended nature of CAP support; the 'supposed' 1988 stabilization stipulated that, if 
production exceeded a certain level, support prices would be cut the following year and CAP 
spending ceiling would be 74% of the EU GDP growth rate (Ackrill and Kay 2006, 124-125)  
“The limits on EU spending set out in the FF are endogenous to the EU budgetary process…FF 
thereby strengthened both procedural and domain constraints, developing significantly the 
institutional setting of the EU budget process.” (Ackrill and Kay 2006, 125) Since the reform 
lacked an effective enforcement mechanism, “by 1992 the balanced budget rule was again 
threatened by ever-rising CAP spending.” (Ackrill and Kay 2006, 130) The authors claim that 
the reform needed was the 1992 decoupling of production from levels of support, continued in 
2003 by granting direct support to farmers. The 2003 CAP reform further strengthened the 
balanced budget rule by introducing a financial discipline requirement stipulating cuts in direct 
payments if spending raises over 300 million Euro above the FF ceilings. The authors refute 
some of Lindner’s arguments: the 1988 reform was crucial, as Lindner states, but needed the 
endogenous pressure of the 1992 MacSharry reform to ensure a balanced budget, reduce support 
prices by 30%, introduce direct payments to farmers and decoupling from production. The 
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authors note that another possible alternative – a new definition for compulsory expenditure – 
had ‘enormous bargaining costs’. (Ackrill and Kay 2006, 127) 
Last but not least, Ackrill and Kay (2006, 128) note that recently the EU budget debate 
has shifted from negotiating more money for specific policies to maintaining or even reducing 
the size of the budget. The 1999 inter-institutional agreement has made unexpected spending 
increases very difficult: if the increase is less than 0.03% of EU-GNP, the Council must agree by 
QMV and the EP by a majority of members and 3/5 of votes cast; if the increase exceeds 0.03%, 
both EP and the Council must agree, but the Council must vote by unanimity. The Lisbon Treaty 
tightens the budget rules even further: the decisions on own resources require unanimity in the 
Council; the Council may act by QMV on FF by a unanimous decision of the European Council, 
and the distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure is eliminated. 
Member states' concerns with their EU budget balances have become critical for the 
budgetary negotiations. Bache (1999) argues that, when the second FF was negotiated in 1992, 
there were no concerns with net positions. The author hypothesizes that Germany did not want to 
have its efforts for unification be compensated by a smaller contribution to European integration. 
The author claims that the question of EU budget balance was brought about by German 
Länders, taken up by the federal government and then by the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden. 
Bache (1999, 20-23) 
Besides member states, the other EU institutions have a stake in the EU budgetary 
negotiations. Van den Berge (1999) argues that inter-institutional conflict between the Council, 
the Commission and the EP is based on 3 main differences in preferences: expenditure 
classification, legal basis for expenditure and the use of reserves. In terms of expenditure 
classification, the obligatory budgetary commitments were linked in 1982 to the internal and 
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external obligations deriving from the treaties and the inter-institutional agreement of 1988 
classified structural policies and internal policies as non-obligatory. The 1995 budgetary conflict 
centered on this classification of expenditure. In the first reading, the EP adopted amendments on 
the EAGGF-Guarantee and Fisheries Agreement; when the Council voted against them, the EP 
rejected the entire budget and stopped the procedure, arguing against that all commitments that 
do not relate to agreements and protocols in force are non-obligatory. The Court of Justice 
annulled the EP President’s decision, but without expressing an opinion on the distinction 
obligatory/non-obligatory. Article 16 of the inter-institutional agreement proposed a solution to 
the conflict: if the Council and the EP do not agree, the Commission proposes to classify as non-
obligatory Headings 2 and 3 (structural actions and internal policies) and agricultural 
expenditures that are not market organizations, and as obligatory Headings 4 (fisheries 
agreements and contributions to BERD) and 5 (pensions etc). (Van den Berge 1999, 20-21) The 
EP uses the legal basis to express its priorities and thus enhance its powers over the budget. The 
Court of Justice has established that there must be a legal basis for budgetary expenditures (i.e. 
regulation, directive, decision) and no commitment stipulated in the budget can be made without 
it. The inter-institutional agreement allows one exception – pilot projects and preparatory actions 
for some limited amounts. (Van den Berge 1999, 21-22) Finally, the EP regularly puts 
commitments in reserve. Art. 19 (para. 4) of the Financial Regulation stipulates that ‘reserves for 
unforeseen’ are commitments that can be used only by transfers (‘virements’). In practice, the EP 
uses reserves when the commitments seem too high and the EP has doubts or wants to keep a 
means to exert some pressure on the Council; if some conditions need to be fulfilled, the EP lifts 
the reserves only if the conditions are met. The Commission is of the opinion that the EP abuses 
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the use of reserves, arguing that, according to Art. 274, the Commission is in charge of executing 
the budget and the EP should not mix into the budgetary execution. (Van den Berge 1999, 23-24) 
Blankart and Koester (2009) explain why some countries became net payers/receivers 
and argue that the historical development of decision-making on the EU budget has resulted in 
deadlock, which makes change unlikely. The authors attempt to answer the questions: Why is 
there so much redistribution and why are some Member states consistent net payers and others 
consistent net receivers? The authors use the theory of incomplete contracts and show that the 
threat of exit led to the formation of two coalitions, net payers and net beneficiaries who block 
any change in the budget.  
When applying the theory of incomplete constitutional contracts to the EU budget 
process, the authors distinguish four different stages. The first is the contractual stage:  the 
Treaty of Rome of 1957 was typically an incomplete contract, therefore post-contractual 
decisions on redistribution had to be expected. In post-contractual stages I (1958 - 1970) and II 
(1971 - 1986), redistribution happened according to the rules of the Treaty, but also through 
threat. Member states that had alternative policy options and were able to harm the other member 
states by terminating their membership used their threatening power to enforce their distributive 
goals in the budget. As empirical evidence for the exit threats, the authors cite the 1966 'empty 
chair crisis' and the concessions made then to France and the 1984 Fontainebleau agreement on 
the UK rebate. (Blankart and Koester 2009, 7-12) 
In post-contractual stage III (1987-2003), threats became increasingly less credible 
because cooperation had progressed in the Common Market, therefore the loss from terminating 
membership would have been large. The formal rules of the Treaty were applied to the status quo 
that resulted from the previous post-contractual stages but, as the rules separated expenditure 
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from revenues, they generated opposing coalitions with veto power on either side of the budget: 
the expenditure side became dominated by net receivers, whereas the revenue side was 
controlled by net payers. The authors find the same persistence of deadlock in post-contractual 
stage IV (2004-2009) and in the impact of the changes proposed by the Treaty of Lisbon. 
(Blankart and Koester 2009, 12-19) 
As a way out of the deadlock and an increased provision of public goods, the authors 
propose the introduction of a new, separate public good budget  based on individual 
contributions, with an individual right of termination and granting every member state the right 
to propose new public good projects whose cost they should finance. This newly proposed public 
good budget could be implemented by using the existing option of enhanced cooperation. 
(Blankart and Koester 2009, 19-22) 
Kauppi and Widgren (2004) argue that selfish power politics is likely to drive EU 
decision-making in general and the allocation of EU budget in particular, while needs play only a 
minor role: political power explains about 60% of the member states' budget receipts whereas the 
remaining 40% derive from member states' needs; when correlated preferences and cooperative 
voting patterns between member states are allowed, 95% of the budget shares can be explained 
by voting power measures. Kauppi and Widgren (2007) argue that budget shares can be 
explained solely by political power if Franco-German cooperation is taken into account. 
Kauppi and Widgren (2009) focus on the allocation of EU budget funds and analyze how 
the budget is determined in the current system. The underlying research question is: why are 
some countries net contributors and others net beneficiaries? Thus the puzzle the authors want to 
address is what approach governs the determination of the EU budget allocations – the power 
politics view or the needs view. The power politics view argues that the EU budget is primarily 
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determined by selfish member states who use their political power to obtain as much return for 
their own country as they can. The needs view states that the principle of solidarity between 
member states governs the EU budget, such that the common funds are redistributed to the 
poorest regions of the EU. The authors' argument is that neither the power politics view nor the 
needs view alone can explain the EU budget allocations. (Kauppi and Widgren 2009, 2-5) 
Kauppi and Widgren (2009) treat the EU budgetary negotiations as a divide-up-the-cake 
problem, the authors adopt a formal cooperative approach and evaluate actors' voting power by 
using the Shapley-Shubik Index (SSI) as a proxy for power distribution. The SSI evaluates the 
probability of an actor to be pivotal in a coalition (i.e. turn a losing coalition into winning): the 
percentage of an actor's pivotal positions out of all possible pivotal positions predicts her 
expected influence on the (voting) outcome, hence her share of the cake – share of receipts in the 
allocation of budget expenditure. However, the problem with the SSI measure is that it does not 
offer a very accurate description of the actual power distribution of member states. The SSI 
assumes that voters' preferences and thus the probabilities of voting yes are correlated in the 
same way regardless of the group of actors (i.e. the assumption of uniform distribution). 
However, in reality there are groups of member states with similar interests that cooperate more 
closely on a range of issues. If such cooperative groups of member states are repetitively formed, 
the SSI yields an imprecise measure of true power distribution among the member states. 
(Kauppi and Widgren 2009, 10-11) 
Kauppi and Widgren (2009) argue that their findings show that selfish power politics is 
the driving force but the benchmark measure of power they use does not capture the power 
distribution right. Faced with this evidence, the authors hypothesize that actual budget allocation 
is partly determined by the contractual rules agreed in the FF and partly by the power 
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distribution, and member states may agree to contribute more to the EU budget if they are 
promised some money back on the spending side of the budget (bring the bacon home 
hypothesis). These hypotheses are based on some assumptions regarding the power distribution 
in the FF: newcomers have less power than the incumbent member states, big senior member 
states have more power than small senior member states and rich member states have more 
power than poor countries. To test these hypotheses, the authors regress the share of expenditures 
on political power (SSI), income per capita and share of contributions. The authors interpret the 
statistical significance of SSI and contributions as evidence that the budget shares are determined 
as a weighted average of political power and contribution, hence member states tend to get a 
portion of their money back automatically; in addition, solidarity might play a role in the 
determination of structural spending. The authors' conclusion is that on the total level of the 
budget power politics plays the key role. (Kauppi and Widgren 2009, 20-22) 
3.3 DYNAMIC CHANGE IN THE EU BUDGET 
I argue that exogenous and endogenous factors unlock the deadlock on the EU budget: due to the 
pressure created by exogenous shocks like enlargement, endogenized through processes like 
learning and reinforcement, the resources of member states change, as does the distribution of 
their benefits deriving from the institutional arrangements on the EU budget. As a result of this 
change, the budgetary institutions are no longer in equilibrium; the member states whose benefits 
decrease as a result of this change – the net contributors – will push for radical changes in the 
moment of renegotiation. Through the use of issue-linkages in renegotiation, the most powerful 
actors – the net contributors – become the drivers of change. As a result of exogenous pressure, 
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member states become aware of the altered distribution of benefits through the endogenous 
mechanism of learning, which thus changes their preferences. In parallel with the mechanism of 
learning, the institution of ‘net balance’ is endogenously reinforced: this institution becomes 
more and more salient for the main contributors to the EU budget, such that it determines them to 
use issue-linkage in renegotiations in order to obtain a favorable agreement. The rebate is 
another institution that is reinforced, in spite of its unpopularity, because it augments the 
distributional benefits of the net contributors. The result of institutional change in the EU budget 
resembles 'layering' and 'institutional refinement': old and new budgetary rules coexist in every 
new agreement on the budget. In particular, the reinforced institutions of balance and rebate are 
refined or layered on the other institutions that represent the distributional benefits of the budget. 
Every budgetary outcome represents a change of the budgetary institutions. In EU 
budgetary matters, an absence of change would be recognized as the reversion point – last 
agreement on the budget:  
“Should the two arms of the budgetary authority fail to agree on a new financial 
perspective, and unless the existing financial perspective is expressly denounced by one of the 
parties to this Agreement, the ceilings for the last year covered by the existing financial 
perspective will be adjusted in accordance with paragraph 15 by applying to these amounts the 
average rate of increase observed over the preceding period, excluding any adjustments made to 
take account of enlargement of the Union.” (Inter Institutional Agreement of 6 May 1999 
C172/1). 
While EU budgets change incrementally in the annual procedure, substantial change 
marks the negotiations of the FF. The institutions that make up the outcome of the FF 
negotiations are somewhat thin due to the renegotiation clause: change happens at a pre-defined 
point in time – every five or seven years – when the FF is renegotiated; this is explained by the 
 74 
fact that, when the FF was introduced, the designers anticipated changes in both preferences and 
distributional benefits and wanted to ensure that the resulting disequilibrium would be corrected 
through renegotiation in due time. 
Since the net contributors are the drivers of change in EU budgetary outcomes, the 
meaning of ‘net contributor’ needs to be properly understood. The concept of net contributor 
derives from the institution of net balance with the EU budget – an accounting exercise that 
shows the difference between the amounts a country contributes to the EU budget and the funds 
it receives from the EU budget through spending programs. It follows that a net contributor is a 
member state whose contribution to the EU budget exceeds the benefits it receives from the 
budget. However, the institution of net balance is more complicated than it actually seems 
because of its technical nature. On one hand, every country’s contribution to the EU revenues is 
paid every month by the respective finance ministry based on forecasts of the VAT base and the 
GNI and corrections are made the following year. This contribution to EU revenues needs to be 
calculated into the national budget, since it is a constant payment made from the national budget. 
An increase in a state’s contribution to the EU would mean an increase in its budgetary deficit, 
hence the concerns of breaking the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact. On the other hand, the 
funds that a country receives from the EU budget do not go as revenues into the national budget; 
on the contrary, for most program payments the conditionality of co-financing applies, therefore 
the national budget has to specify these co-financing amounts as payments from the national 
budget. The funds disbursed from the EU budget go through national paying agencies to the 
beneficiaries, therefore the finance ministry has difficulties in calculating with precision the net 
balance with the EU budget.  
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In fact, the monopoly of information on the technical calculation of net balances rests 
with the European Commission, which is somewhat reticent in making these balances public (the 
Annual Allocation Reports depict revenues and expenditures separately). Through the 
endogenous mechanism of learning, this information becomes available to member states and 
thus alters their preferences and their distributional benefits deriving from the EU budgetary 
agreements. However, the Commission is against the reinforcement of the institution of balance, 
arguing that one should not look at net balances because different rationales are behind the own 
resources system of the EU and spending programs; moreover, the benefits of integration derive 
from the integration into the single market. For instance, the Commission argues that the 
traditional own resources are Community resources because they follow from the common trade 
policy29
Ackrill and Kay (2006) acknowledge this shift in preferences and benefits by arguing that 
the EU budget debate has shifted from distribution on policies and programs to the overall size of 
the budget and the net balance of each member state. On the contrary, Bache’s (2002) argument 
.  However, endogenous mechanisms draw a thin line between solidarity, fair burden 
sharing and ‘juste retour’. As the number of poor regions has multiplied with the exogenous 
shock of enlargement, the net contributors have started to endogenously feel the burden: they 
want to support less developed countries but they feel that it is not fair to support poor countries 
and poor regions in developed countries, which should take a fair share of the burden. If 
enlargement had not have progressed, there would not have been any concerns with net balances 
and net payers would have been content to pay amounts that seem outrageous today: the 
Fontainebleau agreement on the UK rebate was possible in 1984 but such an agreement would 
have been impossible starting with the 1990s because of the shifting positions of the net payers. 
                                                 
29The member states with strategic points of import into the Community, like Rotterdam, received a reimbursement 
of 25% of the costs for the collection of custom duties. 
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on why there were no net balance concerns before 1992 is too simplistic and ignores the behavior 
of the other net contributors: in Bache’s view, Germany did not let its Eastern Germany 
reconstruction efforts affect its EU budgetary contribution and thus offered to be the main payer 
for European integration. In fact, the preferences of the net payers point to the importance of 
resources and power in distributional bargaining: the ones who pay also want to be the ones who 
make the rules. The concerns with equity, embodied by the idea of ‘juste retour’, are just the 
packaging for an utility maximization argument in a zero-sum game: the net contributors want to 
increase their benefits from the EU and a way to do this is to decrease the benefits of those who 
are at the same level of development – i.e. the rich states. In the early days of European 
integration, the founding countries supported one another in the after-war recovery effort and 
none of them was concerned with who paid most – negotiation was in the mode of functional 
bargaining where the concern for the collective good prevailed; after the number of poor regions 
started to accumulate, net payers’ positions started to gravitate on the institution of balance. 
The causal inference in my theory is the impact of exogenous and endogenous factors on 
the EU actors’ preferences – positions and saliences over issues – and the distributional outcome; 
as a result of these intervening variables, change in budgetary institutions-as-equilibria is 
obtained through the use of issue-linkages in renegotiation. The positions and saliences of EU 
actors have been historically constructed since the early days of the Union. The exogenous 
pressure created by every enlargement is endogenized through the mechanisms of learning and 
reinforcement, thus leading to changes in the preferences of the actors and their payoffs, in 
particular those of the net contributors. The pressure leading to institutional change thus becomes 
endogenous to the EU budget, as Ackrill and Kay argue (2006, 128).  
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The introduction of the UK rebate30
As enlargement progressed, the pressure on financial flows increased: "the Mediterranean 
enlargement brought pressure for more progressive budgetary transfers.” (Laffan and Lindner 
2005, 192) The 1988 budgetary reform resulted in significant institutional change: the amounts 
of regional spending increased considerably and the new members were the main beneficiaries; a 
new institution was introduced – the additional resource based on the GNP of member states; the 
role of the VAT resource was reduced – testimony of the endogenous process of undermining 
(the opposite of reinforcement) – through the capping of the VAT base at 55 % of the GNP of 
each member state; however,  the UK rebate was reinforced: its calculation was modified so that 
its financing could be split among the other member states according to their share in total EC 
GNP, the share of Germany being reduced. (Council Decision 88/376). 
 in 1984 opened Pandora’s box on net balances. This 
represents the first instance of a net contributor with a changed preference of ‘juste retour’: 
obtain at least what they put in. This is also the first case of exogenous ‘pressure’ that is 
endogenized: the accession of the UK created budgetary imbalances because the UK had to pay 
for the exploding costs for Community agriculture but had a small agricultural sector and 
therefore was getting little money back, hence the concerns with ‘juste retour’ (Laffan 1997, 51-
54) 
This combined endogenous and exogenous change led to a significant increase in 
Germany’s net contribution to the EU budget, in spite of the correction it got on its contribution 
                                                 
30 At its introduction, the UK rebate was calculated as a correction of the UK own resources payments:       “66% of 
total EU allocated expenditure multiplied by the difference between the UK share of the EU uncapped VAT base 
and the UK share of total EU allocated expenditure.” (Commission Document 2005, 6)  
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to the UK rebate31
Germany’s position consolidated on conservative spending from the EU budget. In spite 
of the benefits for Eastern Germany after unification, Germany benefited much less from the 
policies financed at EU level as compared to the financial flows transferred to the EU budget. 
This financial burden was complicated by the fact that German unification brought the country to 
the sixth place in terms of GDP per capita. (Laffan 1997, 55) Since the German Länder directly 
contributed to the EU budget, both the Länder and the federal government started to feature 
‘juste retour’ as a preference. This pressure on Germany was complementary to the role 
Germany had as a hegemonic stabilizer in the region: the theory of hegemonic stability posits 
that the hegemon agrees to pay for integration because it benefits from the stability in the area 
and a larger market. (Krasner 1989; Kindleberger 1996) 
; as a result, the institution of net balance became very salient. Germany’s 
financial burden was accentuated in 1992, when the Delors-2 package was negotiated. The final 
agreement is testimony of significant change: structural expenditures increased with 41% and 
introduced the Cohesion Fund to help the newer members: Portugal, Greece and Spain and the 
older but less wealthy Ireland. Further, a subsequent 1994 Decision introduced a progressive 
reduction over the period 1995-1999 of the capping of the VAT base down to 50 % and of the 
maximum VAT call rate down to 1 %, while leaving the calculation of the UK rebate unchanged. 
(Council Decision 94/728).  
Starting with 1990, the position of Netherlands suffered a similar dramatic change in 
preferences and distributional benefits: from net beneficiary (mainly from agricultural funds) 
Netherlands became a net contributor, the largest in terms of per capita contribution. The 
                                                 
31 While the other member states pay their contribution to the rebate in full, Germany obtained a correction from the 
beginning:  “the share of Germany being reduced by • “, where “•“  is supposed to be two thirds of its normal 
contribution to the UK rebate, so that Germany would have to pay only one third. (Commission Document 2005, 6) 
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alteration of distributional benefits in particular was due to the fact that the MacSharry CAP 
reform did not cover the sectors where the Dutch had most of their production; the Dutch did not 
benefit from the increase in structural funds either, as the Netherlands was one of the wealthiest 
member states, hence the Dutch position on equity against the wealthy member states that still 
benefited from regional support. (Laffan 1997, 57-58) 
The 1995 accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden brought more net  contributors into 
the Union, emphasizing the exogenous and endogenous pressure for institutional change. While 
these three countries made claims to the funds disbursed through agriculture and regional aid and 
obtained lump sum payments to correct for their net balances immediately after accession, their 
positions and preferences were those of net contributors to the EU budget.  
By the time Agenda 2000 was negotiated, the endogenous mechanism of learning was 
well developed such that the net contributors were well aware of their financial burden; the 
institutions of balance and rebate were strongly reinforced, such that their position was to reduce 
spending from the budget through correction mechanisms. Richter (2005) rightly argues that 
enlargement brings poorer countries into the EU, but these countries feel the financial pressure 
related to enlargement. This was especially important because Agenda 2000 was laying the 
ground for the biggest enlargement in the history of the Union and the EMU convergence criteria 
started to weigh on national budgets. The 1999 agreement led to subsequent important changes, 
even though less radical than in the previous agreements: while transfers to cohesion were 
marginally reduced to account for enlargement, the reference to GNP was replaced by a 
reference to GNI; a further progressive reduction over the period 2002-2004 of the maximum 
VAT call rate was made down to 0.5 % and the collection costs for traditional own resources 
increased from 10 % to 25 %. The net contributors (Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and 
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Sweden) managed to change the rules in their favor and obtained a reinforcement of the rebate – 
a reduction of their contributions to the UK rebate to ¼ of their normal shares, while the 
remaining ¾ of their contribution to the UK rebate had to be financed by the remaining member 
states. (Council Decision 2000/597). The fact that “the FF packages Delors-1 and Delors-2 
massively increased EU financial resources, whereas the increases in Agenda 2000 were not of 
similar magnitude,” (Laffan and Lindner 2005, 193-194) can be explained by the fact that the 
endogenous mechanisms of learning and reinforcement work gradually; in 1988 and 1992 these 
mechanisms were in their incipient phase, therefore a functional approach and not distributive 
bargaining prevailed, hence the significant increase of 'the pie'. On the contrary, in 1999 these 
mechanisms were well at work, therefore concerns over the distributional benefits of the 
previously enlarged pie dominated the renegotiation. 
The negotiations for the 2007-2013 FF took place under the full-blown pressure of 
enlargement, to which slower growth rates and the Lisbon goals (increase competitiveness and 
invest in research and technology) were added. The positions of the net contributors were 
endogenized such that they openly opposed any increases in expenditure, while the net 
beneficiaries supported the expenditure increases proposed by the Commission in the name of 
solidarity. The position of the older beneficiaries of regional aid was to denounce the so-called 
‘statistical effect’ and demand transitional support, while the positions of the newer member 
states were that the conservative spending promoted by the net contributors would reduce their 
financial benefits. The final agreement obtained shows the layering/refinement effect: the 
ceilings for own resources were maintained at their levels of 1.31% of EU GNI for commitments 
and 1.24% of EU GNI for payments and a new decision was to follow stipulating the rate of call 
for the VAT resource at 0.30%. The outcome of the negotiations shows an important influence of 
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the net contributors on the overall size of the budget (the net balance isntitution), as they 
managed to pull the final agreement very close to their ideal positions. However, it is worth 
emphasizing that the net beneficiaries also had an influence on the agreement, even though 
through a lesser extent; because cohesion is highly salient for the net beneficiaries, they drive the 
outcome on cohesion: the ‘shopping list’ on Cohesion that is contained in the final agreement 
shows that the net beneficiaries got additional funding, for example from the ERDF and the 
regions falling under the Regional Competitiveness and Employment Objective. In fact, the 
mechanism of renegotiation works through issue-linkages on these two issues – cohesion and 
balance: net contributors give up their position on cohesion in exchange for the net beneficiaries 
agreeing on a reduced budget. Because the balance issue/institution represents the overall size of 
the budget, it can be argued that the net contributors are more influential. This influence is also 
justified by the fact that the issues of agriculture and cohesion, when negotiated separately, cause 
negative externalities for the net contributors – i.e. they end up paying more into the budget. A 
high salience on the balance issue and sometimes extreme positions on balance determine 
exchanges that help the net contributors eliminate these negative externalities. 
While the new member states obtained the exclusion of their share of CAP market 
expenditure from the calculation of the UK rebate, the net contributors obtained significant 
changes for the 2007-2013 period that reinforced the UK rebate: the rate of call of the VAT 
resource for Austria was fixed at 0.225%, for Germany at 0.15% and for the Netherlands and 
Sweden at 0.10%; in addition, the Netherlands benefited from a € 605 million reduction in its 
annual GNI contribution, while Sweden benefited from a reduction of € 150 million. Article 77 
of the final agreement shows how the strong positions of the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and Austria gravitated around the institution of rebate/ correction mechanisms:  
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The own resources arrangements should be guided by the overall objective of equity. These 
arrangements should therefore ensure, in line with the relevant conclusions of the 1984 
Fontainebleau European Council, that no Member State sustains a budgetary burden which is 
excessive in relation to its relative prosperity. These arrangements should accordingly introduce 
provisions covering specific Member States. (Article 77 of the European Council December 05 
Note, 29-30)  
 
One can argue that the rebate and the balance institutions reinforce each other. While the 
UK compares its receipts to the EU average and claims that it was the fifth poorest member state 
before the 2004 enlargement, the UK rebate creates perverse incentives. This is because every 
enlargement increases the UK rebate: the more member states enter the Union, the more the UK 
gains in compensation. This creates the anomaly that a relatively developed member state like 
the UK does not contribute to the EU budget in a manner proportional to its economic 
development. 
As a consequence of the fact that France had become the main contributor to the UK 
rebate – approximately one third – as a price for keeping the agricultural payments, the exchange 
of positions between France and the UK led to the agreement on a budgetary reform to follow:  
The European Council therefore invites the Commission to undertake a full, wide ranging review 
covering all aspects of EU spending, including the CAP, and of resources, including the UK 
rebate, to report in 2008/9. On the basis of such a review, the European Council can take 
decisions on all the subjects covered by the review. The review will also be taken into account in 
the preparatory work on the following Financial Perspective. (Article 80 of the European Council 
December 05 Note, 32)  
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The pressure on the preferences and the benefits of the incumbent member states is 
visible in the exchanges that lead to the institutional outcome of the FF.  The richer countries 
voted for enlargement and agreed to pay for European integration but their financial burden 
cannot increase indefinitely. When countries decide to join the union, they make a cost-benefit 
analysis and decide to join because the benefits from joining are higher than the costs of doing 
so. Relatively rich countries like Austria, Finland and Sweden, but also Slovenia and Cyprus 
made claims when acceding on structural funds for some of their less prosperous regions, thus 
showing sign of a potential exchange cohesion-balance in the FF negotiations following their 
accession.  
The last wave of EU enlargement has been so spectacular that it almost invites the study 
of related changes in the budgetary institutions. If enlargement has indeed an impact on the EU 
budgetary processes, then one should look for evidence in this last round, as the effect of 
enlarging the Union with 10+2 countries is of such a magnitude that makes it easier to observe. 
In addition, if one wants to learn something from the way in which the EU solves the problem of 
resource allocation through renegotiation, then one needs to look at the EU with 27 member 
states, where these problems are indeed acute.  
In my theory, the dependent variable is conceived as change in the institutions-as-
equilibria, translated into an agreement on new budgetary rules. If agreement is not obtained, the 
status quo (last year’s budget or the last FF) prevails; this addresses the puzzle surrounding the 
existence of deadlock in EU budgetary negotiations: if a new agreement is obtained, there is no 
deadlock and institutional change occurs, if not, deadlock prevails. In terms of measurement, the 
degree of change is given by the degree of layering – the number of new layers/sediments added 
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to the existing ones. If only one layer is added, change is incremental; if several new institutions 
emerge, change is substantial. 
One issue that needs to be addressed is the possibility of every player to veto an 
agreement when unanimity is the rule of renegotiation (i.e. the FF negotiations). Players are 
utility maximizers, they increase their utility by entering in exchanges on different issues in 
successive rounds of negotiations. Therefore it is more likely for a player to veto an agreement 
early in the negotiations either because there are no profitable exchanges she could make or 
because she has not entered any such exchanges yet. This de facto situation reduces the 
possibility of vetoes as negotiations progress, such that agreement through issue-linkages 
becomes smoother and can be reached in a timely manner, in spite of the initial distributional 
conflict. One caveat should be mentioned: when players make exchanges, they increase their 
utilities but sometimes they can produce negative externalities for the players not involved in 
exchanges; this externalities could lead to a veto by the players affected. However, what we see 
empirically is that agreements contain a ‘shopping list’, whose goal is to address these negative 
externalities. 
My independent variables are enlargement and economic development. These two 
exogenous factors are conceived in a broader sense as being more than the simple addition of 
new members: they encompass the exogenous factors that shape an increase in the number of 
players: an increase in the heterogeneity of states creates tensions between different levels of 
economic development (when poorer countries join) and different degrees of economic 
integration (when richer countries join). Conceptualizing the exogenous factors in this way offers 
the advantage that it adds an economic dimension to the simple expansion of the union that can 
control for confounding variables related to domestic constraints. Over time, this tension 
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encompassed by the exogenous factors affects the preferences of players – positions and 
saliences – and their payoffs in the budgetary agreement, which are the intervening variables that 
influence the new institutional outcome. With every round of enlargement, the issue of net 
balance is reinforced, it becomes more salient to net contributors and pushes their positions 
towards a more conservative budget; similarly, the issues of regional aid or agriculture become 
more salient to the net beneficiaries. A change in preferences and benefits due to exogenous 
factors influences the FF negotiations immediately following the respective enlargement (e.g. at 
time t) and thus the outcome results in institutional change. However, this institutional change 
becomes a factor that has an effect on the formation of preferences and distributional benefits 
related to the negotiations of the following FF, at time t+1. Empirically, as highlighted above, the 
institutional change can be seen in the reform of the agricultural policy, the adjustments of 
regional policy but mostly in the reversals of the net contributors’ burden: first only Germany 
obtained a reduced contribution to the VAT resource (implying a reduced contribution to the UK 
rebate), then all net contributors obtained such a reduction, which was increased over time, and 
finally some of the net contributors obtained cash back.  
  While my main focus is on the dynamic of institutional change in the FF negotiations, as 
the main distributive decisions are taken there, one cannot ignore the EU annual budgetary 
negotiations where spending decisions are taken on the margins available under the FF 
agreement. The dynamic in the annual budgetary negotiations is quite different due to a different 
institutional set-up:  the voting rule is QMV, the actors are the member states and the EP with the 
Commission as agenda-setter, there are formal rules (first and second readings of the budget) and 
informal rules (two trilogues and two conciliation meetings). In spite of this institutional 
difference, the model I propose shows that change is incremental when compared to change in 
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the FF negotiations. The net contributors remain influential in the annual budgetary outcome, as 
the outcome depends on the position of the net contributor that is able to build a coalition for 
reducing expenditures. The annual budgetary outcome also depends on the position of the EP, 
which pushed for an increase in the budget; the clash between these two opposing preferences 
for increasing and decreasing the budget leads to incremental change in the annual budgetary 
procedure. As Hix argues, the annual budget is about redistribution: within the amounts allocated 
on each issue by the FF, member states distribute the funds between regions, crops or projects. I 
argue that this redistribution happens only at the margin – what was not distributed by the FF 
institutional agreement.  
It is worth emphasizing that my theory shows the existence of both significant and 
incremental change in the budget and the link between the FF and the annual budget is that the 
FF constrains the pie represented by the annual budget. My theory does not deal with the impact 
of the FF on the annual budget, which has been studied in the EU budget literature. Whereas 
Lindner (2006) looks at the stability effect the FF has had on the annual budget, I am interested 
in the effect of exogenous and endogenous factors on the FF (and annual) negotiations; I am 
exploring the way in which these factors change players’ preferences and benefits, which leads 
to change in budgetary institutions. Figure 1 summarizes the causal path of my theory. It is worth 
emphasizing that there is disagreement in the literature on the stabilizing effect of the FF: Ackrill 
and Kay (2006) argue that the introduction of the FF was actually not enough to keep EU annual 
expenditures under control, hence the need of the 1992 MacSharry reform or the changes 
proposed by the Lisbon Treaty.  
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Figure 1. Dynamic institutional change in EU budgetary negotiations 
 
My theory disagrees with the claims of Baldwin and Portes (1997) who argue that small 
overrepresented countries are the winners of the budgetary game: when they enter the union, 
they change the budgetary rules in their favor. If this were the case, one would see a massive 
increase in the burden of the net contributors and no new members becoming net contributors 
immediately after accession. In addition, empirical evidence shows that Spain and Portugal, 
which entered relatively early into the union, did not manage to obtain a change of rules in their 
favor, as Greece blocked their accession and conditioned their entrance on the adoption of the 
Mediterranean Program. In a similar way, the Eastern European countries that have recently 
joined the EU did not manage to obtain the high amount of EU funds they had hoped for. 
However, my theory agrees with the fact that, when countries enter the union, no matter if small 
or large, they make a claim on the EU budget for either regional aid or agriculture. In spite of 
their net contributor positions, the main payers of the EU still receive EU funds for their regions 
or agricultural sectors. 
My thesis on the influence of net contributors is in line with the argument of scholars 
who find a domination of power politics in the EU budget and argue that enlargement changes 
budgetary rules; (Heikki and Widgren 2004; Widgren 2004; Widgren 2006) as coalition size 
increases, divergent blocks become more likely in Council decision-making. (Hagemann and De 
Clerck-Sachsse 2007)  
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As in my theory issue-linkage represents the mechanism used in renegotiations, issue-
linkage has indeed the effect found in the literature: the issues that are linked are those for which 
players have different saliences; (Morgan 1990; Sebenius 1983) bargaining is facilitated when 
there are blocks of players with similar preferences or when a particular group gains more 
players; (Tollison and Willett 1979) and the pressure of time heightens with the increase in the 
number of players (Sebenius 1983). Huelshoff (1994) looks at dynamic issue-linkages and their 
effect on absolute gains but does not analyze either the way in which issues are linked or the 
impact of linkages on the outcome and on the other players. Hix (1998) rightly argues that issue-
linkage offers  to net contributors a compensation for their negative balance with the EU budget, 
hence their favorably changing the rules on the VAT rate or the UK rebate; the FF negotiations 
are about allocation and allocation problems are solved by issue-linkages: some win on some 
issues and lose on others that are less important to them.  
In order to see how endogenous mechanisms and exogenous factors lead to institutional 
change in the EU budgetary arrangements, I develop two analytical narratives on the FF 
negotiations and the annual budgetary procedure using a bargaining and a procedural model, 
respectively. The implicit hypothesis (1) to be tested is that the bargaining and the procedural 
models describing the FF negotiations and the annual budgetary negotiations, respectively, 
accurately predict the actual FF ceilings (the new institutional outcome) and the (incrementally 
changed) annual budget adopted.  
Before empirically testing my theory, it is worth emphasizing that applying the 
theoretical models to data poses some challenging issues of measurement. Given the extreme 
difficulty of conducting technical interviews to construct utility functions, the actors’ preferences 
(positions and saliences over issues) must be assessed by experts and observers familiar with 
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them. External assessment of the most preferred point seems to be straightforward. However, 
“there is no guarantee that experts used the measurement scales in precisely the same way that 
any one interpretation of the theory might require.”(Achen 2006, 121) In order to collect 
historical data on positions and salience, I used semi-structured interviews with officials from the 
Commission, the member states and the EP, EU document analysis, archival materials and 
attendance in the budgetary committee meetings of the Council and the EP32
 
. Where it was 
possible, the questions the national experts were asked were: “What was your country’s position 
on issue x?” and “How important was issue x to your country?” When Commission and EP 
experts were interviewed, they were asked for which countries a given issue was most salient and 
which countries had the most extreme positions on a given issue. The caveat is that, in spite of 
how carefully positions and salience are measured, they might be somewhat noisy. 
 
 
                                                 
32 I conducted 25 interviews in May-June 2006 in Brussels. In the period July 2007 – February 2008, I conducted 30 
interviews, I did research in the Library of the European Commission and I sat in the meetings of the Budgetary 
Committee (CoBu) in the EP and the Budget Committee of the Council in Brussels.  
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4.0  FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK NEGOTIATIONS – AN ANALYTICAL 
NARRATIVE  
4.1 THE EMBEDDED FRAMEWORK OF THE FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK 
NEGOTIATIONS 
In order to analyze the dynamic negotiations on the FF, I use and adapt the position exchange 
model proposed by Stockman and Van Oosten (1994). Since the FF is decided under unanimity 
at European Councils, the players are the member states; the Commission and the EP have a 
marginal influence on the agreement. This assumption is in accordance with the literature that 
finds that the EP and the Commission have a limited influence when unanimity and European 
Councils are involved. (Thomson and Hosli 2006; Heikki and Widgren 2004; Widgren 2006; 
Tsebelis and Yataganas 2002; Baldwin and Portes 1997; Hagemann and De Clerck-Sachsse 
2007) However, the roles of the Commission and the EP are more prominent in the annual 
budgetary procedure, as explained in a further section. 
The position exchange model is appropriate for modeling the FF negotiations for several 
reasons. First, there are no precise formal rules for the FF negotiations written down in the 
Treaties. As there is no strict procedure to follow, the negotiations take place between member 
states in an ‘informal’ way and culminate with agreement in European Councils. The 
Commission makes an initial proposal and then the country holding the Council Presidency 
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reacts to it by proposing a compromise to which the other member states respond; if no 
agreement is reached, the following country holding the Presidency proposes a new compromise 
and this procedure continues until agreement is reached. While there is no clear deadline, 
agreement must be reached before the ongoing FF ends, otherwise the ceilings of the previous FF 
apply. Since the position exchange model is a bargaining model that stresses the importance of 
informal institutions, it is the most appropriate model for the description of the institutional 
framework that characterizes the FF negotiations. It is worth noting that, by contrast, the annual 
budgetary procedure takes place according to rules stipulated by the Treaties, therefore a 
procedural model is more appropriate for analyzing it.  
Second, during the FF negotiations member states shift their positions; initially, their 
preferences are more extreme but after several bargaining rounds they realize what is feasible 
and thus their positions converge towards a compromise. While EU collective decision-making 
is characterized by pressure to have agreement (the ‘consensual’ culture), member states still 
follow their national interests: “member governments grappled with their desire to reach 
agreement, on the one hand, and with their determination that the terms of the agreement be as 
favorable as possible to their own viewpoint, on the other hand.” (Laffan and Lindner 2005, 200) 
The position exchange model has the advantage that it allows players to shift positions in order 
to increase their utility.  
Third, the convergence towards an outcome is facilitated by the ‘horse-trading’ that 
players engage in. There is empirical evidence that member states use bilateral meetings in 
which they attempt to influence each other, such that the final FF outcome is a compromise in 
which countries have moved away from their initial positions. The position exchange game is a 
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bargaining model that describes the way in which players link different issues to which they 
attach different saliences in order to increase their utility.  
Fourth, the position exchange model performs better than other bargaining models (the 
compromise model, the challenging model) applied to EU decision-making. This model is “the 
only model that is insensitive to the level of measurement on the issues.” (Arregui, Stokman and 
Thomson 2006, 152) Given that the measurement of member states’ preferences (positions and 
saliences) might contain some noise, as pointed out in the previous section, this finding is 
particularly reassuring.  
I adapt the position exchange model in order to account for the unanimity rule that 
governs the FF negotiations. Under unanimity, all member states have equal voting power, no 
matter if they are large or small, therefore they have equal weights in influencing the collective 
outcome. Consequently, I assume that member states’ power deriving from their voting weights 
need not be taken into account when unanimity is the voting rule, as all countries have in theory 
the same veto power. Therefore, I adapt the compromise model so that the expected outcome on 
issue a is a function of the n players’ ideal positions pia and the salience sia they attach to the 
issues negotiated under the FF framework: 
Xa = ∑
=
n
i 1
pia sia / ∑
=
n
i 1
sia       (1) 
Players’ preferences are represented by the utility loss function proposed by Stokman and 
Van Oosten (1994, 108): 
EUi = ∑
=
m
a 1
- sia |Pia - Xa|       (2) 
The n players of the game are the EU member states at the moment when FF negotiations 
start; given the history of the EU integration and the FF, n Є [12, 27]. For example, the current 
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FF was negotiated with 25 member states, as negotiations started soon after the 2004 
enlargement and ended before the 2007 accession of Romania and Bulgaria.  
The issues that players make exchanges on are viewed as uni-dimensional continua and 
represent the main elements of the debates raised during negotiations; these are the most 
controversial issues and do not include subordinate/auxiliary points. The points on the issue 
continuum are alternative decision outcomes that players favor or possible compromise 
outcomes. These issues are in fact policy questions on which at least some of the actors involved 
take different positions; if the actors take the same positions on an issue then there is no political 
problem to be analyzed. Players’ preferences are defined over these issues rather than on 
underlying dimensions of preferences, like a ‘left-right’ dimension or an ‘integration’ dimension, 
on which it would have been more difficult to align players. 
In budgetary matters, the issues have a scale level of measurement, such that all points on 
the continuum have meanings – they refer to the size of the budget to be allocated to a particular 
policy/program. The FF has a maximum of 8 headings, to which the overall size of the budget is 
added, therefore the possible m issues are defined as m Є [1, 9]. However, not all issues are 
debated politically; the most controversial issues are agriculture and regional aid (structural 
funds and cohesion) which make up roughly 90% of the EU budget and the overall size of the 
budget, defined as a percentage of EU GDP/GNI, hence m = 3 and the measurement scale is 0-
100 such that Pia Є [0, 100] and Xa Є [0, 100]. 
A player’s salience sia has a measurement scale 0-100: sia Є [0, 100]; it represents the 
importance a player attaches to a given issue, therefore a score of 0 means no importance 
whatsoever, 100 is the highest importance and 50 represents an average level of priority. The 
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absolute values of salience matter less, as the critical differences are those between different 
actors on an issue and between different issues for the same actors. 
The game proceeds as follows. At the beginning of the game, players express their ideal 
positions in response to a proposal made by the Commission. After the initial proposal, the 
Commission does not participate in negotiations and thus cannot influence the outcome. In the 
first stage of the game, the member state holding the Presidency proposes a compromise package 
that represents the mean of all players’ ideal positions on every issue weighted by the saliences 
they attached to each issue; this compromise outcome is computed by equation (1). Member 
states react to the Presidency proposal by computing their expected utility on every issue 
according to equation (2); then, they start inquiring if they could increase their utility by making 
some exchanges with other players on some issues. As mentioned above, (Stokman and Van 
Oosten 1994) for two actors to engage in an exchange on a pair of issues they must attach 
different saliences to these issues: an actor shifts her position on an issue that is less important to 
her in order to obtain gains on an issue that is more salient to her. For the issue-linkage to take 
place, both actors must be on opposite sides of the expected outcome on both issues and their 
utility gains from the exchange must be equal; the exchanges that bring the highest utility gains 
take place first, thus foregoing some possible exchanges with lower utility; maximum utility gain 
is obtained when an actor shifts to the position of another actor an the less salient issue, while the 
latter partially shifts toward the former on the issue more salient to the former; these shifts can be 
obtained in subsequent exchanges. As the Presidency’s stated goal is to obtain agreement among 
all member states, after some issue-linkages take place, the Presidency might propose a follow-
up package that is equivalent to a new compromise outcome calculated by equation (1) based on 
players’ revised positions. Or, if agreement has not been reached in 6 months, the incoming 
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Presidency will propose a new compromise outcome based on players’ revised positions.  Due to 
their substantial funding, the most prominent issues where linkages occur in the FF are structural 
actions (cohesion), agriculture and the overall size of the budget (net balance). For instance, the 
Netherlands is a net contributor to the budget and prefers a reduced overall budget and lower 
funding for structural actions, whereas Spain is the main beneficiary from structural funds, and 
thus prefers a large budget for this issue but also a considerable increase in the overall budget. If 
they are on opposite sides of the expected outcome on both issues and if they attach different 
saliences to these two issues, the Netherlands and Spain could engage in a mutually beneficial 
trade, where, in exchange for getting support for a large structural action budget, Spain agrees to 
a reduction in the total budget and thus moves to the Dutch position on this issue, while the 
Netherlands moves towards Spain on structural actions. 
Once issues have been linked during several successive rounds (in between the European 
Councils organized by each Presidency) and players have switched to their revised positions, 
agreement is reached in the second and last stage of the game which for the FF is the last 
European Council of the ongoing FF period. The outcome XFF on every issue is given by 
equation (1), where the revised positions have replaced players’ initial preferences. The outcome 
of this game XFF is linked to the game that describes the annual budgetary procedure, as the 
following section will show. 
The position exchange model applied to the FF reveals the process through which actors 
reach agreement on the FF. The saliences over issues and the initial positions of players are 
historically constructed before the negotiations on each FF start. After the Commission has made 
the FF proposal and the Presidency has proposed a compromise, actors shift their positions 
 96 
during the informal bargaining phase of negotiations in order to obtain a compromise in the final 
stage of voting.  
Besides their gains, actors engaged in an exchange might cause positive or negative 
externalities for the other players of the game. Arregui et al (2006, 147) note that, when negative 
externalities are larger than the utility gains generated by the game, exchanges between pairs of 
actors serve parochial interests, rather than producing agreements acceptable to all. Empirical 
evidence on the FF negotiations shows that, in order to correct for these externalities, a so-called 
‘shopping list’ has been added to the final agreement.  
4.2 A DYNAMIC APPROACH TO PREFERENCES 
The issues over which budgetary preferences are defined are agriculture (the expenditure ceilings 
for agriculture) and ‘cohesion’ (the expenditure ceilings for structural funds and the cohesion 
fund). The third issue is the overall size of the budget, expressed as a percentage of EU GNI; 
given its direct link with the institution of ‘balance’, this issues is called 'balance' to emphasize 
the link with the net balance concern of the net contributors (the balance is reduced when the net 
contributors obtain corrections). 
The positions of players and their saliences over issues vis-à-vis the Commission 
proposal at the start of the 2000-2006 FF and the 2007-2013 FF negotiations, respectively are not 
taken as given but change due to endogenous and exogenous mechanisms. I construct these 
preferences historically through the use of archival material, EU official documents and 
interviews with experts; my main finding is that the saliences and the positions of players on 
each of the three issues are critical for determining the expenditure ceilings of the FF. The goal 
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of every member state is to obtain an outcome as close as possible to its preferences; through 
successive rounds of negotiations, the actors who are most influential manage to pull the 
outcome towards their ideal positions.  
As the theoretical section argues, the main finding is that, as enlargement progressed and 
as the mechanism of learning developed, member states started to become aware of changes in 
preferences and in the distributional implications of previous institutional arrangements; the 
institution of ‘balance’ reinforced itself, it became more and more salient for the main 
contributors to the EU budget such that their positions consolidated on a conservative budget; the 
institution of the rebate was also reinforced in each agreement over budgetary institutions. The 
net beneficiaries of regional aid (Spain, Portugal, Greece, the new member states) assigned a 
high salience to structural funds/cohesion, for which their position was ‘increased expenditure’ 
from the very beginning (i.e. since their accession), whereas for France and Poland agriculture 
was very salient from the very beginning. The empirical evidence shows considerable variation 
in players’ preferences, which intensified the competition over resources and created the need to 
reform the EU largest spenders – regional and agricultural programs. 
Of the net contributors, the Netherlands turned from a net beneficiary in 1988 to the 
second largest net contributor in 1993 and became the largest per capita contributor in 1995. Like 
Belgium and Ireland, the Netherlands pays a relative large amount of custom duties to the EU 
budget because of the size and composition of her imports. (Hendrik Jan Brouwer33
                                                 
33 Hendrik Jan Brouwer is the Treasurer-General of the Dutch Ministry of Finance in 1994-1995. 
 1995, 19) 
The Dutch did not benefit from the increase in structural funds that happened in 1988 and 1992, 
as the Netherlands was one of the wealthiest member states. This consolidated the Dutch position 
on arguing that the inefficient redistribution of cohesion funds to non-cohesion countries led to a 
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situation in which richer countries  benefited from EU aid: the Netherlands and the UK received 
less per capita funds than Germany, France and Italy, which had a higher or similar per capita 
income. (Brouwer 1995, 21). Like Denmark, Finland and the UK, the Netherlands promoted the 
‘whole-country’ approach for cohesion support, in order to avoid a situation in which poor 
regions in rich countries still benefit (Richter 2005). Given that the MacSharry CAP reform did 
not cover most of the Dutch production sectors, the Netherlands supported a revision of CAP by 
limiting the agricultural budget and returning some responsibility to national level (partial 
nationalization to respect the principle of subsidiarity). Consequently, the position of the 
Netherlands is to stop the increase of the EU budget and create a general system of 
compensations to ease the financial burden of the net contributors34
Germany’s position is that it is not fair that Germany contributes more to the EU budget 
than the UK and France combined, which are relatively rich countries; the revenue system 
should take both GDP and population into account, especially because Germany’s contribution 
to the EU budget is still higher than its share in EU GDP 
.  
35
                                                 
34 Interviews with the Dutch representatives in the budget committee of the Council, June 2006 and February 2008. 
. Germany’s position consolidated on 
conservative spending from the EU budget in 1988 and then in 1992, when the Delors-2 package 
increased the structural expenditures with 41% and Germany’s unification increased its overall 
financial burden. In agriculture, Germany supported a market system – supply and demand 
should determine prices and production – hence no necessity of agricultural spending from the 
EU budget (Friedmann 1995, 48). Germany’s position consolidated on the argument that EU 
funding should focus on regions with specific structural problems, like the German Länder 
(funded under Objective 1 of structural funds) affected by the statistical effect. As a 
consequence, Germany started to promote the replacement of structural assistance with 
35 Interview with the German representative in the budget committee of the Council, January 2008. 
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subsidized loans or tax reductions for investment, arguing that the numerous cases of fraud 
showed that German taxpayers’ money was not properly spent, as the beneficiary member states 
did not properly control the spending of EU money due to a lack of appropriate incentives: if 
irregularities were uncovered, the beneficiaries just had to return the money. (Bernhard 
Friedmann36 1995, 46) Like the UK, Germany has a ‘lopsided’ position on the EU allocation of 
expenditures: Germany benefits mainly politically and indirectly economically from the single 
market, as it exports goods, services and capital to the new member states.  (Richter 2005, 103) 
As a result of all these developments influenced by enlargement, the issue of net balance became 
very salient for Germany; this high salience is underscored by the fact that Germany requested to 
deduct the deficit on the EU budget from the general government deficit in order to comply with 
the Stability and Growth Pact. (Richter 2005, 110) Germany’s position for the 2007-2013 FF was 
that expenditure should be kept under 1% of EU GNI in commitment appropriations37
The 1995 accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden brought more net  contributors into 
the Union. Like Germany, Austria became a net payer whose contribution to the EU budget was 
higher than its share in EU GDP, therefore Austria’s position is that prosperous countries should 
use fewer EU resources but does not support the radical Dutch and UK approach that ‘rich’ 
countries do not need cohesion support. Unlike Germany, Austria had a balanced position in 
terms of allocation of expenditures, benefiting from both agriculture and cohesion. As Austria 
has one region that benefited form Objective 1 funding since accession, Austria found that the 
effect of cohesion transfers was important to citizens, also alleviating the fear of relocation of 
production away to the newer member states. (Richter 2005,104-106) 
. 
                                                 
36 Bernhard Friedmann is a member of the European Court of Auditors. 
37 Interview with the German representative in the budget committee of the Council, January 2008. 
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The two other countries that joined the Union with Austria, Sweden and Finland, have a 
position similar to an older Northern member – Denmark. As the Northern countries have the 
highest level of development, they do not benefit from cohesion, except Finland whose scarcely 
populated areas are covered by Objective 1. These countries believe in the partial 
renationalization of both agriculture and cohesion and argue that EU funds should be used 
instead on research and development38
From its accession in 1972, UK’s position and salience on balance developed gradually 
due to the fact that it was not a significant beneficiary from EU agricultural expenditure. The 
introduction of the UK rebate in 1984 represents a maximum in terms of salience on ‘balance’. 
“The 1984 introduction of the institution of the UK rebate was accepted because the Community 
needed to increase the own resources, and UK prime-minister Thatcher agreed to vote for the 
increase only in exchange of reducing her ‘unacceptable’ contribution”. (Butler
. Of the three countries, Sweden has been since the 
beginning a net contributor to the budget, hence the salience of the ‘balance’ issue. 
39
Ireland is the member state that has benefited the longest time from structural and 
cohesion funds and agricultural subsidies. While in the 1980s and 1990s it was part of the 
cohesion countries, in the 2000s it reached a level of development that decreased its salience for 
‘cohesion’: after the 2004 enlargement, Ireland’s position was to ask for transitory provisions for 
 1995, 35) 
Given that the UK did not enjoy the benefits of agriculture and cohesion, the UK has been 
favoring a renationalization of both regional aid and agriculture. While the other member states 
consider the UK rebate as an unfair correction, the UK’s position is that an alternative to the 
current system would be net contributions based on prosperity, but that would be extremely hard 
to negotiate. (Butler 1995, 36) 
                                                 
38 Interviews with the Swedish and Danish representatives in the budget committee of the Council, May 2006. 
39 Michael Butler, former UK representative, and Hans Tietmeyer are the ‘inventors’ of the UK rebate system. 
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the regions that were phased out from cohesion but insist on agricultural subsidies40
Belgium and Luxembourg are two special cases in the sense that they benefit from having 
the seats of the EU institutions on their territory. With every enlargement, these benefits 
increased, such that Belgium and Luxembourg over time became ‘honest brokers’ (neutral on 
balance) and supporters of the Commission’s proposals. Belgium’s preference on cohesion is 
given by the fact that one of its regions (Wallonie) benefits from Objective 1 funding, whereas 
Luxembourg is interested in the social dimension of Cohesion (Objective 3)
. While the 
effect of enlargement on the Irish preferences is apparent through this ‘statistical effect’, Ireland 
represents an outlier in the sense that its accession to the EU (i.e. ‘enlargement‘) led to economic 
development and thus a change in preferences. 
41
Like Portugal, Spain has been a long time beneficiary of regional aid and has been known 
as a fierce advocate of cohesion funding, arguably in order to secure the success of enlargement 
and of the economic and monetary union. (Carlos Westendorp Cabeza
. 
42 1995) While 
enlargement maintained this high salience of cohesion, the last enlargement placed Spain in the 
category of countries affected by the statistical effect, therefore Spain’s position is for a very 
high budget for cohesion so that the phased out transition regions could profit as well43
Greece has been a long time beneficiary of cohesion and therefore its position is to 
maintain the same levels of flows from the structural funds from before the last enlargement. 
.  
                                                 
40 Interviews with the Irish representatives in the budget committee of the Council, May 2006 and December 2007. 
41 Interviews with the representative of Luxembourg in the budget committee of the Council, May 2006 and October 
2007 and the former representative of Luxembourg in the budget committee of the Council, January 2008.  
42Carlos Westendorp Cabeza was Secretary of State for European Affairs in 1995. 
43 Interview with the Spanish representative in the budget committee of the Council, February 2008. 
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Like Spain, Greece wants an increase in cohesion expenditure to ensure it is not phased out by 
the newer member states. (Efthymios Christodoulou44
The 2004 member states tend to have relatively homogeneous positions and saliences on 
the three issues. There are slight differences on cohesion: the Visegrad group (Hungary, Poland, 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia) and Lithuania favor high level of expenditures for cohesion 
(more than 4% of GDP), whereas Latvia favors regional aid for infrastructure. 
, 1995) 
Slovenia is the most prosperous of the new member states, therefore in principle it 
supports the net contributors, provided that the expenditure cuts should affect structural policy 
but agriculture as well (Slovenia has limited arable area and considers the CAP over-
dimensioned and inefficient, therefore some of the agricultural resources should be shifted to 
structural policy). In terms of the ‘statistical effect’, Slovenia rejects the idea of distinguishing 
between old and new countries and finds it unacceptable that the old cohesion countries, having 
been at a level of development similar to Slovenia, received structural funds for many years, 
whereas Slovenia will be ‘phased out’ in 3 years after accession, without being fully ‘phased in’. 
(Richter 2005, 94) 
Poland is less prosperous but the largest of the new member states, therefore it used its 
political weight in the final accession negotiations at the Copenhagen Summit (December 2002) 
and in the Lisbon treaty debate. Richter (2005) argues that Poland was surprisingly flexible in the 
FF negotiations: it wanted the highest possible level of own resources (1,24%) but it was also not 
opposed to 1%, as a higher budget implies a higher national contribution. (Richter 2005, 97-99) 
While Poland did not accept a reduction of direct payments to farmers and supported an increase 
in the share of rural development under the agriculture heading. Poland rejected both a conflict 
                                                 
44 Efthymios Christodoulou is MEP and former Governor of the Bank of Greece. 
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between old and new member states and the focus on the neediest countries, but supported 
special claims by groups of states. Poland was against the (partial) re-nationalization of regional 
policy45, considering that solidarity was important to the EU construction and re-nationalization 
would constitute a first step towards withdrawal from integration. However, Poland argued for 
fairness in the allocation of structural aid: transfers/capita for the regions affected by the 
statistical effect should not exceed those of the regions of the poorest member states. Poland 
proposed lower national co-financing rate for programs related to the Lisbon Strategy and her 
position was that the EU budget should serve to finance common policies from Community 
sources and not as a battleground for net contributions46
Hungary supported the Commission proposal of 1.24% and rejected the 1% threshold, 
arguing that the EU policies need appropriate funding and budgetary discipline should not be 
achieved by reducing the EU budget. Hungary claimed that there were two conflicts of interests: 
net payers versus net beneficiaries on the size of the budget but also the allocation problem 
between old and new member states. On the former, Hungary was against any correction 
mechanism, seen as a regressive contribution where poorer states pay more. On the latter, 
Hungary wanted to keep the agreement on CAP up to 2013 and argued for rural development but 
its main interest was cohesion: like Lithuania, it requested an increase in the 4% of EU GDP to 
be spent on Cohesion. (Richter 2005, 99-103) Hungary argued that, in practice a country’s 
eligibility was calculated anyway below the 4% limit due to the difference between the official 
exchange rate and  purchasing power parity. In terms of the Berlin methodology used to calculate 
transfers for individual regions, Hungary argues for the reduction of payments for the regions of 
.  
                                                 
45 The argument for the (partial) re-nationalization of regional policy is that member states with per capita GDP 
higher than 90% of EU average should take care of their own regional problems using their national resources. 
46 Interviews with the Polish representative in the budget committee of the Council, June 2006 and September 2007. 
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old prosperous member states, but requested a reduction of co-financing for structural funds for 
new member states from 25% to 20%47
Given that member states respond to the Commission’s proposal, it is worth noting the 
Commission’s position on the three issues. In the 1990s, the Commission favored an increase in 
the democratic control of spending, a phasing out of the UK rebate and an adjustment of the 
balance of costs and benefits. (Christiane Scrivener
.  
48 1995) The Commission has always favored 
an increase in the resources for European policies, hence an increased budget for agriculture and 
cohesion. While opposed to calculating net balances, the Commission argued that in 1999 gross 
contributions to the budget were reasonably proportional to member states’ GNI: the UK, 
because of the rebate, paid the least, then Italy paid the next smallest contribution, whereas the 
Dutch contributed the most.49
The description above tracks the effect of enlargement on players’ preferences. The main 
effect found is that enlargement determines more ‘extreme’ preferences and a higher salience on 
‘balance’ for the net contributors, who argue that the EU budgetary system is too unbalanced: 
their gains from integration (market and capital movements) in an enlarged union have been 
exceeded by the financial costs of the EU budget contribution. While the ‘balance’ issue is 
polarized by conservative expenditure versus an increase in spending (especially cohesion), it is 
dominated by the UK rebate. The effect of enlargement on net contributors is particularly visible 
on this issue due to the way in which the UK rebate is designed and calculated: every 
 “The Commission, not without reason, argues that the gains from 
economic integration greatly outweigh the (fairly modest) net financial contributions, with the 
result that the focus on ‘juste retour’ is especially unhelpful.” (Begg 1999, 14)  
                                                 
47 Interview with the Hungarian representative in the budget committee of the Council, June 2006. 
48 Christiane Scrivener is a former Commissioner for Taxation and Customs. 
49 Interviews with Commission officials, May 2006 and July 2007-February 2008. 
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enlargement increases the amount the UK is compensated through the rebate: the more member 
states enter the union, the more the UK receives back.  
In 1999, net contributors argued for a decrease in financing, while net beneficiaries 
opposed any national co-financing of CAP or regional spending. In 2005, the main effect of 
enlargement is that the positions of the ‘old’ beneficiaries from cohesion (Spain, Portugal, 
Greece, Finland, Luxembourg, Italy) became more extreme because of the ‘phasing out’ of their 
less developed regions: they emphasized the gains per capita, argued that the least off regions 
should be helped to maintain public investment and advocated greater progressivity in gross 
contributions. This position could be explained by the fact that, before the number of regions 
multiplied with enlargement, the union member states were happy to support one another’s poor 
regions. However, this multiplication of poor regions increased the burden of the net contributors 
until their position became that it was not equitable to support poor regions of prosperous 
member states. The ‘statistical effect’ redefined poverty according to lower standards and shifted 
the focus of structural funds. In the net contributors’ view, the lowering of standards needed to 
be accompanied by a change in rules that would maintain equity and put some financial pressure 
on rich countries with less developed regions. 
The positions of the net contributors were clearly expressed in 2004 by the “letter of the 
six”, which argued that the EU budget should not exceed 1% of EU-GNI, at that time not 
specifying whether in commitment appropriations or payments. All the other member states 
wanted a counterweight vis-a-vis the block of 6 – which represented more than 70% of both 
population and contribution – so they positioned themselves close to the Commission’s proposal 
and signaled they could accept a compromise around 1.10% – 1.15% of EU GNI. Even though 
agriculture was decided by the December 2002 deal, the Netherlands and the UK wanted the 
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question reopened, arguing that Romania and Bulgaria could be accommodated under the 
ceilings foreseen for EU-25. Since rural development had not been decided in 2002, for the new 
member states most of rural development money came from Cohesion transfers, hence their main 
interest in Cohesion50
The initial positions of players and the saliences they attach to the three issues are 
presented in Table 1 and Figure 4 below. Given that there was a change in the denomination of 
the FF headings in the 2007-2013 FF, the cohesion issue includes all expenditure under heading 
1 and the agriculture issue consists of all heading 2 expenditure. As described above, the scale on 
positions and saliences is from 0 to 100. For the agriculture and cohesion issues, 0 means an 
ideal position where players favor no increase in EU funding for the issue in question (the status 
quo – last FF ceiling), whereas 100 stands for as much EU funding as possible. On the ‘balance’ 
issue, 0 is the position of a player who favors a reduced level of the EU budget revenue (the 
status quo equal to the last FF) and therefore a high level of compensations, a position of 50 
implies a moderate level of revenue and indifference on the correction mechanism and 100 is the 
position of players who want a high revenue level (1.24% of EU GNI
.  
51
Table 1 presents the positions and saliences for the 2007-13 FF negotiations. The figures 
in red signal a change from the 2000-06 FF negotiations, as indicated below. Germany is the 
main contributor to the EU budget, therefore it favors a reduced budget of 1% and corrections, 
) and therefore a low 
level of compensations. On the salience measure, 0 is given when players pay no attention to the 
issue in question, 50 when the issue stands for an average priority (the country is neutral on the 
issue) and finally 100 represents an issue of the highest importance.  
                                                 
50 Interviews with Commission officials, November 2007 and January 2008. 
51The EU possible expenditure ranges between 0.9%, minimum of expenditure, and 1.24% of EU GNI  - the 
maximum established by the rules (interview with a Commission official from DG Budget, September 2007). 
 107 
hence the position of 20 on ‘balance’. Germany’s salience for the issue of ‘balance’ has 
increased from 70 in 1999 to 90 in 2004. The Netherlands is a net contributor with the highest 
contribution per capita, therefore its position on ‘balance’ is at 15 (slightly more conservative 
than Germany). Similarly to Germany, its salience on ‘balance’ has increased from 70 in 1999 to 
90 in 2004. The salience on ‘balance’ of the other two main contributors, Austria and Sweden 
also increases from 60 in 1999 to 80 in 2004. Given the development of Ireland, its position on 
cohesion decreases from 70 in 1999 to 50 in 2004, whereas its salience changes from 60 in 1999 
to 40 in 2004. The main beneficiaries of cohesion in 1999 – Spain, Portugal and Greece – are 
phased out in 2007-13, therefore they change their positions from 80 in 1999 to 90 in 2004. 
Because of the UK rebate, the UK ranks at 100 on the salience of ‘balance’, whereas its position 
on balance is at 10 (low revenue and high compensation). France attaches the highest importance 
to agriculture, therefore it ranks at 100 on the salience of agriculture; however, its salience on 
balance increases from 60 in 1999 to 70 in 2004. In 2004, the preferences of the newer member 
states were somewhat homogeneous: their salience on balance was 50 (neutral in terms of the 
importance of correction mechanisms and revenue level), but most of them were at position 70 
on balance (higher level of revenue). 
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Table 1. Country saliences and positions for the 2007-13 FF negotiations 
country 
Salience 
Balance 
Salience 
Cohesion 
Salience 
Agriculture 
Position 
Balance 
Position 
Cohesion 
Position 
Agriculture 
Germany 90 40 10 20 50 20 
UK 100 10 10 10 10 10 
France 70 40 100 60 50 90 
Spain 60 80 70 80 90 60 
Italy 60 70 60 80 80 60 
Portugal 60 70 60 80 90 60 
Ireland 60 40 80 80 50 60 
Greece 60 70 80 80 90 60 
Denmark 60 15 40 40 15 20 
Sweden 80 10 40 25 10 20 
Finland 60 70 60 40 50 30 
Austria 80 50 50 25 50 30 
Netherlands 90 10 40 15 10 20 
Luxembourg 10 20 50 50 50 50 
Belgium 10 60 50 50 50 50 
Poland 50 90 90 90 100 90 
Hungary 50 90 80 70 100 70 
Czech Rep 50 90 80 70 100 70 
Malta 50 70 40 70 80 50 
Cyprus 50 70 40 70 80 50 
Letonia 50 80 80 70 90 70 
Lithuania 50 90 80 70 100 70 
Estonia 50 70 80 70 80 70 
Slovakia 50 90 80 70 100 70 
Slovenia 50 60 40 60 70 50 
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                                                                                                                   compr.                  Hu,Cz,Le,Lt,   Sp,Gr 
                                 Uk   Nl  Ge Au,Sw   Fi,Dk     Be,Lx  outcome     Fr, Sl  Es,Sk,Ma,Cy   It,Pt,Ir        Po 
            balance           I  I   I   I    X      I          I        I          I        I            I          I                
                                10  15  20  25    28.33     40             50        53.46           60          70                80             90       
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                                  10      20         30                           50        59.53 60 60.07         70                                       90       
 
Figure 2. Positions and exchanges in the 2007-13 FF negotiations  
 
4.3 NEGOTIATIONS ON THE 2000-2006 FF AND 2007-2013 FF   
4.3.1 Negotiations on the 2000-2006 FF, an Analytical Narrative (shadow case) 
The 1999 negotiations on the 2000-2006 FF took place in a difficult context. The net contributors 
expressed their preferences: reduced CAP intervention prices (low saliences and positions on 
agriculture), change in the rules for structural actions (moderate positions and saliences) and 
compensations on the ‘balance’ issue (low position and high salience). The Commission was 
aware of the pressure on the net contributors, therefore in the proposal for the 2000-2006 FF it 
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recommended a generalized system of corrections that would be ‘equitable’ and acceptable to 
all52
During the first stage of the position exchange game, equation (1) is used to compute the 
expected outcome on all three issues, according to the compromise model: the average of the 
ideal positions weighted by salience. The predictions of the compromise model are position 
46.34 on the balance issue, position 62.11 on cohesion and position 51.25 on agriculture. 
According to equation (2), players compute their expected utilities from these expected outcomes 
and identify mutual beneficial exchanges on pairs of issues. The most prominent exchanges 
happen when players are farther away from the expected outcomes and attach different saliences 
to the issues traded; the comparison of saliences determines the direction of exchange – which 
actors will move in which direction during the exchange. Players can enter a trade only if they 
are on opposite sides of both issues traded, otherwise they can increase their utility just by 
choosing a more extreme position. Table 2 shows the position of actors in relation to the 
expected outcome and identifies the potential exchanges of voting positions. According to the 
table, the most likely exchange partners are the net contributors, on the left side of the expected 
outcomes on all issues and the net beneficiaries, on the right side of the expected outcomes on all 
issues.  
. It is worth noting that the Commission tried to pass the same proposal in 2004, but without 
success. 
One of the likely exchanges is that between France and the net contributors, given that 
France has no possible linkages other than agriculture and balance (on the latter Germany and 
the Netherlands have the highest saliences). Consequently, France is willing to move on balance 
in exchange of influencing the outcome on agriculture, whereas Germany is willing to move on 
                                                 
52 Interviews with Commission officials, September 2007-February 2008. 
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agriculture (salience 10) in exchange of increasing her utility on balance. Germany moves to the 
position of France on agriculture and in exchange France moves towards Germany’s position on 
balance and ends up in position 42.1. The rate of the exchange is equal utility gain, equal to 87.5, 
according to equation (2) of the position exchange model. The new prediction is 52.125 on 
agriculture and 45.09 on balance, calculated by applying equation (1) to the new positions.  
Of the net beneficiaries, Spain attaches the highest salience to cohesion (80), therefore a 
likely exchange is between Spain and the net contributors on the issues of cohesion and balance. 
Given that, of the two net contributors with the highest salience on balance (70), Germany has 
the presidency, the exchange will happen between Spain and Germany. Spain moves towards 
Germany’s position on balance ending up in position 50.9 and in exchange Germany moves to 
Spain’s position on cohesion. The utility gain of the trade is 142.222. The new prediction is 
63.889 on cohesion and 43.058 on balance. 
In subsequent exchanges, France continues to move towards the position of the remaining 
net contributors (the Netherlands, Sweden and Austria), while they move towards France’s 
position on agriculture. The final predictions are 63.89 on cohesion, 55.375 on agriculture and 
41.17 on balance. 
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Table 2. Potential exchanges of positions 1999 
Issue 2: agriculture 
 left right 
left Uk, Ge, Nl, Dk, Sw, 
Au, Fi 
 
Issue 1: 
balance 
right Be, Lx Fr, Gr, Ir, It, Sp, Pt 
Issue 3: cohesion 
 left right 
left  Uk, Ge, Nl, Dk, Sw, 
Au, Fi 
 
Issue 1: 
balance 
right Be, Lx, Fr Gr, Ir, It, Sp, Pt 
Issue 2: agriculture 
 left right 
left Uk, Ge, Nl, Dk, Sw, 
Au, Fi, Be, Lx 
 
Fr 
Issue 3: 
cohesion 
right  
 
Gr, Ir, It, Sp, Pt 
  
The model can be empirically tested in two ways. First, one needs to check if the 
predicted exchanges are indeed the linkages that happened between players during negotiations. 
Empirical evidence shows that Germany, who had the presidency during negotiations, 
orchestrated the main issue linkages. One of this exchanges happens with France on agriculture: 
“Following a bilateral meeting between the French and the German Agricultural Ministers […], a 
representative of the German government finally conceded that cofinancing had little chance of 
surviving as a part of the package given the continuing opposition of the French.” (Laffan 2000, 
12) In exchange, France had to agree to support a higher share of the financing of the UK rebate 
(35% instead of 24%), thus increasing France’s contribution by 263 million per year,  traded for 
a 75% reduction of the four main contributors’ financing of the UK rebate53
                                                 
53 Interviews with Commission officials, September 2007-February 2008. 
. From the exchange 
with Germany, Spain obtained a 5.6 % increase in structural aid: in exchange of its support on 
the balance issue, Spain maintained substantial net transfers. (Begg 1999, 16-17) 
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Second, one needs to check the difference between the prediction of the model and the 
actual outcome of the final Berlin agreement in 1999, which in fact represents a collection of old 
and new layers/sediments. On the agriculture issue, the prediction of 55.375 represents a 
moderate budget for agriculture, which corresponds to the following layers: the agreed reduction 
in CAP intervention prices (arable cultures, milk and beef), compensated by an increase in direct 
aids to producers. Given that the UK did not exchange positions with any of the players, the UK 
rebate was maintained. When compared to the initial prediction of the model (46.34), the 
prediction of 41.17 on the balance issue represents an outcome in favor of net contributors, even 
though modest in magnitude. This measure of their success means that they managed to stabilize 
the budget – i.e. no sizeable increases, including the 4% GDP cap for regional aid – even though 
the expenditure are higher than their ideal positions. However, the net contributors did obtain 
corrections in their favor, represented by the following layers: a payment of only 25% of their 
UK rebate share and a progressive reduction of the VAT call rate to 0.75% in 2002 and 0.50% in 
2004. Evidence of the fact that the exchanges took place between pairs of actors and did not 
involve the net contributors as a group is the fact that the compensations for the net contributors 
differ, i.e. involve different layers: Germany benefits the least, the Netherlands profits from an 
additional increase of the collection rate on customs duties to 25%, and Austria and Sweden 
receive different types of ad hoc payments through structural funds (mainly under objectives 1 
and 3). The side-payments for Austria and Sweden are part of a ‘shopping list’ of layers with 13 
‘specific situations’, added to the agreement on cohesion/structural funds; these compensations 
correct for the negative externalities that the model predicts, in this case the regions no longer 
eligible and a reduction in the Cohesion Fund depending on progress towards convergence. 
(Bache 1999)  
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4.3.2 Negotiations on the 2007-2013 FF, an Analytical Narrative 
The negotiations on the 2007-2013 FF took place under the full effect of both enlargement and 
the endogenous mechanisms of learning and reinforcement. Historical documents and 
interviewed officials54 agreed that, compared to 1999, the 2007-2013 FF negotiations exhibited a 
more pronounced interest on the balance issue. Some officials55 argued that the situation was 
even clearer than in 1999 because the net contributors had expressed their positions well in 
advance, before the negotiations started. Even though in February 2004 the Commission 
proposed a package56
In December 2003 a group of six countries (Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, 
the UK and France) wrote a letter advocating a maximum of 1% of EU GNI for the EU budget. 
While it was not clear if the 1% referred to commitments or payments, as negotiations 
progressed, 1% became the reference for commitments with an equivalent 0.9% in payments – a 
 for the FF with an overall level of 1.26% of EU GNI in commitments and 
1.14% in payments, negotiations actually started much earlier in 2002 when the accession 
packages were agreed on with the candidate countries. Although the candidate countries were in 
a much weaker negotiating position and no issue-linkages per se were possible, the agreement 
reached in December 2002 fixed agricultural support until 2013 and technically eliminated the 
agriculture issue from the subsequent FF negotiations. However, as negotiations progressed, 
some member states thought about reopening negotiations to trade agriculture with other issues. 
                                                 
54 Interviews with Council and Commission officials, May-June 2006 and July 2007-February 2008. 
55 Interviews with Commission officials and former member state representatives that participated in the 2004-2005 
presidencies. 
56 Commission’s proposal changed the titles of headings, while keeping agriculture and structural aid as the most 
funded issues: the new Headings 1 and 2 contained sustainable development with cohesion and competitiveness and 
natural resources, respectively, Heading 3 was strengthening European citizenship and Heading 4 – Europe as a 
global partner. 
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dramatic cut in the budget57
For net beneficiaries, given that the deal on agriculture was closed, cohesion was the 
most salient issue. While net contributors argued that rich countries should support their poor 
regions, the beneficiaries equated cohesion with solidarity between all regions and citizens: more 
developed member states should help the less developed ones. Given that the funding available 
under cohesion was capped at 4% of GNI, most new member states fixed their ideal positions 
according to this figure: the Visegrad countries wanted an increase in the 4% (position 100 on 
cohesion), Letonia was very interested in receiving the full 4% (90) while Estonia was more 
interested in the innovation aspect of cohesion (80). 
. This letter is the evidence for the pressure exercised by enlargement 
on the preferences of net contributors. By announcing their positions ahead of the main rounds of 
negotiations, the net contributors signaled the high salience they attached to the balance issue, 
their low positions on the issue and their dissatisfaction with the status quo. In the group of six, 
the UK was the net contributor in the best position, as it received a huge correction through the 
UK rebate; the UK signed the letter to signal the high salience it attached to the UK rebate. Well 
aware that enlargement increased the UK rebate, France had opposing interest to the UK: it 
wanted to decrease its share in the financing of the UK rebate while still preserving the benefits 
from agricultural funding, hence its higher position on balance (60).  
The main effect of enlargement was that the older member states previously benefiting 
from cohesion were phased out due to the statistical effect, therefore their position was to 
maintain their pre-enlargement level of benefits (position 90 for Spain, Portugal and Greece). In 
                                                 
57 According to interviews with Commission officials, 1% in commitments and 0.9% in payments represented a 9 
billion Єuro cut in the 2007 budget as compared to 2006. 
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fact, the Commission wanted to avoid this conflict between old and new cohesion countries and 
proposed an approximate 50:50 division of funds58
After the May 2004 enlargement, the Irish and Dutch presidencies examined the 
Commission proposals in detail but did not start the real negotiations. The Dutch presidency 
proposed some ‘building blocks’ on different policies, with cohesion being the most important 
one, which in fact clarified the major issues to be negotiated and the ideal positions of member 
states
.  
59
The Luxembourg presidency was very active in organizing bilateral meetings, which 
facilitated the exchanges between pairs of actors on the main issues: cohesion and balance. As 
with the previous negotiations, in the position exchange model equation (1) is used to compute 
the expected outcome (the average of the positions weighted by salience) on both cohesion and 
balance, according to the compromise model; the predictions are position 53.46 on the balance 
issue and 79.12 on cohesion (the outcome on agriculture, previously decided, remains at 59.53). 
Players compute their expected utilities according to equation (2) and identify mutual beneficial 
exchanges, under the conditions that players are on opposite sides of the expected outcomes and 
attach different saliences to the issues traded. Table 3 shows the positions of the actors in relation 
to the expected outcomes and identifies the potential exchanges.  The difference in saliences 
determines the direction of trade – which actors will move more on which issues. As with the 
previous negotiations, the net contributors attach higher salience to the balance issue, therefore 
they are interested in shifting their positions on cohesion in exchange for obtaining support on 
. The first real rounds of negotiations started under the Luxembourg presidency in the 
first half of 2005.  
                                                 
58 Interviews with DG Budget officials, June 2006 and September-October 2007. 
59 Interviews with Dutch representatives in charge of budgetary matters, May 2006 and November 2007. 
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balance. As before, the potential trading partners are the net contributors – on the left side of the 
expected outcome – and the cohesion countries – on the right side, who attach a higher salience 
to cohesion than to balance. The most prominent exchange happens between the countries with 
the highest salience on both issues and the most extreme positions, Spain and the Netherlands. 
The Netherlands moves to Spain’s position on cohesion (90) and in exchange Spain moves 
towards the Dutch position on balance, ending up at position 68.1; the exchange rate is an equal 
utility gain of 43.99. The new predictions are 79.67 on cohesion and 52.97 on balance, calculated 
by applying equation (1) to the new positions. Similar exchanges happen between Spain and 
Germany, Spain and Sweden, such that Spain continues to drift towards the net contributors 
(through positions 44.3, 30.9) until it ends in position 14.2. Similar successive exchanges happen 
between pairs of net contributors and the Visegrad countries, Italy, Portugal, Greece, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Estonia. The new predictions are 82.01 on cohesion and 28.87 on balance. 
Table 3. Potential exchanges of positions 2004-2005 
Issue 2: agriculture 
 left right 
left Uk, Ge, Nl, Dk, Sw, 
Au, Fi, Be, Lx 
 
Issue 1: 
balance 
right Ma, Cy, Sl Fr, Gr, Ir, It, Sp, Pt, 
Po, Hu, Cz, Le, Lt, 
Es, Sk 
Issue 3: cohesion 
 left right 
left  Uk, Ge, Nl, Dk, Sw, 
Au, Fi, Be, Lx, Fr 
 
Issue 1: 
balance 
right Fr, Ir, Sl Gr, It, Sp, Pt, Po, Hu, 
Cz, Le, Lt, Es, Sk, 
Ma, Cy 
Issue 2: agriculture 
 left right 
left Uk, Ge, Nl, Dk, Sw, 
Au, Fi, Be, Lx, Sl,   
Fr, Ir  
Issue 3: 
cohesion 
right  
Ma, Cy 
Gr, It, Sp, Pt, Po, Hu, 
Cz, Le, Lt, Es, Sk 
 
 In spite of the fact that the Luxembourg presidency predicted an agreement, negotiations 
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failed on June 17, 2005. Luxembourg officials60 argued that in June 2005 the delegations were 
very close to an agreement, as the main differences on the overall level of FF had been 
smoothened out, with the exception of the UK who had declared that the approach on the UK 
rebate was unacceptable. As mentioned before, UK’s position was motivated by the fact that 
enlargement increased the benefits from the UK rebate and the UK wanted to keep those 
benefits. Montagnon61
From the point of view of the position exchange game, agreement was not obtained 
because member states had not exhausted all possibilities of trade that would increase their 
utilities. In fact, the UK had not been engaged in exchanges during the first half of 2005 and, like 
Germany in 1999, the UK used the opportunity of the presidency in the second half of 2005 to 
engage in issue-linkages. From this perspective, June 2005 marks the end of a negotiation round 
and the start of a new round.  
 (2006, 441) argues that the demand of budgetary reform, which meant a 
reform of agriculture, had not been previously debated and the UK used it in a surprising way to 
block an agreement in June 2005 and then decided not to analyze it in depth in order to increase 
the chances of agreement in December 2005 under the UK presidency.  
The next negotiation round started de facto in November 2005, when President Barroso 
sent a letter to the Presidents of the Council and the EP emphasizing the balance issue and its 
global character62
                                                 
60 Interview January 2008. 
; this letter mentioned the ‘clause de rendez-vous’ for the budgetary reform 
2008/2009. This was an opportunity for the UK to reopen the agriculture deal and trade the 
reform of agriculture with the UK rebate, since agriculture was the historic cause behind this 
correction mechanism. Since France was the country with the highest salience on agriculture, the 
61 Montagnon (2006) is citing officials involved in negotiations. 
62 Interview with Commission officials, February 2008. 
 119 
UK entered an exchange with France on balance and agriculture: France wanted the UK to 
decrease its compensation obtained through the UK rebate, whereas the UK wanted France to 
reform agriculture in order to reduce the EU funds spent on farmers. Consequently, the UK 
moves to France’s position on agriculture in successive stages and France moves towards the 
UK’s position on balance ending up at position 48.8; the utility gain is 53.69. The new prediction 
is 28.33 on balance and 60.07 on agriculture, calculated by applying equation (1) to the new 
positions.  
In order to estimate the predictive power of the position exchange model, one needs to 
test the predicted exchanges and the outcomes of the game (the old and new layers) with those 
that happened in negotiations. One interviewed official63
                                                 
63 Interview January 2008. 
 confirmed the utility of a weighted 
average model in computing the outcome and argued that the compromise proposed by the 
Luxembourg presidency – 1.056% of EU GNI – was indeed computed as a weighted average, 
taking into account the Commission proposal of 1.21% of EU GNI and the net contributors 
arguing for 1%. While it is difficult to compare the 28.87 outcome on balance in the 
Luxembourg negotiations with the Luxembourg package, one could compare the two outcomes 
with the initial positions. On one hand, given how close the 1.056% is to 1%, one could argue 
that the Luxembourg package was strongly influenced by the net contributors. On the other hand, 
the initial prediction of the ‘compromise’ model is 53.46, whereas the position exchange model 
predicts 28.87 for the Luxembourg compromise – a move of approximately 50% towards the net 
contributors. The magnitude of this distance is considerable compared to the distances between 
the outcomes and the initial positions on the other issues, therefore one could conclude that the 
position exchange model accurately predicts an outcome heavily favoring the net contributors. 
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The same is true about the final outcome of the game – 28.33 – and the final expenditure ceiling 
adopted for the 2007-13 FF – 1.045% of EU GNI (862.3 billion Єuro64 in commitments and 
0.99% EU GNI in payments – 819.4 billion Єuro). While interviews65 confirm that the actual FF 
outcome was driven by Germany, the prediction of the game shows a heavy influence by the net 
contributors. In fact, if one considers 1% as being close to 0 on the balance issue and 100 
representing 1.24% (maximum possible expenditure), then 28.33 would be equivalent to 
approximately 1.068%. It follows that the prediction error of the position exchange model 
applied to the FF negotiations is 0.023%. On the 0-100 scale, this prediction error66
The measure of institutional change – the layers added – reflected by the outcome is in 
favor of the net contributors as follows: while the rate on the VAT resource is frozen at 0.30%, 
Germany obtained a reduction of 0.15%, Austria 0.225%, and the Netherlands and Sweden 
0.10%; further, the contribution of the Netherlands is reduced with 605 million Єuro per year 
and that of Sweden with 150 million per year. (Montagnon 2006, 441 -442) This difference in 
layers/compensations obtained by the net contributors is further evidence for the fact that the 
exchanges took place between pairs of actors and did not involve the net contributors as a group. 
 is 9.43, 
smaller comparable to the average error of 23.4 reported by Arregui et al (2006, 143) for scale 
issues and 20 players. 
Empirical evidence also confirms that Luxembourg presidency favored bilateral talks and 
thus encouraged exchanges. The Netherlands and Sweden were extremely keen on obtaining 
money back on balance, the Netherlands had requested 1 billion Euro per year and so did 
                                                 
64 Since the initial proposal of the Commission was tabled in February 2004, all the figures are expressed in 2004 
prices to avoid further confusion. Given that the annual budgets are established in current prices, the Commission 
will make technical adjustments to the Financial Framework ceilings each year using a deflator of 2% a year. 
65 January-February 2008. 
66 On the 0-100 scale, the 1.045% outcome represents a point of 18.9, hence the prediction error is 28.33-18.9=9.43. 
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Sweden; since the most possible cuts were on cohesion, they were ready to trade; the Spanish 
officials were also keen on making issue linkages involving cohesion67. The other cohesion 
countries followed the examples of the Spanish in making issue linkages, with Poland being the 
most prominent example68
The exchange between the UK and France is empirically grounded in the successive 
exchanges that happened in December 2005. First, the UK proposed a 1.5 billion/year cut in the 
rebate, accompanied by a 10% cut in the regional aid to enlargement countries (as negative 
externality), in exchange of a reform of the system of direct payments in agriculture; then the UK 
offered a 8 billion cut for the entire period. In exchange for accepting the review of the budget 
and thus a reform of the agricultural system, France asked for a 14 billion cut in the UK rebate. 
The final deal agreed was a budget review 2008/2009 and a 12 billion cut – a 10.5 billion cut in 
the UK rebate and a reduction of 1.5 billion in the funding received by enlargement countries
. The shopping list containing 17 ‘cadeaux’ stipulating transition 
measures for cohesion is a result of the bilateral trades of the cohesion beneficiaries. 
69. 
To compensate for this negative externality that decreased the utility of new member states, and 
given that the UK rebate augments significantly as a result of enlargement – 15% increase in 
2004 and 64% in 2007-2013 – the rebate is not to be calculated on the agricultural expenditure 
for the new member states70
                                                 
67 Interviews with the Dutch and Spanish representatives, November 2007 and February 2008. 
. While the 2008/2009 budget review was intended to overhaul EU 
agricultural funds, given the influence of the net contributors on the outcome, there is a high 
likelihood they will take the opportunity to further influence the outcome in their favor.   
68 Interviews with the Polish representatives, May-June 2006 and October 2007. 
69 Financial Times December 2005. 
70 In 2003, 40% of the UK rebate represented agricultural expenditure, according to DG Budget officials. 
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The position exchange model predicts reasonably well the changes resulting from the two 
subsequent FF negotiations; in addition to emphasizing the role of power, embodied by the net 
contributors, it points out to the role of the EU presidency as a facilitator of issue-linkages and 
compromise packages. The reinforced institution of balance, with its adjacent institution of 
rebate incurs the most significant changes – the most important layer – hence its prominence as a 
vehicle of change. In 1999, before the big enlargement of 2004, the outcome of negotiations on 
balance was 41.17, whereas in 2005 the outcome decreased to 28.33, thus moving closer to the 
positions of net contributors. For a weighted average model, this difference between the two 
outcomes is substantial. While comparing the exchanges realized in 1999 and 2005, one could 
see that with more players more issue-linkages are possible (as the literature on issue-linkages 
argues) hence a larger scope for the influential players to draw agreement towards their preferred 
outcome.  
 
 123 
5.0  NEGOTIATIONS ON THE EU ANNUAL BUDGET – AN ANALYTICAL 
NARRATIVE 
5.1 THE EMBEDDED FRAMEWORK FOR EU BUDGETARY NEGOTIATIONS 
The EU annual budgetary negotiations are analyzed using a variation of the procedural 
bargaining model proposed by Crombez (1997)– a sequential game of complete information – 
that takes into account the formal rules for the EU budgetary procedure (as stipulated by Articles 
268 to 280 of the Treaty establishing the European Community). This model helps to 
characterize the set of annual budgetary equilibrium outcomes that can be adopted as a function 
of the ideal positions of the EU member states and the EP; like in the FF negotiations, some 
players are pivotal in influencing the agreement on the annual budgetary institutions. 
Similar to the bargaining model used for the FF negotiations, as a result of the 
endogenous mechanism of learning, all actors know each other’s ideal positions, the location of 
the status quo, and the rules of the game: before negotiations start, players state their positions, 
which are well known given the annual character of the game and the fact that there is little 
change in these positions from one year to the other.  Different from the FF negotiations, in this 
game the players are the Commission, the EP and the Council. All actors have Euclidean 
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preferences71
The ideal positions of the Commission and the EP are represented by the median
 over a one-dimensional policy space that represents the EU budget – a global issue 
similar to the ‘balance’ issue featuring in the FF game.  The assumption of unidimensionality is 
motivated by the fact that this game redistributes the margin available from the FF ceiling and 
there are no issue-linkages; each player’s strategy involves a proposal on a given redistribution 
of EU funds. 
72
                                                 
71 Each player has a most preferred outcome – her ideal positions and prefers policy outcomes that are closer to, 
rather than farther away from her ideal position. 
 
Commissioner (Com) and the median MEP (P), respectively. The policies that are closer to the 
median Commissioner’s ideal policy defeat any other policies in the Commission. Similarly, the 
median MEP stands for a policy that cannot be defeated in the EP. On the contrary, the Council 
is not represented as a unitary actor because it makes decisions by QMV; the Council’s position 
is represented by the countries pivotal under QMV. The QMV threshold represents 
approximately 71% of the total votes in the Council: between 1986 and 1994 (the first period), 
the QMV threshold was 54 votes; this number increased to 62 between 1995 and 2003 (the 
second period), due to the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, and then to 232 between 
2004-2006 (the third period) due to the accession of the ten new member states.  There are two 
pivotal countries under QMV: country 1 (C1) is the country that represents the blocking minority 
and is pivotal for a move to the right; it is the country with the 23rd vote from the left in the first 
period, 26th vote in the second and 90th in the third period. C1 and the countries to her right 
constitute a qualified majority.  Similarly, country 2 (C2) is pivotal for a move to the left; it is the 
country with the 54th, 62nd and 232nd vote from the left, respectively. Given the global character 
of the policy space and the fact that a move to the right represents an increase in the EU budget, 
72 According to Black’s median voter theorem. 
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one can easily see that C1 stands for a net beneficiary whereas C2 is a net contributor. As well, 
given that the number of votes needed for QMV increases with enlargement (from 54 to 62 and 
then to 232), the position and the influence on the outcome of the net contributor represented by 
C2 is strengthened by an increase in the number of votes. 
The first line in Figure 3 presents the configuration of ideal positions on the EU budget.  
Since the budget needs to be adjusted according to inflation, all players are placed to the right73 
of the status quo q – last year’s budget.  The Commission is located the farthest to the right74 
because it is the advocate of the highest expenditures for financing the EU policies; every year, 
the Commission proposes a high preliminary budget, although within the FF margins – the 
outcome XFF– and argues that, without proper financing, the Commission cannot do its job of 
implementing the EU policies.  There are three cases for the location of the EP and the two 
pivotal countries C1 and C2:  EP is situated to the left of C1 and C2, EP is situated to the right of 
C1 and C2 and EP is situated in between C1 and C2.   Given that solving for equilibria produces 
the same results in all three cases, I consider only the first situation75
 
.   
                                                 
73 Equation (1) used to compute the outcome of the FF negotiations also shows that the EU budget is bound to 
increase with enlargement. 
74 The outcome of the FF negotiations XFF is placed farther to the right of the Commission. 
75 The other two cases are presented in a footnote in the section describing the equilibrium.   
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Figure 3. Spatial representation of the annual budgetary game   
The strategies available to each actor and the stylized budgetary procedure are presented 
in Figure 4.   The Commission proposes a preliminary budget b, such that q < b < XFF.  Next, the 
Council, under QMV, can either reject b or accept it and propose its own modifications x; in case 
of rejection, the procedure ends with the status quo q.  x is sent to the EP, which by majority can 
either accept x , and the procedure ends, or amend it with b̀.  The amended b̀  is then presented in 
the Conciliation Committee. Next the Council moves:  by QMV it can either accept the 
amendments, case in which the game ends with the adoption of b̀, or reject the amendments and 
propose its own amendments b*; if accepted by a qualified majority, b* is sent to the EP; if b* is 
rejected by the Council, the reversion point is again q.  If the EP rejects b*, the reversion point is 
q, according to the provision of twelfths76
                                                 
76 If the budget is rejected, the provision of twelfths stipulates that, until the budget is adopted, the EU will function 
every month on a twelfth of last year’s budget.   
.  If b* is accepted by the EP, b* is the adopted budget 
and the outcome of the game. The set of possible amendments b̀ and b* are continuous intervals 
of the entire set of possible budgets delimited by the status quo and the ceiling XFF set by the FF: 
q< b̀ < XFF and q< b*< XFF. When the EP accepts the budget, the final outcome of the game 
reflects the Council’s preferences.  
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Figure 4. The Extensive form of the game    
The game described above is solved77 by using backwards induction and the concept of 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium78
                                                 
77 Crombez (1997) solves a different variant of the game in a similar way. 
; the equilibrium describes the optimal strategy for every 
player in every stage of the game, given the actions taken in prior stages.  Backwards induction 
requires that, when players make a proposal, they do not necessarily propose their ideal positions 
but think ahead of subsequent stages and propose something that actually can become the EU 
budget.   
78 The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium describes a strategy that satisfies the Nash equilibrium condition (is 
optimal) in every subgame of the game, including the game itself. 
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The last two stages of the game are reached if there is no agreement on amendments to b, 
case in which both the Council and the EP vote on b*.  If the EP and a qualified majority in the 
Council prefer b* to q, b* is approved and becomes the annual budget; the set of possible 
outcomes b* is described by the segment [q, 2P-q].  In the fourth stage, the Council compares b̀ 
(the amended b) to b*; if a qualified majority prefers b̀ to b*, the EP can successfully propose b̀ 
in the third stage, given that b̀ has the majority of EP.  In Figure 2, the segment [P, C2] 
represents the set of all possible outcomes b̀ and b*.  If b* is to the left of P (the ideal position of 
EP), the EP successfully proposes b̀  to the right of P (the EP, C1 and QMV in the Council prefer 
an outcome to the right of b̀).  If b* is to the right of C2, the EP successfully proposes b̀ to the 
left of C2 (the EP, C2, and QMV in the Council prefer an outcome to the left of b̀).  If b* is 
between P and C1, the EP cannot propose b̀ as the EP prefers policies to the left of b*, whereas 
QMV in the Council wants policies to the right of b*, hence the outcome of the game is b*.  If b* 
is between C1 and C2, it reaches the last stage of the game as QMV in the Council cannot agree 
on any policy change79
Proposition
.  In the second stage, the Council compares b* to q, and, since b* > q, the 
Council always accepts the Commission’s proposal.  In the first stage, the Commission proposes 
the b that is closest to her ideal position, such that b=C2. 
80
From this Proposition if follows that the Commission proposes a budget b* that both the 
EP and QMV in the Council prefer to q (there is no other b that the EP and the Council prefer to 
: The set b* є [P, C2] of budgets that can be adopted under the EU 
budgetary procedure is the set of proposals that the EP and a qualified majority in the Council 
prefer to the status quo and there are no other proposals the EP and the Council prefer to them. 
                                                 
79 The other two cases produce a similar solution.  When P is located between C1 and C2, [C1,C2] defines the 
solution set, with the difference that b̀, not b* is the adopted budget.  When P is located to the right of C1 and C2, 
the solution set is [C1,P], with the difference that [C1,C2) represents b̀ and [C2,P] describes b*. 
80 Proposition similar to those used by Crombez (1997) to solve the game. 
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b*).  In the second stage of the game, the Council approves b*, neither the EP nor the Council 
can amend it, therefore the proposal reaches the last two stages of the game where it is approved 
by both the EP and the Council. Since the Commission is the advocate of an increase in the 
budget, it will make a proposal from the segment [P, C2] that is closest to her position – the ideal 
position of country C2. 
As specified above, C2 is a member state pivotal for a move to the left that produces a 
lower budget, therefore it represents a net contributor. The likely outcome of the budget is the 
ideal position of C2, therefore C2 is the member state with the highest influence on the 
budgetary outcome. As more countries join the EU, the number of votes needed for QMV 
increases: before 1995, 54 votes were necessary, before 2004 the number increased to 62 and 
then to 232 after May 2004. This increase in the QMV strengthens the position of C2: not only 
does it influence the outcome, it becomes part of a more numerous coalition.  
The winset [P, C2] described by the proposition depends on the median voter in the EP. 
When the winset is small, the EP’s position becomes closer to that of C2, which influences 
agreement. The largest two European parties in the EP are the Christian Democrats and the 
Socialists. Even though these are European parties and behave somewhat differently than the 
traditional national parties, an increase in the number of Christian Democrats in the EP would 
move the position of P slightly to the left, as they favor more moderate budgets, whereas an 
increase in the number of Socialists would push P slightly to the right, as they advocate an 
increase in spending for the EU policies.  Empirically, the number of Christian Democrats has 
increased since the creation of the EU not only as a result of enlargement but also as a 
consequence of government changes in Europe.  However, when a country joins the EU, the total 
number of MEPs it brings to the EU is divided between its parliamentary parties, as the EP 
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election results usually mirror the party distribution in the Parliament of the acceding country81
 
.  
Given this dispersion, enlargement has a rather weak effect on the location of P, which changes 
only marginally: the EP’s influence on the budgetary outcome is not significant.   
5.2 NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE 2008 EU ANNUAL BUDGET AND THE 
EMPIRICAL TEST 
In order to test the predictions of the procedural game describing the EU annual budgetary 
procedure and the influence of the net contributors on the outcome I use a case study on the 2007 
negotiations for the 2008 EU budget. This case study on the annual budget is also intended to test 
the incremental change that each annual budgetary outcome represents. This analytical narrative 
is based on data gathered through interviews, document analysis and 'soaking and poking' – 
participation in the budgetary committees of the Council and the EP82
As pointed out in a previous section, the annual budgetary negotiations observe the 
ceilings established by the outcome of the FF negotiations and are mainly concerned with the 
. This study of the 2008 
budget is an appropriate choice because there were high distributional tensions in negotiations 
and the threat to have no agreement and thus no change was extremely credible. If endogenous 
and exogenous factors affect preferences and distributional benefits and increase the domination 
of net contributors in such a difficult case as the 2008 budget, than this effect is present in other 
cases of EU annual budgetary negotiations. 
                                                 
81 When a new country joins the EU, it organizes a special EP election in order to fill the positions of MEPs 
allocated by the Accession Treaty.  
82 The empirical research was conducted during the period July – December 2007 in Brussels.  
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redistribution of the margin available. The negotiations on the 2008 EU budget were centered on 
the margin available for financing the Galileo program that manages the European satellite 
navigation system. Launched in 2001, this program accumulated a delay of five years on its 
initial calendar and was confronted with difficulties regarding industrial governance and the 
transfer of risk to the private sector83. The Galileo joint undertaking launched a concession call 
in October 2003 and in July 2005 agreed to the creation of a consortium located in Toulouse and 
composed of eight partners84, most of them operating in the big member states. The concession 
contract negotiations, intended to decide the deployment and exploitation of the Galileo system, 
started in January 2006, with pronounced conflict on the division of responsibilities and the 
location of ground installations; at the beginning of 2007, negotiations came to a halt. In June 
2007, the Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Council acknowledged the failure of the 
concession contract negotiations and asked the Commission to present alternative proposals for 
the financing of Galileo. Further, the June 2007 European Council called on the Council to make 
a decision85
These developments transformed the 2008 annual budget negotiations into a debate on 
the redistribution of funds to finance Galileo. On 19 September 2007, the Commission proposed 
a revision of the FF to increase the financing of Galileo
 in the fall.  
86
                                                 
83 Commission Communication COM/2007/0261. 
 (proposal b in the game). The 
Commission claimed 3.4 billion Euro additional funding for a Galileo full operational capability 
by 2013, out of which only 1 billion is stipulated by the FF, the remaining 2.4 billion to be 
obtained by an increase in the FF ceilings. This implied an increase in the ceiling of heading 1A 
– ‘Competition for growth and employment’, where Galileo and the European Institute of 
84 The eight partner companies are: AENA, Alcatel, EADS, Finmeccanica, Hispasat, Inmarsat, Thales and TeleOp. 
85 This decision is subject to QMV. 
86 Commission Communication COM/2007/0534. 
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Technology (EIT) are included, by 2 409 million Euro for 2008-2013, while decreasing with the 
same amount headings 2 – ‘Preservation and management of natural resources’ and 5 – 
‘Administration’ for 2007 and 2008. In addition, a redeployment of 300 million Euro from the 7th 
Research Framework Program – the transport section was granted in favor of research funding 
for Galileo and 309 million Euro for the financing of EIT. Even though the Commission claimed 
that this proposed redistribution did not require additional funding, in practice it increased 
member states’ contributions because it used an unusual amount of the margin of the FF 
(otherwise left mostly unspent). This was motivated by the fact that Galileo was crowded out by 
enlargement expenditure in headings 2 and 5. 
The Commission’s proposal was strongly supported by the EP, which conditioned the 
negotiations on the 2008 budget, in particular the success of the November 23 conciliation 
meeting (acceptance of b*), on finding a favorable solution for the financing of Galileo. The 
Council disagreed with the approach of the Commission and urged it to draft a different proposal 
that did not increase the ceilings of the FF (in this respect b=q and the Commission considers a 
new proposal). The EP was willing to revise the FF but opposed any form of inter-governmental 
funding proposed by the Council and the financing of Galileo from the redistribution of funds 
under heading 1A. On 25 October, in the first reading the EP voted the following ‘asterisk’ 
amendments (b̀): for the financing of Galileo and EIT—739.1 million Euro (higher than the FF 
ceilings for heading 1A); it placed in reserve some administrative and operational budget lines, 
to be released under certain conditions; it voted a series of Pilot projects and Preparatory actions 
and it restored the amounts cut by the Council in first reading (x) for heading 2 – ‘Preservation 
and management of natural resources’ and decentralized agencies; on heading 3A, the EP 
increased appropriations for the Frontex agency; on heading 4, it reduced the CFSP budget by 40 
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million (20%) to be used for external under-funded programs; it also included 47 million for 
Kosovo and Palestine. The total budget amount proposed by the EP was 129.69 billion Euro in 
commitment appropriations and 124.2 billion in payment appropriations (0.99% of EU GNI). 
In the second reading, the Council responded to the EP’s amendments by maintaining the 
Council’s first reading amount for headings 1, 2, 3B and 4 (proposed b*=x) and added 85 million 
for the CFSP mission in Kosovo but accepted the appropriations proposed for Frontex (heading 
3A). The Council also released a declaration arguing for the funding of Galileo within heading 
1A. The total amount proposed by the Council (proposal b*>x) was 127.92 billion in 
commitments and 118.66 in payments (0.94% of EU GNI). 
Some of the net contributors favored a redeployment within heading 1 A to finance 
Galileo (and the EIT). The UK, Sweden and the Netherlands signed a declaration87 requesting 
the Commission to seek redistribution of funds within heading 1A. Germany also supported a 
redistribution within heading 1A. In the beginning, Germany proposed that the additional 2.4 
billion for Galileo could be financed either by national contributions of the member states and 
the European Space Agency (ESA) or by 50% national and ESA contributions and 50% from 
heading 1A - the additional 700 million from unused commitment appropriations within heading 
1A88
                                                 
87 Available in the meetings of the Budget Committee of the Council, October 2007. 
. With the support of the net contributors, the proposal of redistribution within heading 1A 
met the QMV threshold in the Council’s first reading. On the contrary, Austria had a singular 
position, as it did not support a reprioritization within heading 1A, claiming that Galileo cannot 
be treated as more important than programs like the Research FP or the Trans-European 
Networks; Austria called into question the total of 3.4 billion requested, emphasizing the lack of 
an appropriate assessment of the risks (and costs) implied by Galileo. In their turn, France, 
88 COMBUD 243/07 used in the Budget Committee of the Council (October 2007). 
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Spain, Poland and Greece did not agree with a reduction in ceiling 2 for agriculture, Ireland, 
Finland, the Czech Republic, Romania and Poland agreed with a redeployment within heading 
1A, Finland and Latvia argued for a use of heading 1A margin, Spain was for a financing of 
Galileo from the 7th FP and Belgium and Luxembourg continued their tradition of supporting the 
Commission89
The most important issue to be solved between the Council and the EP was the funding of 
Galileo and the EIT and to a lesser extent the CFSP appropriations for Kosovo. As predicted by 
the game, if agreement is reached in the conciliation meeting, than the last two stages of the 
game are not reached. This prediction is supported empirically: agreement was reached in the 
conciliation meeting: 120.35 billion in payments – 0.96% of EU GNI – (285.25 million for 
CFSP, as requested by the Council, out of which 70 million mobilized by the flexibility 
instrument, as requested by the EP). The agreement stipulated the revision of the 2007-2013 FF 
to finance Galileo as follows: 400 million from the transport section of 7th Research Framework 
Program, 200 million redeployed within heading 1A, 300 million from the FF margin for 
heading 1A in 2008-2013; 1600 million increase in heading 1A commitments (2008-2013) offset 
by the same amount in commitments for heading 2 for 2007 (a reduction in agriculture was 
accepted only for 2007, a particularly good year for European agriculture and thus for taxpayers). 
For the 2008 budget, Galileo obtained 940 million in commitments (151 were already in the 
Commission’s initial proposal for 2008, 50 million from 7th FP and 200 million from the 
flexibility instrument) and 300 million in payments (100 million already in the proposal) and the 
EIT received 2.9 million (same amount as the Council’s first reading).  
. 
                                                 
89 Participation in the meetings of the Budget Committee of the Council (September – December 2007). 
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The annual budgetary outcome represents incremental change. While the final agreement 
on Galileo contains some elements from the proposal of the Commission – i.e. the reduction in 
heading 2 ceilings offset by an increase in heading 1 and redistribution from the transport section 
of the 7th FP – it is dominated by the positions of the net contributors – use of margins and 
redeployment within heading 1A – who refused to increase their contributions to the budget. 
This outcome is consistent with the predictions of the procedural game on the annual budgetary 
negotiations: knowing the equilibrium of the game, the Commission will propose country C2’s 
ideal point, as this proposal will meet the QMV threshold.  
The agreement on Galileo represents the ideal position of three net contributors who 
formed the center of the QMV coalition. The position of these net contributors (use of margin 
and redeployment within heading 1A of the FF) is an effect of the exogenous shock of 
enlargement and the endogenous mechanism of reinforcement and learning about preferences 
and distributive implications. In the annual budget, the mechanism that is reinforced is the FF 
itself, through its margin, hence the insistence of net contributors to maintain as large a margin as 
possible but use the margin instead of an increase in the FF ceilings, which would have meant an 
increase in their contributions to the EU budget. Given that Galileo was a European priority, the 
alternative to a FF revision would have been intergovernmental financing, which would have 
increased the financial burden of the net contributors even further, thus undermining instead of 
reinforcing the institution of balance. The outcome of negotiations shows that the FF is an 
institution that reinforces itself in the annual budgetary procedure: an increase of the FF ceilings 
is not possible and the role of the annual budget is to redistribute funds within the FF ceilings in 
order to finance European projects. The link between the distributional benefits insured by the 
FF outcome and the annual budget becomes explicit: in the FF, net contributors claim 
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distributional compensations, whereas in the annual budget they try to maintain as large a margin 
as possible in order to preserve the benefits deriving from these compensations. 
The Commission opposed the positions of the net contributors, as it considered that the 
heading 1 A margin should be left unallocated to accommodate any unforeseen events; as well, 
the Commission opposed a redeployment within heading 1A, arguing that the programs under 
this heading are subject to co-decision and therefore very difficult to renegotiate90. The final 
agreement is accompanied by a declaration stating that the outcome on Galileo (redeployment 
but no increase in FF ceilings) does not constitute a precedent and “the use of funds from the 
margin of the previous year is an exceptional measure and will in no way set a precedent for 
future revisions.”91
While in the annual budget net contributors try to maintain as large a margin as possible 
in order to preserve their distributional benefits, the EP wants to increase expenditures, therefore 
every year the EP proposes a full use of the margins: officials working on the budget argue that 
the annual procedure is in fact a battle on the margins
 However, it should be noted that budgetary discipline requires that the 
margins should be exhausted before the flexibility instrument could be used; therefore the 300 
million increase in the margin represents a match for the mobilization of the flexibility 
instrument in the funding of Galileo, thus preserving the interests of the net contributors. 
92
                                                 
90 Participation in the meetings of the Budget Committee of the Council (September – December 2007). 
. While there is always a net contributor 
that is pivotal for a decrease of the budget, a country that is not a net contributor is less 
influential on the annual outcome: on the 2007 budget for instance, Finland insisted on reducing 
the number of administrative posts allocated to the European institutions; even though it held the 
91 Council Document 15717/07. 
92 Interviews with officials working on the budget. 
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Presidency of the Council and thus managed to push the issue high up on the Council’s agenda, it 
failed to influence the outcome93
                                                 
93 Interviews with officials working on the budget. 
. 
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6.0  CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER IMPLICATIONS 
6.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
This dissertation proposed and tested a dynamic model of institutional change that analyzed the 
exogenous and endogenous factors that contributed to changes in preferences and distributional 
implications of institutional arrangements; the exogenous factors are economic – a difference in 
levels of economic development – and political –EU enlargement. The endogenous processes 
identified are learning – awareness of a change in preferences and benefits – and reinforcement 
of institutions that are part of the older institutional arrangement but have the potential to 
restore/increase distributional benefits for the disadvantaged players. The theory related these 
endogenous and exogenous gradual changes to changes in institutional equilibria, initiated by the 
inconsistency between preferences and benefits obtained from (past) agreements: the players 
whose benefits decrease push for renegotiating the institutional bargain that is no longer in 
equilibrium. The game theoretical bargaining model demonstrated how renegotiation is realized 
through issue-linkages and how the most powerful players obtain an outcome as close as possible 
to their preferences. The outcome of (re)negotiations is characterized by layering – the co-
existence of old and new institutions that are added as a result of the influence of the 
disadvantaged players. 
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The empirical evidence presented in Chapters 4 and 5 supports the propositions of the 
model, showing that institutions-as-equilibria create strategic opportunities for institutional 
change. When the FF is negotiated, every five to seven years, depending on the time horizon of 
the negotiators, dramatic changes occur. On the contrary, in the EU annual budgetary 
negotiations changes are incremental, at the margin left by the FF, which in this case represents 
institutions-as-constraints.  
The analytical narratives of the last two FF negotiations show that the exogenous political 
factor of enlargement and the lower degree of economic development of the newer member 
states led to a change in the preferences of the net contributors, enabled by a deterioration of the 
implications of the FF. The endogenous mechanism of reinforcement made the ‘balance’ issue 
more salient and pointed to the rebate as an equilibrium solution. Net contributors became aware 
of a change in preferences and distributional benefits and, at the moment of FF renegotiation, 
used issue-linkage to restore their advantages; they managed to obtain an outcome as close as 
possible to their preferences. This dominance of the net contributors is also revealed in the 
annual budgetary negotiations, where institutions change incrementally, within the margin 
stipulated by the FF. Last but not least, the empirical results prove the dual face of isntitutions: 
while the FF outcomes represent institutions-as-equilibria, they act as institutions-as-constraints 
for the annual budget. 
In spite of the realization of both significant and incremental change, the empirical 
findings underline the fact that past/locked-in institutions coexist with new ones, as a result of 
the process of layering. This is to say that the new equilibrium that emerges does not represent a 
complete break with the past but contains some elements of continuity. It is fair to say that the 
net payers are the masters of both continuity and change, as they managed to keep a low level of 
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EU finances – very close to 1% – and succeeded to obtain correction mechanisms that reduced 
their financial burden. 
The analytical narratives on the FF negotiations test the predictions of the bargaining 
model and the impact of the differences in preferences and payoffs on the institutional outcome. 
In addition to the implications for institutional change, the last FF negotiations can be taken as an 
example of how a heterogeneous collective body solves the problem of resource allocation: the 
exchanges that happen during negotiations are such that the net contributors give up their 
position on cohesion in exchange for the net beneficiaries agreeing to move on balance towards 
the positions of the net contributors. Because the balance issue is an institution that represents the 
overall size of the budget, an outcome on this issue that is close to the position of the net 
contributors gives the measure of their bargaining success. This influence of the net contributors 
on the size of the budget and its institutions does not imply that the players with high salience on 
agriculture and cohesion are not influential on the respective issues. On the contrary, given the 
directions of the exchanges, the outcomes on those two issues are influenced by the net 
beneficiaries; however, the magnitude of this influence (computed as the difference between the 
initial prediction of the ‘compromise model’ and the final prediction of the game) is much 
smaller and it represents the concessions (‘shopping list’) obtained by the net beneficiaries.  
The analytical narrative on the EU annual budget shows a residual influence of the net 
contributors on the distribution of the margin between the actual expenditure and the FF ceilings. 
In spite of the small magnitude of the margin, the net contributors maintain their influence on the 
outcome. When compared to the unanimity rule that governs the FF negotiations, the influence 
of the net contributors follows a different dynamic due to the fact that the voting rule for the 
annual budget is QMV. The prediction of the procedural game rightly shows that the net 
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contributors succeed in influencing agreement by building a coalition on their conservative 
preferences. Specifically, the analytical narrative on the 2008 budget proves that the outcome on 
the funding of the Galileo program was highly influenced by the preferences of the net 
contributors. 
6.2 CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE 
This dissertation improves our understanding of political processes and outcomes. By explaining 
both radical and incremental change, it contributes to the literature that has attempted to explain 
institutional change – a complex process whose complexity has eluded most political scientists. 
Most importantly, the empirical findings explain how locked-in institutions can be changed, in 
spite of high competition for scarce resources; besides exogenous and endogenous factors, the 
distribution of benefits and the power of players are the defining factors that affect institutional 
change. Players bargain for the distributional implications of the institutions-as-equilibria and 
institutional change occurs through renegotiation, as each actor wants to scrap the rules that are 
no longer advantageous and create new ones that bring more benefits. The asymmetries of power 
are reflected by the outcome, as the final agreement is determined by the players with more 
resources who advance the rules closer to their distributional preferences.  
The game theoretical elements of the dissertation show that the dynamic component that 
has been long missing in bargaining games can be added by simply allowing preferences and 
payoffs to vary; in this way, the rational choice oversight of taking preferences as given is 
avoided. Further, the classical notion of preferences is enriched through the conception of two 
input variables that represent preferences: a player’s position on an issue and the salience it 
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attaches to the issue negotiated. The specificity of the bargaining and procedural games 
presented by this dissertation allows a logical and precise description of players’ strategies in 
every round of negotiations, their influence on one another through issue-linkages, and their 
influence on the final outcome.  
This dissertation enriches the historical institutionalist literature with an analysis of both 
exogenous and endogenous mechanisms of change. While institutions represent the equilibria of 
bargaining games, economic and political exogenous factors and the endogenous mechanisms of 
learning and reinforcement work gradually in between the moments in which new equilibria are 
constructed. This dynamic account of institutional change proves that time matters not only for 
stability but also for change.  
In the realm of the European Union studies, this dissertation advances our understanding 
of EU budgetary procedures but also of mechanisms that affect member states’ interests and 
benefits deriving from European integration. First, the bargaining and procedural models 
proposed contain specifications of EU decision-making that could be applied to other legislative 
negotiations, thus accommodating the search for generalizations in political science.  
Second, the empirical findings add to the explanations of European integration, in 
particular economic and financial integration. The story of the EU budgets shows how 
integration has progressed through the EU budget and how it was affected by enlargement. The 
findings are also telling on prospects of future enlargements for both old and new members: a 
country that joins the union as a net contributor could have a significant impact on the dynamics 
of the EU budgetary negotiations, whereas a potential net beneficiary could further polarize the 
issue of balance.  
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Third, while the budget is small compared to national budgets and has little 
macroeconomic significance for the Union, it represents a very important autonomous source of 
financing for the European policies. These European policies have had a tremendous impact on 
the development of EU member states, hence the acrimonious battles over the ‘tiny’ pool that is 
the EU budget. The results of EU budgetary negotiations demonstrate that any increase in this 
pool would have to be initiated by the net contributors.  
Fourth, this dissertation increases the transparency of EU budgets and EU decision-
making by explaining the interplay between intergovernmental and supranational institutions. 
While it is difficult to obtain an exact account of what happened, some theoretical lenses like 
rational choice historical institutionalism could be useful for understanding EU decision-making. 
In particular, the outcomes of the EU budgetary negotiations prove that the intergovernmental 
aspect of EU decision-making is critical. This is a lesson that the supranational bodies, the 
Commission and the EP could profit from if they want to increase their influence on EU policy 
outcomes. In particular, the facilitator role of the Council Presidency is a good model to follow: 
the Commission and the EP could try to boost their power by facilitating issue-linkages in a 
manner similar to that of the presidency in the FF negotiations. 
From an international relations perspective, this dissertation adds to the negotiation 
models that have tried to explain how preferences and institutional constraints are translated into 
equilibrium outcomes. The preferences of actors and the distributive payoffs accompanying the 
agreement are critical for determining political outcomes: the goal of every player is to obtain an 
outcome as close as possible to her preferences. The solution offered by the EU budgetary 
negotiations enriches the negotiations literature by offering a model for the allocation of scarce 
resources in spite of high political conflict and an increased heterogeneity of players. Obtaining 
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agreement through issue-linkage is a good solution in politically difficult bargaining situations 
and could be replicated in other situations where players have equal weights (i.e. unanimity is the 
voting rule).  
Last but not least, it is worth pointing out that the explanations of institutional change 
offered by this dissertation cannot explain every case of institutional change. In particular, 
because the model proposed depends on exogenous and endogenous factors affecting preferences 
and payoffs, it cannot explain how change happens in an institutional arrangement that does not 
have distributional implications. As well, the model proposed cannot explain a case where 
preferences change but the distributional benefits deriving from an agreement do not vary and it 
leaves open the question of what happens if only some exogenous or endogenous mechanisms, 
but not all are at work. 
6.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR SUBSEQUENT FF NEGOTIATIONS 
The main lesson for any EU budgetary negotiations/reform is twofold. First, while change in the 
annual budget is incremental, the FF negotiations provide the opportunity for radical change. 
Second, in any reform, old and new must coexist. In addition but similar to the renegotiation 
clause that exists in every FF, the 2007-2013 FF contains a clause for future change – the 
2008/2009 budgetary review. This represents the resolution to undertake a wide-ranging budget 
review in 2008/09, covering all aspects of both spending – including the CAP – and resources – 
including the UK rebate. This is testimony of the fact that the distributional benefits are expected 
to deteriorate and the member states mostly affected wanted to ensure that renegotiation would 
be timely such that the benefits could be restored/reinforced. The presence of the budgetary 
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review clause in the final agreement also shows that the learning process has reached maturity 
and those affected by exogenous and endogenous factors have learned to better protect their 
interests.  
Due to its potential for institutional change, the 2008/2009 budget review represents an 
important element in the European construction. The EU budget review was effectively launched 
in September 2007 with a public consultation inviting all interested parties to express their views 
on the matter94
The current structure and implementation of the EU budget is highly redistributive and 
not necessarily related to actions justified at EU level. One of the main restraining factors for the 
EU in a globalized world is the disconnection between the EU policies and their financing. While 
the launching of the Lisbon Strategy was an important step towards coping with the dynamics of 
globalization, the financial resources available at the EU level – approximately 1% of EU GNI – 
are minor when compared to the size of national budgets – 40 to 50% of the national GNI.  
. In November 2008, the Commission also organized a public conference on the 
results of the public consultation. However, at the moment uncertainty is very high regarding 
both the political willingness and the content of the reform. 
This dissertation emphasizes the possibility of change that can be applied to the EU budget 
review; most importantly, it prescribes that radical change can be obtained only in the FF 
negotiations, and not otherwise. The 2008/2009 budgetary review has the task of proposing 
change and this change is bound to take into account the diverging preferences of the EU actors. 
While net contributors are extremely influential in obtaining change in the form of distributive 
corrections, this does not mean that all budgetary institutions can be changed. It is fair to say that 
                                                 
94 As part of the consultation process, the Bureau of European Policy Advisers of the European Commission 
organized an academic conference in April 2008 on the EU public finances and a series of 4 workshop in January-
March 2009 on the possibility of changing the EU budget. 
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some parts of the budgetary framework are difficult to change, for example the governance of the 
EU budget– the rule of unanimity voting in the FF negotiations. However, the so-called 
‘passarelle clause’ of the Lisbon Treaty tries to offer a solution of change for this governance 
problem: while the decisions on own resources still require unanimity in the Council, the Council 
may act by qualified majority on the FF but only following a unanimous decision of the 
European Council. 
There have been some proposals to change the EU budget. The Boege and Sapir Reports 
(2004) propose reforms of the main EU policies. The authors argue that there should be a shift in 
spending from redistributive agricultural and structural programs to public goods provision, 
which would be welfare-enhancing. The Sapir Report recommends that 45% of total spending 
should be used for public goods (especially in infrastructure and research), 35% for industrial 
convergence and only 20% for restructuring programs including agriculture. The Boege Report 
proposes changes on the revenue side – 25% co-financing by member states of EU agricultural 
spending; if total EU spending remains stable, this should increase the room for EU spending on 
public goods and moderate member states’ incentives to ask for more EU spending. 
Another possibility for change is the introduction of a new, separate public goods budget 
encompassing all or a subgroup of member states and based on individual contributions rather 
than general rate based payments. This new budget could be implemented by using the existing 
option of enhanced cooperation; the member states agreeing on a separate provision of public 
goods should not only profit from the benefits of these goods, they should also bear their costs. 
There should be an individual right of termination, so that member states could commit in the 
short-term but drop out in the long term if they so wish. To make sure that pareto-improving 
public goods projects are supported, every member state should have the right to propose new 
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projects within the public good budget. (Blankart and Koester 2009) However, one needs to be 
aware that there are management problems created by funds outside the EU budget, like the 
management of the European Development Fund has demonstrated.  
Coalition theory argues that the larger the size of the winning coalition, the more public 
goods are provided; the smaller the coalition for changing the status quo, the higher the chance 
for pork barrel. According to this theory, given that the EU has a high threshold for changing the 
status quo (like the US), the likelihood for producing public goods at European level increases. 
However, put in historical perspective, this theory implies that there are public goods already 
provided at EU level and financed through the EU budget. Some existing policies, like the 
cohesion policy or the neighborhood policy are redistributive but to some extent could be 
considered public goods. 
A question that could be raised is if the agreement on producing public goods at 
European level is a zero-sum game. One could argue that public goods cannot be clearly 
separated from redistribution: member states will still have a distributive interest in European 
public goods, as the public goods that should be provided at European level are those that 
member states cannot produce efficiently (the subsidiarity test). Since public goods have a 
distributive component, a political debate in the context of economic and political integration is 
necessary in order to decide which European public goods should be financed from the EU 
budget.   
A more realistic proposal for change is to increase the flexibility of the FF. The FF 
establishes ceilings for each heading of expenditure, while the annual budgetary procedure 
determines the spending in each category. However, historical evidence shows that actual 
spending is below the authorized spending ceilings agreed under the FF. The case study on the 
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annual budget demonstrates that proposals for revising the FF ceilings due to unforeseen events 
occur in the annual budgetary negotiations. Further evidence in this respect is the most recent 
Commission proposal to revise the FF in order to provide additional resources for the European 
Recovery Plan. To account for the unspent margins of the FF ceilings, Buti and Nava (2008) 
propose a 'constrained flexibility' clause to allow flexibility across different headings of the FF 
and accross different years. This proposal implies that the total ceilings of the FF should be 
respected for the overall period of the FF, rather than in every single year; in this way, the overall 
size of the multi-annual package is preserved but an increase in a ceiling in a given year could be 
compensated by a decrease in another ceiling or in a different year. This flexibility has the 
advantage that it would allow the reallocation of expenditure towards Lisbon-related programs.   
Another alternative for change in the EU budget is the channeling of some independent 
resources to the EU budget. There are some true EU resource that belong to the EU level, 
therefore they should be included in the budget: the two most obvious examples are the receipts 
from the emissions trading scheme and the monetary income of the European Central Bank. 
(Begg et al 2008) However, one could make a case for the independence of these resources: the 
climate change package could be viewed as an example of a common interest – i.e. public good – 
that has a successful mechanism outside the EU budget that generates resources, therefore one 
could question the need to integrate it in the EU budget. 
Last but not least, the EU budget could be changed to have a macroeconomic role, i.e. a 
role in the financial and economic crisis. One possibility in this respect could be the creation of a 
‘rainy-day’ fund, an enhanced globalization fund or a solidarity fund that could channel aid 
through the EU budget. (Begg et al 2008) This ‘rainy-day’ fund could be built up in good times 
and spent in bad times and it could be financed either by individual contributions of member 
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states or through some European tax. However, such a fund could raise problems related to 
political control and the temptation to spend the money in good times.  
 The goal of this dissertation was to explain institutional change in the EU decision-
making and to determine how preferences of member states change over time and translate into 
institutional outcomes. The theory on how institutions-as-equilibria change provides a 
compelling account for these processes. This research will act as a catalyst for scholars who will 
seek to better understand how institutions change, particularly how institutions go in and out of 
equilibrium 
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